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Abstract 
MUSIC IN (EN)ACTION  
SENSE-MAKING AND NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY OF MUSICAL EXPERIENCE 
 
by  
 
Andrea Schiavio 
 
 
The aim of this work is to lay the basis of a post-Cartesian cognitive science of music. Traditional 
psychology of music often adopts a theoretical framework in line with the dualistic stance 
characterising the Cartesian approach, which implies a separation between mind and matter or, in 
its materialistic version, a separation between brain and body. I criticize such a paradigm on the 
basis of theoretical and empirical evidence, showing that alternative models of human musicality 
offer more plausible explanations without any dichotomy between objective/subjective and 
internal/external. The thesis that I will defend throughout this work holds that musical cognition is 
not something that occurs in our head. Rather, it is a process that extends beyond the boundaries of 
skull and skin, being constituted by the dynamic interplay between embodied agents and the 
environment in which they are embedded. I will defend such a claim through an interdisciplinary 
approach that lies at the intersection of different fields of research (cognitive neuroscience, 
philosophy of mind, phenomenology) and by providing an original interpretation of the enactive 
paradigm that emerged during the last decade of the Twentieth Century in the realm of cognitive 
science.  
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Chapter 1 
Ghosts, dreams and nightmares1 
 
 
Neurophysiologists, most of them, are still under the influence of dualism, however 
much they deny philosophizing. They still assume that the brain is the seat of the mind. 
To say, in modern parlance, that it is a computer with a program, either inherited or 
acquired, that plans a voluntary action and then commands the muscles to move is only 
a little better than Descartes’ theory, for to say this is still to remain confined within the 
doctrine of responses 
 
-  James Gibson, The ecological approach to visual perception  
 
 
Too often […] the older dualism of soul and body has been replaced by that of the brain 
and the rest of the body  
 
- John Dewey, Democracy and education  
 
 
1.1 - Introduction. Reconceptualizing the mind 
 
 
The thesis that I offer in this work holds that musical cognition is not something that occurs 
purely in our head. Rather, it’s a process that reaches out beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, 
being constituted by the dynamic interplay between embodied agents and the environment in which 
they are embedded. I will defend this claim by means of the employment of an interdisciplinary 
approach that lies at the intersection of different fields of research (cognitive neuroscience, 
philosophy of mind, phenomenology, music cognition) and by providing an original interpretation 
of the enactive paradigm that emerged during the last decade of the Twentieth Century in the realm 
of cognitive science (Varela et al., 1991).  
Generally, this dissertation can be seen as an attempt to provide a biologically plausible 
interpretation of the basis of human musicality. Dealing extensively with theoretical argumentations 
as well as empirical data I will critically analyse part of the current literature on music psychology 
and propose an alternative view on a variety of themes related to how human beings experience and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This chapter contains material previously published as Schiavio, A. (2012). Constituting the musical object. A 
neurophenomenological perspective on musical research. In Teorema, 31(3), pp. 63-80.  Moreover, it contains material 
from the following article in preparation: Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in preparation). An enactive perspective on 
infants’ musicality.	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make sense of music. In these terms, my purpose is firstly to show how some leftovers from 
Cartesianism vitiate the current scientific study of musicality, and only secondarily do I try to 
convince the reader that what I address is the right way to overcome such a tradition. Finally, I lay 
out the philosophical and empirical implications of investigating music cognition through a 
different - enactively grounded - approach. To my mind, it is a prerogative of a modern science of 
music cognition to integrate its own advances with a continuous and rigorous confrontation of the 
results obtained by the new perspectives on the nature of the mind. During the last years, in fact, 
cognitive science has witnessed the foundation and development of different, yet intrinsically 
related, perspectives that aimed to reconceptualise our understanding of the mind and subjectivity. 
These approaches, labelled embodiment, externalism, embedment and enactivism are all committed 
to build up a new science of mind (Foolen et al., 2012), putting together empirical and theoretical 
evidences from many different disciplines. A post-Cartesian cognitive science of music, therefore, 
cannot avoid a deep confrontation with the main themes and perspectives that characterise such a 
new and challenging framework. Not only, in fact, will its critical analysis surely contribute to 
improving our understanding of human musicality, but the study of how a cognizer makes sense of 
music can also shed light on many aspects that traditional cognitive science might ignore. 
Perception, generally, is mostly treated in terms of visual perception, and a critical 
phenomenological analysis of other perceptual domains, enriched by the recent advances in 
cognitive science, is still missing.  
The main aim of the scholars who modelled and developed the theoretical frameworks at the 
basis of the new science of mind is to propose a decentralization of cognition from one’s head, by 
focusing on how the bodily power of action and its situated coupling with the environment play a 
constitutive role in mental processes. Many contemporary authors maintain a position for which 
‘the human mind is embodied in our entire organism and embedded in the world, and hence is not 
reducible to structures inside the head’ (Thompson, 2005, p. 409). This shared standpoint radically 
challenges the paradigm that has dominated cognitive science from the second half of the last 
century: cognitivism. This latter view, broadly speaking, holds that an agent’s mind can be seen as a 
computer, as it assumes that mental phenomena ‘are effective or algorithmic processes in the sense 
of computability theory, i.e. processes that - according to Church’s Thesis - compute partial 
recursive (or, equivalently, Turing-computable) functions’ (Cordeschi & Frixione, 2007, p. 38). 
According to this standpoint, the realm of the mind begins and ends up inside the boundaries of the 
skull. In contrast, all these new approaches take a different direction, rejecting the mind-computer 
metaphor that characterises the cognitivistic perspective as well as its Cartesian presuppositions. 
Proponents of the mainstream cognitive standpoint - as we will see - share with Descartes a 
particular view on the nature of mind. A view that is no longer sustainable: ‘The Cartesian tradition 
is mistaken in supposing that the mind is an inner entity of any kind, whether mind-stuff, brain 
states, or whatever. Ontologically, mind is much more a matter of what we do within environmental 
and social possibilities and bounds. Twentieth-century anti-Cartesianism thus draws much of mind 
out, and in particular outside the skull’ (van Gelder, 1995, p. 380). In order to get a very basic and 
superficial idea of these anti-Cartesian views, we could introduce the following, intuitive, 
assumptions  
 
 
• Cognition does not depend solely on brain processes, but results from structures widely 
distributed across the whole body of a living system (the mind is embodied).  
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• Cognition arises from interactions with the (social and physical) environment, being a 
category actively immersed in the world (the mind is embedded).   
 
• Cognition can reach beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, integrating resources internal 
and external to the animal (the mind is extended). 
 
• Cognition is sense-making, being an emergent, skilful know-how, constituted by embedded 
and embodied forms of interactions between a self-organized living system and its 
environment. Through this dynamic interplay, the creature enacts or brings forth its own 
domain of meaning (the mind is enacted). 
 
 
It is quite often assumed that these paradigms could theoretically be endorsed all together as a 
whole, hence defining a ‘4 Es’ approach (Ward & Stapleton, 2012). According to this standpoint, 
saying that the mind is Enacted, would automatically imply that the mind is also Embodied, 
Embedded and (at least potentially) Extended. I agree only in part. The position that I will defend in 
this thesis draws from all of these paradigms, taking from each of them some of their main aspects 
and standpoints. However, I will not embrace all of them at the same time. In fact, the variety of 
externalist proposals (Hurley, 2010), the different interpretations of embodied approaches 
(Gallagher, 2011) and the impossibility to define a unique interpretation of the enactive perspective 
(i.e. Hutto & Myin, 2013), would substantially compromise such a unitary view. In particular, the 
differences between externalism and enactivism, as Di Paolo (2009) points out, seem to rule out 
many levels of possible interaction. Nevertheless, it is surely correct that there is some continuity 
among each standpoint, if we are to consider only the basic above-mentioned assumptions. Simply 
put, when considering the body of an agent as an inseparable category from the mind in order to 
understand cognition (embodiment), we cannot but think of this body as a situated entity 
(embedment). But being a body-situated-in-the-world means being part of a dynamic interplay with 
the environment (enaction). And, finally, this co-determinative processes between a living system 
(with its recurrent patterns of sensorimotor coupling) and its world (intended as its relational 
domain) would imply that internal and external resources are integrated in a way that would enable 
a subject to accomplish her goals thanks to a variety of external scaffoldings, extending the 
boundaries of skull and skin (externalism).  
If this line of reasoning were as straightforward and flowing as this oversimplification portrays, 
the task of this work would be much easier. Unfortunately, the story is not that trivial, considering 
that not all of these categories, as previously mentioned, can be easily intermixed. Such a plan 
would inevitably fall short due to the distinctive and peculiar aspects of each theoretical framework. 
Some of the arguments used by proponents of the extended mind thesis, as we will see, stand in 
open contrast with a truly enactive characterisation of cognition, and might eventually collapse into 
a dualistic account that considers body and mind as separate and distinct entities (see Thompson & 
Stapleton, 2009). Moreover, some types of embodied approaches seem to be constituted on a very 
internalistic vision of cognitive processes, which are seen as widely distributed across the whole 
body but not necessarily coupled with external resources (i.e. Adams & Aizawa, 2010). The debate 
on mirror neurons, their interpretation and functional role in understanding the actions, emotions 
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and intentions of other individuals will exemplify this problem in the following chapters. Given 
these considerations, this work will mostly focus on enaction. This theoretical framework is in fact 
crucial for coherently maintaining a clear anti-dualistic position without any risk to be committed to 
a mere internalistic stance. After a brief overview of the enactive standpoint, this chapter will focus 
on the clarification of the conceptual topography of the Cartesian cognitive science, its 
philosophical foundations and its relevance for the development of the current leading perspectives 
in music psychology. 
 
 
1.2 - A world of meaning 
 
 
Enactivism is a term used by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) to define a new theoretical 
and empirical paradigm in the realm of cognitive science, based on the codetermination between 
embodied agents and their world. This approach considers cognition as an emergent phenomenon 
constituted by embedded and embodied forms of interactions between a self-organized living 
system and its environment. According to Thompson and Stapleton (2009), one of the main goals of 
the enactive perspective is to explore how a living system is organized in order to reach autonomy, 
namely the ability to sustain itself under precarious conditions (Maturana & Varela, 1980; De 
Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). Autonomy is essentially what allows living systems to regulate their 
interactions with the environment, as ‘an autonomous system is a system composed of processes 
that generate and sustain that system as a unity and thereby also define an environment for the 
system’ (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009, p. 2). In order to achieve an ideal condition of 
(autonomous) viability, an organism transforms the world into a place of salience, where the 
meanings enacted rely on the degree of complexity of the agent (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009, p. 
507). In other terms, a living organism, rather than being a mere spectator of passively witnessed 
events, makes sense of the world by enacting or bringing forth his or her own perspective on the 
basis of his or her adaptive autonomy. This ascription of meaning regards the animal as a whole 
organism  - thus also in terms of thermodynamic requirements and not only considering intellectual 
processes - and is mainly defined through the actions performed in the environment, which 
intrinsically entwine the living organism with the world in a normative way (Varela 1997; Di Paolo 
2005). 
 
 
The organism and environment are not actually separately determined. The environment 
is not a structure imposed on living beings from outside but is in fact a creation of those 
beings. The environment is not an autonomous process but a reflection of the biology of 
the species (Lewontin, 1983, p. 99).  
 
 
As Sheets-Johnstone (2012) puts it, the agents’ animation makes the world intelligible for them, 
and this principle constitutes the meaningful core of the animal’s situatedness in the world. In fact, 
‘animate beings do not simply move in an epiphenomenal sense: they are born to move; they are 
moved to move; they move meaningfully’ (ibid., p. 34). The centrality of action for sense-making 
emphasises the view that considers our experiences of the world as pragmatic in nature - being 
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mediated by goal-directed sensorimotor patterns.  
The enactive approach considers the experienced world as determined by the dynamic coupling 
between an animal’s physiology, its sensorimotor organization and the environment in which it is 
situated, thus addressing perception and action not as two separate categories, but rather, as a 
unitary inseparable entity. If cognition and perception are dynamic sensorimotor activities, and the 
environment is not conceived of as the result of neural computations, then an agent’s world is a 
result of the enacted experience of the organism’s bodily engagement within it and the taken-for-
granted division between internal (neural) states and a pre-given external world therefore should be 
ruled out. As I see it, the enactivist perspective represents a challenge for the traditional cognitive 
science of music, as it could provide a radically different model to understand the relationship that 
ties a musical subject and a musical object. After all, every musical experience occurs within this 
relationship. I can imagine music, I can listen to it, analyse it, perform it or learn it. Outside of this 
relationship there is no musical experience. The problem therefore is to define the terms of this 
relationship. Is it a causal relationship, where, for example, musical objects and musical subjects are 
independent categories? Or is the relationship itself a codetermination between the two, where 
subjects and objects are inseparable and thus impossible to be studied distinctly? How exactly are 
these two categories related? And how could we define “musical subjects” and “musical objects”? 
Before answering these questions and proposing an enactive approach to musical experience, 
however, I will provide a detailed analysis of the previous models employed to understand human 
cognition, its characterisation, and its influence on current music psychology.  
 
 
1.3 - A dream and a nightmare 
 
 
When describing the notion of “Cartesian Anxiety” firstly proposed by Bernstein (1983) and 
then reintroduced by Varela and colleagues (1991), Steve Torrance uses the following, striking, 
metaphor: ‘This anxiety generates a dream and a nightmare - the absolutist dream of achieving a 
guarantee of objective truth in our internal representations, and the nihilist nightmare that such a 
guarantee is forever beyond us’ (Torrance, 2005, p. 3). This anxiety, broadly speaking, consists in 
assuming that “to know x” means “to have a representation of x”. Torrance perfectly portrays the 
consequences of this equivalence: in order to provide a plausible description of a given 
phenomenon, cognitive science should give a reliable account of our internal representations, as 
they portray the concrete and objective properties of the world that we experience. On the other 
hand, the focus on mental objects leads de facto to the investigation of a realm that is not physical 
and therefore not objectively measurable. This contrast generates an unsolvable tension: no account 
of human cognition has ever provided a plausible and falsifiable explanation of how a physical 
entity could generate a non-physical representation (Nagel, 1974). As David Chalmers puts it:  
 
 
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how 
it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our 
cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual 
or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we 
explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an 
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emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have 
no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give 
rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it 
does (Chalmers, 1995, p. 203). 
 
 
This is what Chalmers himself labels as the “hard problem of consciousness”, that is, simply 
put, the problem of experience. There is no doubt, in fact that ‘lived, first-hand, experience is a 
proper field of phenomena, irreducible to anything else’ (Varela, 1996, p. 347) and that the 
possibility of bridging the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983; Searle, 1992) between the qualitative 
character of subjectivity and its purely physical and functional correlates has enamoured many 
scholars. Many contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists, for example, maintain an identity 
theory in contrast to dualism. For them, a subjective feeling is neural activity (i.e. Churchland, 
1986).  
However, as we will see, the identity between mind and brain is not the only way to reject the 
Cartesian dualism. This is the reason why solving this explanatory gap is not the goal of this 
dissertation. Rather, what I am actually interested in, is to provide a coherent critique of the 
dualistic foundations of such an issue, advocating an account that does not admit any contrast 
between external and internal, subjective and objective. Any attempt to bridge the gap, as I see it, 
would only perpetuate its aprioristic assumptions, thus giving rise to a circular scenario. A perfect 
example of this fallacy can be seen in the book Embodied Music Cognition and the Mediation 
Technology (Leman, 2007) where the author considers the body as the mediator between musical 
experience (mind) and sound energy (matter), thus remaining committed to the Cartesian 
perspective that he himself explicitly rejects (ibid., p. 13). Here, like in other cases, the 
hypostatization of the starting dichotomy (between mind and matter) necessitates an ad hoc solution 
(body-as-mediator) in order to mediate between the two different categories. I will come back to 
Leman’s interpretation of embodiment and music cognition in Chapter 4. Before doing that, 
however, a clarification seems necessary. Given that the Cartesian legacy is, in fact, ‘both 
widespread and tenacious, not only as an explicit doctrine but, more significantly, in the clandestine 
influence it has on explicit doctrines of the mind’ (Rowlands, 1999, p. 3), it seems reasonable to 
have a closer look into its principles and main implications, as it still constitutes a fundamental 
source of inspiration for many of the contemporary accounts of musical cognition.  
 
 
1.4 - The dogma of the ghost in the machine 
 
 
The view endorsed by Descartes is generally called “Substance Dualism” as it proposes a 
radical dichotomy between two different substances: mind, which has no physical extension and is 
defined by the property of “thinking”, and matter, whose property is “extension”. A substance can 
be defined not as a collection of properties but, rather, as the actual entity that possesses these 
properties. Therefore the human mind is not a mere collection of beliefs, mental states and so forth 
but rather it is that thing whose property is to think. While the human mind is a thinking entity, 
governed by the principles of reason, matter (the physical body, the world) is ruled by mechanistic 
principles (Rowlands, 1999). Descartes maintains a profound asymmetry between the ways of 
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knowing and understanding the human mind and the world. While the mind is in fact an internal 
category, the latter is an external one. As Gilbert Ryle puts it: 
 
 
There is a doctrine about the nature and place of the mind, which is prevalent among 
theorists, to which most philosophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe 
with minor reservations. Although they admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they 
tend to assume that these can be overcome without serious modifications being made to 
the architecture of the theory. [The doctrine states that] with the doubtful exceptions of 
the mentally-incompetent and infants-in-arms, every human being has both a body and a 
mind. [...] The body and the mind are ordinarily harnessed together, but after the death 
of the body the mind may continue to exist and function (Ryle, 1949, p.11). 
 
 
A classic line of reasoning for proponents of this form of dualism is based on the well-known 
principle called Leibniz’s law or the indiscernibility of identicals (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 
1997, p. 5). If we assume that x = y, then we have to admit that every property P of x is also a 
property P of y, and every property P of y is also a property P of x.  
 
 
x = y → ∀P(Px ↔ Py) 
 
 
Probably the most famous argument proposed by Descartes to defend his thesis is the one that 
employs this law in relation with the notion of doubt. Descartes (argument A) holds that (i) you can 
doubt about the existence of your body, but  (ii) you cannot doubt about the existence of your mind. 
It follows that since mind and body display different properties then they must be distinct entities. 
The two premises i and ii, however, raise several problems when defining being such that I can 
doubt its existence as an actual property of the two objects - mind and body. How can being an 
object of doubt be identified with a real property of a given substance? Let’s consider the following 
analogous argument (B). I can have doubts about Clark Kent being Superman, but this will not 
change the fact that Clark Kent is Superman. To clarify this point, let’s consider the two arguments 
A and B as follows: 
 
 
A) 
 
(i) I cannot doubt that I am my mind 
(ii) I can doubt that I am my body 
Therefore à Mind and body are two different entities 
 
B)  
 
(i)       I cannot doubt that Clark Kent is Clark Kent 
(ii)       I can doubt that Clark Kent is Superman 
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Therefore àClark Kent and Superman are two different entities 
 
 
As we can notice from this traditional (i.e. Goldberg & Pessin, 1997) counterexample, the 
conclusion of B is clearly mistaken. It seems, therefore, that we do not have any reason to consider 
the doubt argument as a valid candidate to demonstrate the separation between mind and body. 
Being a propositional attitude, doubt cannot be used properly through Leibniz’s law. But what 
happens when, for example, using the notion of extension? Let’s now imagine that x is the sensation 
of sadness I feel while listening to John Dowland’s tune ‘Flow my tears’ while y is the sound that 
comes out from the speakers of my laptop. While y is measurable and has a location in space - 
defined by the waves of pressure that propagate through a given medium - x cannot be objectively 
measurable and does not have a physical, spatial existence. Therefore x and y do not share the same 
properties, which means that my feeling is something different from any physical state. Since the 
mind has no extension and it does not share the same attributes with matter they cannot be the same 
thing. However, if we do accept dualism, the problem of how non-physical minds and extended 
bodies interact will probably never be solved. As Jerry Fodor observes: 
 
 
The chief drawback of dualism is its failure to account adequately for mental causation. 
If the mind is nonphysical, it has no position in physical space. How, then, can a mental 
cause give rise to a behavioural effect that has a position in space? To put it another 
way, how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws of the 
conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum? (Fodor, 1981 [1994], p. 25).  
 
 
Since the body takes up room and it is measurable it must be a separate and distinct substance 
from the mind (Johnson, 1987). But then, how can an abstract, non-physical, mind cause any kind 
of change in a body? And how can a body, which is observable, extended, affect something as 
immaterial as the mind? In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641 [1980]), Descartes 
investigates the causal relationship between the two. In the sixth meditation, for example, he allows 
that what causes bodily sensations, like disgust or pleasure, is to be found in the precise structural 
organization of the nervous system. In particular the nerves transmit to the pineal gland the relevant 
information, which are processed and transformed into the actual feeling. In other words, we could 
argue that for Descartes the body acts on the mind through the movements of ‘spirits’ that 
eventually reach the brain.  
However, it remains unclear how the body machinery could generate something subjectively 
unique, and therefore immaterial, like a feeling. As the above-mentioned ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’ shows, an explanation of how the relationship between physical and mental entities 
takes place is still nowadays considered a core issue for the study of human cognition. Cartesian 
dualism, we can say with Rowlands (2003), suffers from a major problem when trying to 
reincorporate the non-physical mind into the body. How is it possible that a body displays at the 
same time, two separate substances? Descartes describes this interaction in these terms: 
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I am present to my body not merely in the way a seaman is present to his ship, but… I 
am tightly joined and, so to speak, mingled together with it, so much so that I make up 
one single thing with it (Descartes, 1641 [1980], p. 94). 
 
 
As Dorothée Legrand noticed, ‘despite his radical dualism, Descartes himself thus fails to 
disembody the mind of the factual subject and his view rather calls for further investigation of the 
bodily-self’ (Legrand, 2010, p. 182). Indeed, paraphrasing the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle 
(1949), the Cartesian mind is not only “a ghost”, but it actually is “a ghost in the machine”.  
As Thompson (2007) states, it is purely accidental that my mind is embodied in my body. At 
least theoretically, a thinking substance can be genuinely conceived as existing apart from the body, 
and thus my mind could be easily united with someone else’s body. The ghost could inhabit other 
machines without necessarily cause any metaphysical problem. However, we do have some 
problems. The gap still remains unbridgeable, and the ghost evoked by the Cartesian stance would 
eventually transform every dream of a fully developed model of the human mind into the nightmare 
of not being able to grasp the ultimate objective reality of such a disembodied substance. Let’s now 
reconsider the two strong arguments that stem from the Cartesian view of the mind:   
 
 
• The mind is an immaterial substance, separated from the body 
• The mind lives inside a body, being a ghost inside the skull.  
 
 
But another strong dichotomy implicitly lies in these assumptions, if we are to take them seriously: 
 
 
• While human experience is an internal property, the world in which our bodies are situated 
is nothing but an external category  
 
 
The doctrine of dualism encourages a view that radically divides organisms and their 
environments, thus creating a separation between internal and external, subjective and objective. 
While modern cognitive scientists, psychologists, neuroscientists and philosophers have heavily 
criticized the dichotomy between mind and matter, the assumption that cognition lies inside the 
head has been silently accepted. Considering the mind-matter dichotomy, Ryle - among others - 
famously alleged that treating the mind like a non-physical object is a category mistake, because 
things or facts of one kind would be presented as if they belonged to another. In fact, ‘the logical 
type or category to which a concept belongs is the set of ways in which it is logically legitimate to 
operate with it’ (1949, p. 8). Probably the most famous of the examples provided by Ryle is the one 
about a student who comes to Oxford and, while viewing the library and the colleges, asks “but 
where is the university?”. The category-mistake lies in the visitor’s assumption that a University 
would fall into the category of ‘buildings’ rather than, say, ‘institutions’. Hence, according to Ryle, 
Descartes is wrong in attributing the existence of something called ‘mind’ over and above 
someone’s behavioural dispositions.  
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Ryle’s solution is in line with the behaviourist perspective of providing a non-dualistic 
psychology that focuses on the observable behaviour of living systems (Baum 1994). Hence, on the 
one hand we have a doctrine like Cartesianism, which tries to explain human behaviour relying on 
hidden, non-physical causes - an immaterial mind that moves a material body. On the other hand, 
the observable criteria studied by the behaviourists do not allow occult or hidden mental states. 
According to a behaviourist, in fact, a mental state of a subject is defined by her behavioural 
disposition. In other words, I understand that my friend is angry because she shouts at me and not 
because I inferentially attribute to her the mental state of being angry. All I need to do is to observe 
her behaviour. ‘Behaviourism had allowed no reference to internal states of the organism; 
explanations of behaviour had to be formulated in terms of sensory stimuli and behavioural 
conditioning’ (Thompson, 2007, p. 4).  
This position, however, has been heavily attacked, mainly for being too narrow. As Jerry Fodor 
points out ‘once it has been made clear that the choice between dualism and behaviourism is not 
exhaustive, a major motivation for the defence of behaviourism is removed: we are not required to 
be behaviourists simply in order to avoid being dualists’ (Fodor, 1968, pp. 58-59). The idea of 
reconciling mind and matter, to attribute a legitimate role to internal mental states, avoiding de facto 
the rise of behaviourism, thus motivated the emergence of the so-called cognitive approach. 
Proponents of this theoretical framework are firmly committed to the idea that, in order to shed light 
on the nature of the mind, the only possibility is to unravel the structures inside the skull - in terms 
of subjective mental representations or cytoarchitectonic networks. However, as previously 
observed, the separation between mind and matter is not the only dichotomy that needs to be 
overcome.  
As the next chapter will show, the attempt to bridge the explanatory gap between mind and 
matter, as offered by the cognitive approach or by any other form of reductionism, would 
substantially leave unaltered its dualistic presuppositions. The dualities between internal and 
external, subjective and objective, inputs and outputs are still controversial issues that perpetuate the 
Cartesian anxiety. As we will see, the birth and the development of cognitivism, has serious 
implications for the science of music cognition as it largely inspired the main trends, assumptions 
and methodologies of musical research.    
 
 
1.5 - Perpetuating the dichotomies 
 
 
Cognitivism is the term that labels the anti-behaviouristic movement in cognitive science, which 
came into being around the half of the last century (Fodor, 1968). While behaviourism tried to shed 
light on the nature of behaviour by referring to law-like relationships between sensory inputs and 
behavioural outputs, the cognitive paradigm offered a position that sees ‘the mind as a device [i.e. a 
computer] to manipulate symbols is thus concerned with the formal rules and processes by which 
the symbols appropriately represent the world’ (Thelen, 2000, p. 4).  
Having essentially dominated the field for more than forty years, its importance and relevance 
for current research in music cognition and, more in general, for psychology and cognitive science, 
has anything but disappeared. As we will see, in fact - despite the emergence of challenging 
theoretical frameworks - the cognitive perspective is still widespread. Before embarking on this, a 
critical overview of concepts, methodologies and implications underlining this standpoint will be 
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provided. According to Mark Rowlands, ‘traditional attempts to study the mind are based on the 
idea that whatsoever is true of mental processes - perceiving, remembering, thinking, reasoning, and 
so on - they exist in brains’ (Rowlands, 2010, p. 2). Cognitivism is, in effect, the paradigmatic 
example of such commitment and Andy Clark (1997, p. 83) strategically summarizes its main 
assumptions into the following five points: 
 
 
• Memory is a retrieval from a stored symbolic database 
• Problem solving is seen as a logical inference 
• Cognition is centralized  
• The environment is (just) a problem domain  
• The body is an input device 
 
 
One by one, these points led to the idea proposed by Jerry Fodor of a methodological solipsism 
(Fodor, 1980a). Mental processes, as he claims, can be understood only on the basis of a subject’s 
individual mental properties, without any involvement of external factors, such as the environment. 
As Wilson puts it, ‘methodological solipsism in psychology is the view that psychological states 
should be construed without reference to anything beyond the boundary of the individual who has 
those states’ (Wilson, 2004, p. 77). The mind-as-a-computer metaphor implies that the key to 
understand human cognition lies inside the boundaries of the skull. Therefore, what is required to 
fulfil such a goal is precisely an isolationist analysis, a cognitive mapping of an individual mental 
states, or representations.  
But this dualistic view of the world ‘presupposes that mental individuation can indeed be 
explained without recourse to wordly conditions. It presupposes just the existence of thinkers and 
their thoughts’ (Schantz, 2004, p. 15). Oversimplifying, cognitivism transformed the dualistic 
asymmetry between mind and matter into a materialistic form, where the brain and the mind form 
an interactive processing system separated from the rest of the body and from the world. The mind 
is essentially the program that the brain runs. As Hilary Putnam admits, in fact  
 
 
If one assumes that the mind is an organ, and one goes on to identify the mind with the 
brain, it will then become irresistible to (1) think of some of the “representations” as 
analogous to the classical theorist’s “impressions” (the cerebral computer makes 
inferences from at least some of the “representations”, the outputs of the perceptual 
processes, just as the mind makes inferences from impressions, on the classical story), 
and (2) to think that those “representations” are linked to objects in the organism’s 
environment only causally, and not cognitively (just as impressions were linked to 
‘external objects’ only causally, and not cognitively) (Putnam, 1981, pp. 9-10). 
 
 
If the mind were a sort of computer, then the brain substrates would represent the “hardware”. 
On the other hand, mental processes would constitute the ‘programs’. The difference between 
“software” and “hardware” is well exemplified by the research programs that are supposed to shed 
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light on their nature and functional properties. While cognitive psychology is devoted to 
investigating and identifying the cognitive entities, cognitive neuroscience studies how these work 
and where they are implemented in the brain, with the ultimate aim to provide an extensive and 
precise cytoarchitectonic mapping of neural networks. As Noë noticed, in fact, ‘Psychology is 
interested in what the brain does, but at higher levels of abstractions than that of neuroscience’ 
(Noë, 2004, p. 25). The cognitivistic perspective opened a new gap between computational 
cognition and subjective mental phenomena (Thompson, 2007, p. 6), that is, as Jackendoff 
observes, a mind-mind problem:  
 
 
The upshot is that psychology has not two domains to worry about, the brain and the 
mind, but three: the brain, the computational mind, and the phenomenological mind. 
Consequently, Descartes’ formulation of the mind-body problem is split into two 
separate issues. “The phenomenological mind problem” […] is, How can a brain have 
experience? “The computational mind problem” is, How can a brain accomplish 
reasoning? In addition we have the “mind-mind problem”, namely, What is the relation 
between computational states and experience? (Jackendoff, 1987, p. 20, quoted in 
Varela et al., 1991, p. 52).   
 
 
The mind-mind problem, as clearly emerges2, is a variant of ‘the hard problem of consciousness’ 
that we previously encountered. This implies that cognitivism, far from concluding the discussion 
on the nature of mind and cognition, expands the gap between mind and body into a new series of 
problems that call for further solution. The legacy that links Cartesianism to cognitivism lies in the 
fact that the strong dichotomies created by the dualistic stance are perpetuated by cognitivist 
materialism. Several solutions have been posited to overcome these difficulties (e.g. Dreyfus, 
1995). 
One of the most famous critiques of the computational mind is probably represented by the 
controversial (see Dennett, 1980, 1987; Block, 1980; Fodor, 1980b; Crane, 1991; Cole 1991) 
mental experiment of “the Chinese room” offered and revisited several times by John Searle (1980). 
Searle wants to demonstrate that a computer cannot think or that, in other terms, symbolic 
manipulation deals only with syntax and does not have anything to do with understanding or with 
semantics. His attack was mainly against the proponents of the so-called strong Artificial 
Intelligence, who claimed that a coherently programmed computer is not only a simulation, or a 
model, of the mind, but can actually be a mind. Therefore, the argument also goes against the mind-
as-a-computer metaphor proposed by the cognitive standpoint. If we assume, along with the 
cognitive framework, that the mind is software and that the brain is hardware, then it would 
certainly be true that a machine, or an actual computer, can have mental states as long as it runs the 
right kind of software. The Chinese Room argument goes as follows:  
 
 
Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full of boxes 
of Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions for manipulating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This analogy has been proposed by Evan Thompson (2007, p. 7). 
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the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other Chinese 
symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese (the 
input). And imagine that by following the instructions in the program the man in the 
room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions 
(the output). The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for 
understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese (Searle, 1999, p. 
115). 
 
 
The point Searle tries to stress, hence, is that without understanding, it would be impossible to 
posit that the machine is thinking - or having a mind. As an example, let’s consider the software 
Finale® or Sibelius®: although they manage to process many information about music, would it be 
possible to say that these programs know music? Searle’s reply would be that symbolic 
manipulation systems are completely unable to generate any kind of mental phenomena, including 
our theoretical knowledge of music. I fundamentally agree, here. Acknowledging the mistake of 
having two parallel octaves while composing a fugue in the style of J.S. Bach does not have 
anything to do with the composer’s understanding of musical styles. I will return to the problem of 
musical understanding in Chapter 3. For now, I briefly want to focus on the solution adopted by 
Searle.  
While rejecting any form of mental-physical dualism, as well as the computational theory of the 
mind proposed by the cognitive standpoint, Searle embraces what he labels as biological naturalism 
(Searle, 1992; 2004). Mind and brain are essentially the same thing. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that its methodological paradigm essentially demands Neural Correlates of Consciousness. 
There are two ways to achieve such a goal: (i) to look for building blocks in the human brain that 
would underlie a particular, subjective, conscious state - like the feeling evoked by the sound of 
middle C - or (ii) to look for a whole conscious field of unified subjectivity (Searle, 2004, p. 116). 
The first strategy - that Searle himself ultimately refuses (Searle, 2000a, p. 572) - underlies a one-
to-one identity relationship between mental and neural states. This is what can be called the 
“matching content doctrine” (Noë & Thompson, 2004a; 2004b). To provide an example of such a 
view, let’s consider David Chalmers’ position (Chalmers, 2000). He assumes that neural and 
experiential content are exactly the same thing. By doing that, however he exposes himself to a 
category mistake. As Thompson notes, experience is intentional (world-presenting), holistic 
(constituted by interrelated perceptions, intentions, emotions and actions) and intransitively self-
aware (has a non-reflective subjective character). Neural content as standardly described has none 
of these features (Thompson, 2007, p. 350). The second approach embraced by Searle (unified 
subjectivity) maintains that any given conscious state is not a mere aggregation of building blocks, 
but rather a modulation of already existing conscious states. For example, the feeling of middle C 
does not depend on the intermodal connections between building blocks but, rather, on the 
modification of a pre-existing conscious field in the background.  
One way or another, Searle’s solution is committed to the idea that the relationship between 
mind and body ‘has a rather simple solution. Here it is: conscious states are caused by lower-level 
neurobiological processes in the brain and are themselves higher-level features of the brain’ (Searle, 
2002, p.9). As Chemero puts it: ‘the most common strategy employed here is to argue that cognitive 
science is reducible to cognitive neuroscience’ (Chemero, 2009, p. 167). In other words, conscious 
experience is completely reducible to the brain, and all we need to do in order to obtain an advance 
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for the “hard problem of consciousness” is, literally, to look inside the boundaries of the skull. Let’s 
consider the following passage: 
 
 
The brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves and 
everything we can use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs must be possible for 
a being who is a brain in a vat because each of us is precisely a brain in a vat. The vat is 
the skull and the ‘messages’ coming in are coming in by way of impacts on the nervous 
system (Searle, 1983, p. 230). 
 
 
The expression “brain-in-a-vat” refers to the famous thought-experiment proposed by Hilary 
Putnam (1981), which basically mirrors the traditional skeptical argument used by Descartes about 
the impossibility of telling whether there is an evil entity that feeds us with false information about 
the world through our senses. In other words, a brain could potentially be fooled into anything if 
only it were fed with appropriate stimuli. Cosmelli and Thompson put it in this way: 
 
 
Suppose that a team of neurosurgeons and bioengineers were able to remove your brain 
from your body, suspend it in a life-sustaining vat of liquid nutrients, and connect its 
neurons and nerve terminals by wires to a supercomputer that would stimulate it with 
electrical impulses exactly like those it normally receives when embodied. According to 
this brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, your envatted brain and your embodied brain 
would have subjectively indistinguishable mental lives. For all you know - so one 
argument goes - you could be such a brain in a vat right now (Cosmelli & Thompson, 
2009, p. 362). 
 
 
Evan Thompson (2007) proposes a null hypothesis for this thought experiment. His strategy 
consists in individuating a particular set of specific conditions that the vat would have. As he points 
out, in fact 
 
 
The vat setup would have to be capable of (i) keeping the brain alive and up and 
running, (ii) duplicating all exogenous stimulation and (iii) compensating in exactly the 
right way for all endogenous (and self-organizing) activity. Such a setup would almost 
certainly have to duplicate many of the chemical, biochemical, and sensorimotor 
properties of the body, probably even the body’s sensorimotor coupling with the world. 
In other words, the null hypothesis is that any vat that meets the requirements of this 
scenario will be a surrogate body (Thompson, 2007, pp. 240-241).      
 
 
I think that two main conclusions can be drawn from this brief discussion. On the one hand, the 
strategy of looking for specific mental or brain states in order to explain cognition appears to be 
problematic for several reasons. If we assume that the mind is a computer then we cannot grasp the 
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causal relationship that connects symbolic manipulation to reasoning, as the Chinese room 
experiment shows. On the other hand, a reductionist approach only seems to perpetuate such a 
problematic and ungraspable relationship. As many authors point out, indeed, even if we know what 
causes or correlates to a specific conscious state - like the sensation of middle C - we could still 
dispute whether experiences are nothing more than their causes or their correlates (i.e. Hutto & 
Myin 2013). But there is, as I said, another conclusion. The role of the body clearly represents a 
challenge for any form of reductionism or methodological solipsism. The consideration that the 
brain is not the sole cause of experience - as it emerges from the discussion about the brain-in-a-vat 
- calls for a significant paradigm shift from the traditional views of the mind. The envatted brain 
experiment shows that a brain cannot be seen as identical to the mind because experience emerges 
‘not from neural activity alone but from the interaction between the brain and the device’ 
(Rockwell, 2005, p. 68); a device that inevitably will be a surrogate of the body and thus, immersed 
in the world.  
As I briefly mentioned in the introduction, the new theoretical frameworks developed in the last 
few years by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists dramatically 
reconsider the role of the body and of the environment for cognition, and radically challenge the 
view that mental representations are the only possible tool for reasoning and understanding the 
world. The brain-body-world nexus, as Rockwell (2005) puts it, implies not only that the mind is 
not in the brain, but also that the mind is not the brain. The reconceptualization of categories like 
perception, emotion, action and cognition, provided by these new standpoints, would enormously 
contribute to the process of developing a new perspective on musical experience. As I see it, indeed, 
most of the current research in music cognition relies on computational or reductionist accounts 
that, both theoretically and empirically, cannot provide a biologically and phenomenologically 
plausible account of musical experience. The next chapter is devoted to convincing you of this. 
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Chapter 2 
Diabolus in Musica3 
 
 
The reason for the failure of rational culture, as we said, lies not in the essence of 
rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in 
naturalism and objectivism  
 
   - Edmund Husserl, The Vienna Lecture  
 
 
Cognitivism, like life and pasta, comes in a bewildering variety of forms 
 
- Andy Clark, Microcognition 
 
 
2.1 - Beyond the modularity of the musical brain 
 
 
The devil is in the details, they say. This chapter is dedicated to exploring some assumptions at 
the basis of traditional research on human musicality. In particular I want to show that the explicit 
or implicit use of the cognitive standpoint cannot allow a coherent model of music cognition. 
Traditionally, Noam Chomsky (1957; 1966) and Jerry Fodor (1983) are considered the prototypical 
proponents of the cognitivistic framework, as they explicitly supported the dichotomies between 
inner mental states and external observable behaviours and between modular, fixed brain functions 
and unspecific, dynamical learning mechanisms (Brincker, 2010, p. 5).  
For modularism, I refer to the theory proposed by Jerry Fodor (1983) about a cognitive 
architecture set out in specialized vertical structures - modules - underlying the mental ability to 
transform the input into representations afterwards offered to central areas for more complex 
elaborations (see Calabretta et al., 2003). As Calabretta and Parisi put it ‘modular systems can be 
defined as systems made up of structurally and/or functionally distinct parts. While non-modular 
systems are internally homogeneous, modular systems are segmented into modules, i.e., portions of 
a system having a structure and/or function different from the structure or function of other portions 
of the system’ (Calabretta & Parisi, 2005, p.3). According to Prinz (2006a), Fodor defines brain 
modules by their special properties. ‘He says that modular systems are: (1) Localized: modules are 
realized in dedicated neural architecture; (2) Subject to characteristic breakdowns: modules can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This chapter contains material previously published as Schiavio, A. (2012). Constituting the musical object. A 
neurophenomenological perspective on musical research. In Teorema, 31(3), pp. 63-80.  Moreover, it contains material 
from the following article in preparation: Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in preparation). An enactive perspective on 
infants’ musicality.	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selectively impaired; (3) Mandatory: modules operate in an automatic way; (4) Fast: modules 
generate outputs quickly; (5) Shallow: modules have relatively simple outputs (e.g., not judgments); 
(6) Ontogenetically determined: modules develop in a characteristic pace and sequence; (7) Domain 
specific: modules cope with a restricted class of inputs; (8) Inaccessible: higher levels of processing 
have limited access to the representations within a module; (9) Informationally encapsulated: 
modules cannot be guided by information at higher levels of processing’ (Prinz, 2006a, pp. 22-23). 
In his analysis, Prinz offers a series of valid arguments against modularity. However, my 
purpose here is not to consider each property one by one. Rather, I aim to show that the 
radicalization of such a model, in particular with regard to points 6 and 7, would substantially 
compromise any plausible account of music experience. In general, William Uttal (2003), arguing 
that an efficacious taxonomy of all mental processes has yet to be developed, rejects the idea that 
higher cognitive processes can be localised to particular regions (or networks) in the brain referring 
to the studies of localization as a modern variant of phrenology. Moreover, any sort of reductionism 
cannot account for a phenomenologically relevant theory of experience that takes seriously the 
intimate relationship between brain and body. However, the modular perspective did influence 
many scholars involved in music-related issues from the early eighties to the following decades (i.e. 
Peretz & Morais, 1989; Piccirilli et al., 2000) often through a comparison between music and 
language (see McMullen & Saffran, 2004, for a review).  
The classic method of reasoning can be described as follows: (i) the musical signal is an external 
stream of information that comes from the environment; (ii) it is processed by some specific brain 
mechanisms, and finally (iii) it results in a mental representation. The inferential fragmentation of 
this process via perception, neural integration and representation is in league with the traditional 
view that considers someone’s musical experience as an inner, computationally implemented, 
event. This assumption often led researchers towards a model of the musical mind that is, at least, 
disputable. The structural organization that objectively constitutes the physical signal (pitches, 
rhythm, dynamics, harmony and so forth) - which is reflected by the brain’s modular architecture - 
is subjectively experienced via representations. In other words, the assumption underlining this 
commitment is that music is not experienced as a whole but, rather, through the inferential 
integration of different domains such as pitch, rhythm, harmony, as processed by their relevant 
modules. Daniel Levitin (2006) for example, insists that we can identify some categories (once 
again, pitch, timbre, rhythm and so forth) that can be individually varied without affecting other 
musical dimensions. In his view, indeed, the brain extracts from the musical stimuli each of these 
attributes autonomously. Several studies, however, make doubtful that (for instance) melodic 
interval perception is codified per se, showing that estimates of interval size are actually affected 
by temporal structure (Russo & Thompson, 2005a), as well as register, melodic direction (Russo & 
Thompson, 2005b) and listener expertise, giving rise under certain timbre manipulations to an 
interval size illusion.  
According to Ian Cross, moreover, ‘what we know of music in neurobiological and 
neuroscientific terms is constrained by a conception of music that is narrowly shaped by historical 
and cultural notions of what constitutes “music”’ (Cross, 2010, p. 2). As I see it, this problem 
concerns not only the classical theoretical problems of the definition of music (see paragraph 2.5 for 
discussion), but also refers to the modular perspective. Proponents of this argument cite specific 
music-related deficits in patients that are consistent with a modular perspective of the mind. In a 
well-known paper, for example, Isabelle Peretz (1993) describes the case of patient G.L., whose 
ability to elaborate sounds in a tonal context was compromised after bilateral temporal lobe damage 
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due to strokes. Interestingly, G.L. did not display any other problem in processing temporal 
structures or melodic contours: the only deficit was in discriminating the coherence of a given pitch 
with the harmonic context. G.L. was diagnosed with amusia without aphasia as s/he scored in the 
normal range of standard aphasia tests. However, getting back to Cross’ consideration, we should 
ask whether this dysfunction can be considered biologically musical. In fact, tonal music is only a 
small part of the complex phenomenon of music, being a Western feature that emerged in the 
Fifteenth Century. Is it then possible to posit species-specific brain architectures phylogenetically 
developed to process distinct aspects related to peculiar, Western-based, musical organizations? If 
the neural basis of musicality were a pre-wired biological system, this would imply that musical 
knowledge is pre-determined, being encapsulated in domain-specific brain modules from birth. But, 
as Honing and Ploeger (2012) pointed out, ‘while there are several aspects of musicality that 
emerge spontaneously, early in life, and with minimal exposure to music, and as such suggesting 
heritability (cf. Lewontin, 1998), none of them need to be specific to music’ (ibid., p. 5). Moreover, 
a reflection on the processes underlying human development shows that developmental plasticity 
leads to knock-on effects in different domains (Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas, 2003, p. 648).  
Therefore, the localisation of a specific musical rule in one area of the brain cannot be accepted 
as evidence for the modular view of music since a specific function in the brain may result from 
many different developmental processes (advances in sensorimotor abilities, language development, 
etc.) not involving ‘genetic specification of epistemological content’ (Tomasello, 1999, p. 203). A 
modular interpretation of the mind/brain, moreover, seems to be hardly sustainable considering that 
the history of Homo Sapiens ‘is simply not sufficient, under any plausible scenario, for genetic 
variation and natural selection to have created many different and independent human cognitive 
modules’ (ibid., p. 55).  
 
 
2.2 - Statistical properties, expectations and mental representations  
 
 
The modular account of the musical mind represents an important outcome of the cognitive 
neuroscience of music. The focus on specific brain mechanisms underlying our ability to be 
engaged with a musical stimulus has been largely accepted during the last decades, leading to a 
research program whose ultimate aim is to realize a map of what is going on in the brain during any 
sort of musical experience. As emerged, however, this methodology reflects a leftover from the 
Cartesian stance, though reconsidered on the basis of a materialistic commitment: if the brain’s 
physiological architecture is the sole source of relevant musical information, then (i) the external 
world - the music that comes from the environment - remains an independent category from the 
subjective experience that occurs in someone’s brain, and (ii) it still remains unclear how exactly 
neural tissues or mental computations would substantially enable us to have that particular musical 
experience. Once again the dream of achieving an objective perspective on the nature of musical 
experience meets a ghostly nightmare.  
The Cartesian anxiety is, in fact not cured: even if particular neural processes present a clear 
correlation with specific musical structures we still miss a complete picture of the phenomenon. 
Correlation, after all, is not causation. The radical form of internalistic materialism portrayed by the 
modular approach to human musicality precludes every consideration about what happens outside 
the skull because of the commitment to the idea that the mind is imprisoned inside the head. On a 
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related note, if we are to take seriously the claim that mind and brain form a unique information-
processing mechanism we are still unable to understand how exactly a subjective feeling can be 
generated. No matter how deep our understanding of neurons and their synaptic connections might 
be: the gap between these physical properties and the subjective feeling that they generate is still 
open.  
I see David Huron’s work Sweet Anticipation (2006) as a complementary attempt to solve this 
puzzle. Despite the noble intentions, however, Huron’s work seems to be committed not only to the 
materialistic constraint that sees music as having objective properties which can be autonomously 
coded by the human brain, but also to the idea that categories like musical expectations are basically 
“mental or corporeal belief” (Huron, 2006, p. 41) splitting de facto body and mind/brain into two 
distinct systems. This standpoint in fact - as any internalist approach devoted to bridging the 
explanatory gap - perpetuates the Cartesian anxiety. Huron’s story is that statistical properties of 
tonal music, to which listeners have been familiarised with by means of exposure, would elicit 
particular qualia (or subjective feelings) via relevant expectations. As it appears from the book, his 
argumentation can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
i)   Tonal music exhibits statistical properties on different levels (pitch, scale degrees etc.) 
ii) Listeners display sensitivity to the probabilities of different musical events and patterns 
iii) Listeners use these probabilities to generate predictive expectations about the future 
iv) Expectations imply mental representations 
v) Mental representations are physical brain states 
vi) The violation or confirmation of such expectations generates specific music-related qualia 
Therefore à Qualia derive from brain states elicited by expectations and representations of a 
given musical parameter. 
 
 
The argument, however, seems to be fragile for several reasons. Firstly, the premises (iv) and (v) 
do not really persuade me. They do not logically follow from the other premise (iii), and thus reflect 
an aprioristic assumption about the involvement of mental phenomena. How exactly, do 
expectations imply mental representations? And why? Huron adopts a sort of biological naturalism, 
which consists in the idea of an identity between conscious experience and neural substrates. 
Consider the following passage: 
 
 
Auditory images are not organized in the brain like phonograph recordings. Instead, 
brains interpret, distill, and represent sounds. […] Expectations imply some sort of 
mental representation. The what, when, and where of expectation exist as mental codes. 
These mental codes are not disembodied abstractions. They exist as real biological 
patterns that have taken up residence somewhere inside people’s heads (Huron 2006, p. 
101). 
 
 
When Huron says that “mental codes are not disembodied abstractions”, he does not mean that 
they are constituted by wider processes distributed over the body in its relationship with the 
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environment. This would be, in fact, a traditional embodied claim (i.e. Shapiro, 2011). Huron rather 
claims that they are “embodied” within the brain. But how this assumption would justify the 
involvement of mental representations? After all, for the sake of the argument we could maintain 
that the neural activity in the brain directly generates the relevant subjective quality without any 
inferential, representative, subordination. My point is that Huron tends to overintellectualize a 
process that potentially could not involve high-level processing. I do not see any contradiction, for 
example, in postulating expectations without explicit representations. The data from the following 
experiment might provide a useful insight into this issue. Sebylle Herholtz and colleagues (2008) 
asked two groups of musicians and non-musicians to listen to and familiarise themselves with a 
series of thirteen notes, all with the same duration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the familiarisation phase, they manipulated the same stimuli by cutting the five notes 
before the ending tone. Then they asked the participants to imagine the missing part of the melody.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
One of the melodies used in the experiment 
Fig. 2 
Imaginery task (from Herholtz et al., 2008). Reprinted with permission of the 
publisher. License Number: 3333561359397. 
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After different listening trials, however, the researchers substituted the final note with a different 
pitch. The idea of the experiment was, therefore, to generate an unexpected event and to see what 
happens in the brain of the listeners, thanks to the employment of MEG techniques. The researchers 
found that in the musicians’ group, this experience provoked pre-attentive responses, (measured 
through the imagery mismatch negativity or iMMN). The time between the unexpected auditory 
event and the recorded brain signal is too short (175 ms) for the subjects to recruit contentful 
representations, suggesting that expert musicians process music without any explicit 
representational activity. From these results, it emerges how the familiarisation with a musical 
pattern can improve the pre-attentive processing of the given auditory feedback (see also Koelsch et 
al., 1999; Sittiprapaporn et al., 2003) before any kind of cognitive subordination. With regard to this 
point, someone could argue that Huron’s view involves different (high-level) kinds of expectations, 
therefore requiring an adequate cognitive load (in terms of representations). However, it seems 
quite clear that Huron bases his hypothesis on the parallelism between qualia and expectations, in 
which a single difference in pitch would generate different qualia. If some qualia can emerge 
without explicit mental representations (without semantic content) it would be contradictory to 
expect different qualia to exhibit representational (or semantic) content. Otherwise the latter would 
fall into another category, rather than qualia, displaying additional properties that would differ from 
their proper characterisation. In other words, if Huron were right, even the violation of a single 
pitch’s expectation would give rise to a mental representation above other sensorimotorically 
grounded modalities.  
In this sense, the data from Herholtz and co-workers’ experiment cannot fit into the 
computational model of musical understanding, where perceptual experience is coded through top-
down and bottom-up processes, maintaining mental representation as the outcoming category that 
stems from their integration. On the contrary, Herholtz and colleagues show that the violation of 
expectations of a given melodic fragment has little to do with disembodied phenomena like mental 
objects. The principal and primal source of understanding, as will be shown later, is the body of the 
subjects, in its dynamic interplay with the brain and the intended musical object,  
The idea of avoiding representational processes has been explored in the last few years by 
different theoretical frameworks. A strong anti-representational account for cognition is for 
example the dynamic system theory (Beer, 1990; Thelen & Smith, 1994). Broadly speaking, this 
approach avoids any recruitment of centralized and isolated representational mechanisms. Rather, 
proponents of this standpoint try to explain how a living system can experience the world in terms 
of its embodied actions and its embodied situatedness. Instead of computational architectures 
underlying meaningless symbols manipulation, they assume that multiple systems implement 
categories such as action and perception ‘where each system is capable of residing in one of 
infinitely many continuous states’ (Barsalou, 2008, p. 621). This framework, therefore, tries to 
avoid the notion of mental representation by considering the environment as a place of salience, 
with which the animal interacts through sensorimotor, affective and meaningful patterns. In fact, 
‘over learning, states of these systems become coupled to reflect patterns of interaction with each 
other and with the environment effective in achieving goals’ (ibid.). But reconsidering the role of 
the interaction between embodied agents and the world in non-representationalist terms would also 
mean that expectations - being forms of interaction with the world - should somehow display a 
different format. If we identify expectations with sensorimotor patterns of interaction with the 
world, then it seems that some of the processes that the brain is doing, cannot be decoupled from 
the environment. Hence, as Noë puts it, perceptual experience becomes a ‘temporally extended 
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process of exploration of the environment on the part of an embodied animal’ (Noë, 2000, p. 128). 
To provide an example, let me introduce the following vignette: I am walking through Rome with 
my girlfriend when we suddenly hear some music coming from the left side of Piazza Navona. 
After we hear the sound we turn our heads towards the side of the square where a violinist is 
improvising a variation on a Caprice by Paganini. As Noë’s standpoint implies, my understanding 
of where the violinist is situated is not a conceptual experience (I do not need to elaborate a specific 
mental state to understand where the violinist is playing). Rather, my experience of the violinist 
standing of the left side of Piazza Navona consists in my sensorimotor expertise of how my 
meaningful movements through the environment would allow me to reach her there.  
 
 
It takes no thought or intellectual skill to know that to bring the item off to the left better 
into view, you must turn your head to the left […] [or] when you hear a sound as being 
on the left you don’t need to think about which way to turn your head in order to 
orientate toward the sound. […] You do need to think about how to maneuver a couch 
to squeeze it through a small passage. But you do not need, in the same way, to think 
about how to maneuver your body to squeeze it through the doorway. Just perceiving 
the doorway as having certain spatial qualities is perceiving it as enabling, requiring, or 
permitting certain kinds of movements with respect to it (Noë, 2004, p. 89). 
 
 
To use the terminology employed by Huron, my where-expectation does not require any sort of 
conceptual content. Recent studies on cross-modal mapping of musical properties, moreover, show 
that pitch-space can correspond cross-modally to physical space (Lidji et al., 2007; Eitan & 
Timmers, 2010) thus revealing a level of abstraction that is not entirely decoupled from the 
embodied situatedness in the physical world. From this standpoint, any isolationist analysis of 
single sounds’ attributes would ultimately result in the inability to grasp the complexity of the 
relationship that links embodied agents and musical objects. Huron, as I see it, perpetuates the 
Cartesian anxiety by neglecting the role of processes that could be easily considered as 
sensorimotorically grounded.  
As Dan Hutto recently noted, with regard to the cognitive approach: ‘this intellectualist way of 
understanding the basic nature of minds taps into a long tradition stretching back at least as far as 
Plato; it was revived by Descartes in the modern era, and regained ascendency, most recently, 
through the work of Chomsky during the most recent cognitive revolution’ (Hutto, 2013, p. 252). 
Given these considerations, I take the liberty to partially modify Huron’s story, by getting rid of 
premises (iv) and (v), as well as part of the conclusion, without substantially compromising the 
general scheme: 
 
 
i) Tonal music exhibits statistical properties on different levels (pitch, scale degrees etc.) 
ii) Listeners display sensitivity to the probabilities of different musical events and patterns 
iii) Listeners use these probabilities to generate predictive expectations about the future 
iv) Expectations imply mental representations 
v) Mental representations are physical brain states 
vi) The violation or confirmation of such expectations generates specific music-related qualia 
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Therefore à Qualia derive from brain states elicited by expectations and representations of a 
given musical parameter. 
 
 
By avoiding fully blown mental representation, Huron’s position still maintains the identity 
between qualia and brain states. This standpoint presents several problems and it is based on 
questionable assumptions. The next section offers a critique of such a position. 
 
 
2.3 - Musical qualia  
 
 
For qualia, Huron refers to the term firstly employed by Clarence Irving Lewis in his ‘Mind and 
World Order’ (1929), where he writes: 
 
 
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in 
different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these “qualia”. But 
although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to 
another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. 
Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of 
current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of 
any possible error because it is purely subjective (Lewis, 1929, p. 121). 
 
 
In other words, a quale, is the subjective experience associated with a given sensory event, a 
certain feature of the bodily sensation (Jackson, 1982). The theory of qualia, therefore, holds that 
‘for something to look red to someone is for it to give rise to an experience with a certain qualitative 
or sensational property. Its looking red consists in the fact that it gives rise to that qualitative state in 
a person’ (Noë, 2004, p. 133). The sensation of a middle C, or the feeling of closure evoked by a 
cadence in tonal music seem to be very familiar but still cannot be found outside our mind, as 
properties of the objects.  
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 
Traditional tonal cadential pattern 
	   31	  
If we ask a scientist about the sense of tension elicited by the cadential chords in the traditional 
harmonic progression I (in second inversion) V, I, her reply would be in terms of sound waves 
propagated through the medium of air. Sound travels through disturbances in given medium (air for 
example) pressure, being consituted by waves of different amplitude and frequency. 
But where is the tension provoked by this passage if it is not present in the outside world? Where 
is the sensation that makes me feel the need to solve this melodic pattern to the tonic? I believe, for 
reasons that will be clear at the end of this chapter (see in particular the next section), those 
questions to be wrong questions. As we will see, they only perpetuate an aprioristic Cartesian 
presupposition, and hence can be classified as category mistakes. However most philosophers and 
neuroscientists do take these questions seriously and, like Huron, suggest that the answer has to be 
found inside the brain. In particular, a standard answer would be as follows:  
 
 
i) A musical stimulus reaches the sensory input   
ii) The sensory input sends the signal to the auditory cortex 
iii) A particular neural state would be set up  
Therefore à	  This neural state corresponds to my subjective feelings (qualia) 
 
 
As previously discussed, between (iii) and the conclusion of the argument lies the explanatory 
gap of the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. The two solutions usually adopted to explain how (iii) 
and (iv) relate are dualism (qualia are immaterial entities generated by a physical substance) or 
reductionism (qualia are to be identified with a particular brain state). In both cases, however, there 
is a problem. The first approach will always face the ontological issue of causation while the 
second usually sees the brain as a machine isolated from the rest of the nervous system. Given his 
commitment to identifying mental/brain states to qualia, Huron’s general discussion implies that the 
musical mind is functionally independent from the dynamic interactions between brain, body and 
world. Many arguments, however, have tried to reject the identity theoy between neural states and 
qualia. In particular, it has been posited that two functionally identical living systems might display 
complete different qualia.  
The inverted spectrum argument originally conceived by John Locke (1689), proposes a scenario 
where two different persons (name them John and Mike) are qualitatively inverted with respect to 
the colours they experience in the world - although their brain and visual system work in the very 
same way. Both John and Mike refer to green apples as “green”. When John sees green apples, his 
experience is about what everyone would consider as “green”. However, when Mike sees green 
apples he has, for unknown reasons, a reddish experience. What follows then, is that it is possible to 
imagine that qualia (the sensation of the greenishness of green) have a different relationship with a 
given brain state. We can in fact conceive a change in the property of how a given object looks to us 
without any physical basis (Tye, 1995). As Noë puts it, the inverted spectrum advocates a position 
where ‘two individuals who are identical in all behavioural dispositions (including their 
sensorimotor skills and discriminatory capacities) could differ in what it is like for them to 
experience something red looking’ (Noë, 2004, p. 124).  
Another argument that would undermine the identity theory endorsed by Huron is the Zombie 
argument developed, among others, by David Chalmers (1996). This mental experiment relies on a 
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line of reasoning that has been previously employed by Descartes4 (1637 [1960]) and assumes the 
logical possibility of an imaginary world dominated by creatures exactly like normal human beings, 
who, however, lack consciousness. If, in this imaginary world, bodies with no consciousness 
(zombies) were physiologically indistinguishable from human beings, then, even its logical 
conceivability would be a sound argument to posit that qualia are non-physical entities. To have a 
clearer picture of the argument we can use the following scheme: 
 
 
i) I can conceive a world of zombies 
ii) If I can conceive something, that something is possible 
iii) Zombies are possible 
Therefore à mental states can be distinct from the body’s physical state 
 
 
The rise of physicalist models to explain the nature of human cognition made clear that 
everything that happens in the world must have a physical causation. As discussed before, however, 
it is quite hard to make conscious processes fit into this reductionist view. While materialists would 
claim that mental states are basically a matter of neural processes, scholars who refuse this view 
basically collapse into dualist-like asumptions, being committed to the idea of non-physical 
categories. David Chalmers falls in between these two categorizations, considering that his 
approach could be defined as a “naturalistic dualism5” (Chalmers, 1996). The main problem with 
the zombie argument, as well as the inverted spectrum argument, however, lies in the second 
premise. Does conceivability really entail possibility? Daniel Dennett, for example, fiercely rejects 
the assumption that conceivability is sufficient for logical possibility and then offers several 
arguments against the existence of qualia themselves (1988; 1991). I think it is worth drawing a 
brief comparison between Dennett and Huron, here. Dennett’s strategy consists firstly in 
individuating four main properties defining qualia (1988, p. 385). In his view, qualia are: 
 
 
• Ineffable - it is impossibile to communicate a quale to other persons. The only way to 
apprehend qualia is by direct experience. 
• Intrinsic - they are inside the organism and therefore non-relational. 
• Private - they are subjective, so any interpersonal comparison would be impossible.  
• Directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness - there is no intermediate level or 
representational inference.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For Descartes non-human creatures like animals are essentially automata whose behaviour is ruled only by the 
principle of mechanics. Given that animals do not display language creativity and appropriate non-verbal behaviour - 
which are two main typical human behaviours - he concluded that no machine could realistically behave like a human 
being. What would, then, clearly differentiate human from non-human creatures? As previously discussed, what it is 
required is precisely a non-physical category like the human mind. Apparently, from this conclusion, it follows that an 
imaginary world populated by bodies lacking thinking substances it is not conceivable. 5	  Chalmers admits that the brain generates mental states, but at the same time he maintains that mental states are 
ontologically separated from brain activity - which is the reason why he talks about explanatory gap.	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We can immediately see a radical incompatibility between the above-mentioned properties and 
the way Huron treats qualia. Let’s for example consider the following quote, where the latter 
illustrates his qualia survey: 
 
 
I asked ten experienced Western-enculturated musicians to describe the different scale 
degrees for the major key. Each musician received the following instruction: For each 
of the following scale degrees describe as best you can the distinctive quality or 
character of that tone. Describe how the tone makes you feel in as much detail as 
possible. Imagine the tones for the major key only. Please think of pitches rather than 
chords. Asking musicians to perform a task like this makes a lot of assumptions. The 
task assumes that isolated tones are able to evoke qualia independent of some musical 
context. It assumes that musicians can introspect about such matters without actually 
hearing the sounds. The task assumes that language can be used to express the inef- 
fable qualities people experience. The survey is also limited to the major scale with no 
consideration of the various minor scales (Huron, 2006, p. 144). 
 
 
Huron aprioristically assumes that qualia are independent from the context, they can be rather 
easily expressed through language and that introspection could be enough to provoke the same 
qualia that the subjects would experience while hearing actual sounds. I am not saying that Huron is 
wrong in assuming that qualia display those properties - after all they only contradict Dennett’s 
position. But the fact that all of these assumptions are not rigorously motivated raises several 
problems for the architecture of the whole argument. Huron, furthermore, agrees with Dennett, 
about the second point. Qualia, for both of them, are intrinsic to the animal. To be fair, Huron also 
recognizes the role of the socio-cultural environment in determining the results of the computations 
(Huron 2006, p. 109) that eventually generate qualia but, as this computation implies, he holds that 
qualia are not directly experienced.  
But let’s go back to Dennett’s argument. After having individuated these properties, he asserts 
that although qualia stand for the intuitive way in which things seem to us, conscious experience has 
no special properties to make sense of them. To defend this claim he provides fifteen arguments, or 
mental experiments, named “intuition pumps” in order to show that, after all, the word “qualia” is 
only an excess term in the vocabulary. If we were able to associate the term itself to some referents 
(that we already know precisely), then there would be no necessity to postulate the existence of 
qualia. Our experience of the colour green will be described as being “green” and using an entity 
like a quale to make sense of it only generates an unnecessary contradiction. If indeed qualia define 
with another word something already well understood, like the colour “green” then there is no need 
to postulate their existence. There is no mechanism in the brain that would justify this claim. He 
therefore concludes:  
 
 
So when we look one last time at our original characterisation of qualia, as ineffable, 
intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience, we find that there is 
nothing to fill the bill. […] So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there 
simply are no qualia at all (Dennett, 1988 p. 409). 
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Thus, Dennett ends up rejecting the notion of qualia, denying that there is a hard problem of 
consciousness at all (see also O’Regan & Noë, 2001b; Hutto, 2006, Cohen & Dennett, 2011). Let’s 
briefly recapitulate, now. Huron posits that qualia exist, being intrinsic, representational and 
comparable among different people because easily communicable through language. Dennett, on 
the other hand, claims that the notion of qualia itself is fundamentally confusing, and therefore the 
hard problem of consciousness, as well as qualia, are simply non-problems. Who is right then?  
 
 
2.4 - Towards an enactive solution 
 
 
Besides the conclusion and some important differences in defining qualia, both Dennett and 
Huron share a common view. Simply put, they assume that everything that is related to the mind - 
qualia or not qualia, hard problem or not hard problem - must occur inside the boundaries of the 
skull. In fact, as previously pointed out, the only property of qualia they agree on is their being 
intrinsic - located inside the living system. I think that this is an assumption as well, pace Dennett. 
Unlike Huron, Dennett denies the existences of entities like qualia but - like Huron - does not deny 
the realm of subjectivity. And they both reduce it to brain mechanisms.  
According to Evan Thompson, however, ‘the standard formulation of the hard problem is 
embedded in the Cartesian framework of the “mental” versus the “physical” […]. The guiding issue 
is no longer the contrived one of whether a subjectivist concept of consciousness can be derived 
from an objectivist concept of the body. Rather, the guiding issue is to understand the emergence of 
living subjectivity from living being, where living being is understood as already possessed of an 
interiority that escapes the objectivist picture of nature’ (Thompson, 2007, p. 236). Following this 
analysis, we could distinguish between the morphology of the body and its dynamical, sensorimotor 
interplay with the environment. This paradigm shift from the standard view presents a different way 
to think about the explanatory gap. In this case there is no dualism between mental and physical 
entities, but rather, there is continuity between two different typologies of embodiment (Hanna & 
Thompson, 2003). The traditional formulation of the hard problem of consciousness calls for a 
solution in terms of accepting the separation between mental and physical (dualism) or in terms of 
reducing the mental into the brain (materialism). If a zombie is functionally and corporeally 
identical to me, then it is not even conceivable to imagine a scenario in which they lack conscious 
experience. Subjectivity is animation, but animation is also coupling with the environment. You 
cannot separate these two categories without applying a rough reification (see also Sheets-
Johnstone, 2012). Note that this move enables inference of a quasi-similar conclusion to the one 
provided by Dennett, though without reducing subjectivity to brain mechanisms.  
While Dennett refuses to solve the hard problem because of the controversial usage of qualia, 
many proponents of the enactive paradigm refuse to solve the hard problem because both dualism 
and internalism (or reductionism, or physicalism) are not valid alternatives.  
Hutto and Myin are quite straightforward about this point. In their “recipe” (Hutto & Myin 2013, 
p. 168) to overcome the hard problem of consciousness, step two asks the reader to ‘deny that there 
is a relation between the phenomenal and physical that needs explaining. Consequently, solving the 
Hard Problem isn’t just hard; it is impossible’ (ibid., p. 169). Without the metaphysical distinction 
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between mental and physical phenomena, we are left with two different modalities of being-in-the-
world (Heidegger, 1927) - the body’s physiology and its embodied subjectivity - though conceived 
as fundamentally inseparable. In other words, the sensorimotor primacy posited by the enactive 
perspective moves away from the notion of qualia, considering phenomenological consciousness as 
a world-involving skilful activity (Noë, 2009).  
The questions “where is the mind?” or “where is the tension provoked by a dominant chord 
during a cadence if it is not present in the outside world?” do not make any sense, because 
phenomenal experience involves processes that are part of the dynamic interplay that links an 
animal with the environment, throughout sensorimotor patterns of meaningful (i.e. goal-directed) 
actions and consequently not reducible to mechanisms inside the skull. The tension of the dominant 
chord therefore has no location, being part of the mutual determination involving musical subjects 
and objects. Pelinski (2005) provides a useful insight into this problem, when considering musical 
contexts: ‘it would be a mistake to interpret the insistence on the embodiment of our musical 
experiences as a naïve attempt to substitute reason with the body, or intersubjective rationality with 
subjective experience. Neither is the body in the mind nor is the mind in the body: both phenomena 
are imbricated in musical experience to such an extent that it seems meaningless - and unnecessary 
- to create “clear and distinct” representations of one or the other’. If we are therefore to overcome 
the Cartesian leftovers of many traditional ways to think about music - for example in terms of 
cognitive ability (Sloboda, 1985) - the first step will be to consider a living system in its totality, 
and not as an intellectual web of representations inside its skull, nor as a functionally body-
indipendent, brain-centred organism.  
 
 
2.5 - A challenge in music research 
 
 
Before exploring the implications of a truly enactive approach to musical experience, a word on 
the methodology. It is commonly assumed that the first step in conducting research on music might 
be providing a clear and precise idea of the investigated object. But, regrettably, a simple and 
unproblematic definition which sums up in a bare statement all the different features and nuances of 
past and present music doesn’t exist yet (Merriam, 1964; Molino, 1975; Cook, 1990; Nettl, 2005) 
for ‘there is no limit to the number or the genre of variables that might intervene in a definition of 
the musical’ (Nattiez, 1987, p. 42). Furthermore, this strategy would also be pointless as not always 
what we - Western listeners, scholars or musicians - consider music is intended as such (Bohlman, 
2002; Delalande, 2009). The complexity of musical practices can indeed be described as a set 
without well-defined boundaries (Giannattasio, 1998) impossible to reduce into a predefined and 
abstracted notion of music.  
However, this crucial position has not always been accompanied by an adequate epistemological 
caution, and many contributors in current music research still continue to pursue the goal of 
investigating music given a predefined idea or looking explicitly for a strict definition, two 
strategies which may lead to rough argumentations and inadequate logical passages. Usually, in fact, 
the classic line of reasoning aims to define music from one of its physical properties (e.g. 
McDermott & Hauser, 2005, p. 30) or from one of its specific functions (e.g. Schubert, 2009-2010, 
p. 76). Criticizing the first speculative paradigm, Cook states that although ‘there have been many 
attempts to define what music is in terms of the specific attributes of musical sounds […] it is not 
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possible to arrive at a satisfactory definition of music simply in terms of sound’ (Cook, 1990, p. 10-
11). Anyhow, Robert J. Zatorre, trying ‘to make sense of a complex phenomenon such as music’ 
(Zatorre, 2001, p. 232) justifies his decision to explore the processing of pitches asserting that ‘pitch 
appears to be a central aspect of all music’ (ibid.) apparently assuming the problematic (Piana, 2007) 
distinction between musical and non musical sounds (see Pierce, 1983) and generalizing from an 
aprioristic notion of music, despite a great number of possible counterexamples: for example 
Nattiez (quoted in Giannattasio, 2005, p. 989) shows how the Inuit population use the term nipi not 
only for all the facts that we intend as musical, but also for noise and language. Similarly, Japanese 
shakuhaci music and sanjo music of Korea ‘fluctuate constantly around the notional pitches in 
terms of which the music is organized’ (Cook, 1990, p. 10) and some African music (see for 
example Arom, 2000) - i.e. percussive music - does not require fixed pitches at all. Finally, also in 
our familiar Western music, we can see an emancipation of the so-called non-musical sounds 
perhaps since Luigi Russolo’s manifesto L’arte dei rumori 6  (1913) and, then, in many 
contemporary musical techniques, from microtonality to electronic music (Holmes, 1985; Griffiths, 
1995). Zatorre’s approach will, at most, shed light on how the human brain processes pitches 
through a precise description of its functional organization, a different goal from understanding the 
complex phenomenon of music.  
Similarly, an approach based on the study of a single function cannot explain the various 
manifestations of musical practices. Let’s consider for instance the argument scheme used by the 
evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller to demonstrate that ‘music is functionally analogous to 
sexually selected acoustic displays in other species’ (Miller, 2000, p. 338). Forcing the classical 
Darwinian approach (Darwin, 1871; Kivy, 1959) the author assumes that music and dance are 
basically two sets of indicators of the executer’s state of health, force and coordination, suggesting 
that the function of rhythm would be to show the cerebral capacity to sequence complex movements 
(see also Mithen, 2005), while melodic creativity reveals the singer’s inventiveness and intelligence. 
The article stresses the possibility that chant has to be supposed dangerous as it could make the 
singer observable (audible) by predators. Furthermore, considering Jimi Hendrix’s sexual 
behaviours7 as a current example of how music has conserved its original sexual-selection origins, 
Miller adds that ‘our ancestral hominid-Hendrixes could never say, ‘OK, our music’s good enough, 
we can stop now’, because they were competing with all the hominid-Eric-Claptons, hominid-Jerry-
Garcias, and hominid-John-Lennons. The aesthetic and emotional power of music is exactly what 
we would expect from sexual selection’s arms race to impress minds like ours’ (Miller, 2000, p. 
331). The author’s argument, however, seems to be based on a predefined idea of music derived 
from only one of its presumed phylogenetic functions (Merriam, 1964) and, not without a hint of 
irony, Fitch (2006) analysing Miller’s points, wrote: ‘for every Bach with many children there may 
be a Beethoven who died childless, and for every popular conductor or lead guitarist there may be a 
lonely oboist or bassist’ (ibid. p. 201). According to David Huron (2003) in fact, there are at least 
eight theories about the birth of music: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Translated as The art of noises, the book contains the main ideas of his futurist aesthetics, namely that the industrial 
revolution had given modern men a greater capacity to appreciate more complex sounds then the traditional ones used 
in music. That’s the reason why he construed the intonarumori (noisemaker) a noise-generating device to be used in 
concerts and performances.  
7 ‘He did have sexual liaisons with hundreds of groupies […]. As Darwin realized, music’s aesthetics and emotional 
power, far from indicating a transcendental origin, points to a sexual selection origin where too much is never enough’ 
(Miller, 2000, p. 331). 
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• Mate selection: music is an indicator of the executer’s state of health, force and 
coordination, playing a key role in sexual reproduction processes.  
 
• Social cohesion: the establishment of music is based on its power to gather people, a 
highly important feature considering the history of humanity itself.  
 
• Group effort: through synchronisation, musical practices helped the groups’ 
coordination, facilitating collective working practices.  
 
• Perceptual development: music is an activity aimed at developing peculiar perceptual 
skills	  
 
• Motor skill development: singing and making music represent the concrete basis of 
some motor abilities. From this perspective, singing can be considered an antecedent 
of speaking.  
 
• Conflict reduction: in contrast with language, which may create problems related to 
the arguments debated, singing together might have provided a safer social activity.  
 
• Safe time passing: music can be considered as safe activity, where nothing harmful 
can happen.  
 
• Transgenerational communication: music favoured the transmission of oral 
information across countries and time.  	  	  
Besides these theories, moreover, we can add the homeostatic hypothesis provided by Niels 
Wallin (2000) and the polemical counter-proposal of Steven Pinker (1997) who considers music to 
be auditory cheesecake (p. 595). Given the relevance of each proposal, it seems hardly 
accomplishable to provide an exclusive, defining, account of music by focusing on just one of them. 
Outside the field of the phylogeny of music, ethnomusicology and comparative musicology often 
make comparisons between different notions of music investigating their social and cultural aspects 
in local and global contexts (e.g. Blacking, 1973; Feld, 1982; Rowell, 1992) and, even if defining 
music ‘is not the ultimate aim of the ethnomusicologist’ (Nettl, 2005, p. 25) one of the discipline’s 
main tasks seems to be ‘studying the definitions provided by the world’s musical cultures in order 
to shed light on the way of conceiving music’ (ibid.). Though not explicitly dealing with any sort of 
definition, the methodology used by most of music analysis shares an implicit assumption with the 
ethnomusicological approach: music can be considered as an already structured material shaped in 
well defined parameters (pitches, rhythm, dynamics etc.) since its constitution can be studied only 
within a sociological and cultural perspective (in the case of ethnomusicology) or through its inner 
rules (e.g. tonality, modality, etc.) from musical analysis.  
On the other hand, implicitly considering the musical signal as an unidirectional, external, stream 
of information coming from the environment, many studies on the physiological basis of music 
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perception aim to localize and describe domain-specific, innate and independent brain centres 
which represent a high level interactive system of music processing. Indeed ‘it is common in this 
literature to read suggestions that a certain cognitive characteristic (e.g. pitch perception) is 
governed by neural tissue at a certain location (e.g. primary auditory cortex)’ (Tan et al., 2010, p. 54) 
and, for instance, Peretz and Coltheart (2003) admit that ‘musical abilities are now studied as part 
of a distinct mental module with its own procedures and knowledge bases that are associated with 
dedicated and separate neural substrates’ (ibid., p. 688). As Prinz puts it, this paradigm assumes that 
‘like a Swiss Army Knife, the mind is an assembly of specialized tools, each of which has been 
designed for some particular purpose’ (Prinz, 2006a, p. 22). As we saw, however, this model is 
flawed and based on aprioristic assumptions derived from the Cartesian tradition.  
 
 
2.6 - The spectre of objectivism 
 
 
In his book Ways of listening: An Ecological Approach to the Perception of Musical Meaning 
(2005), Eric Clarke explicitly acknowledges the need to overcome the dichotomies between the 
subjects and objects of a musical context, passive and active listening, autonomy and heteronomy of 
musical experience. However, as we saw in the previous paragraph, most of the research in music 
cognition is still dominated by radical dualistic commitments. In particular, it relies on the 
assumption that music is something external - outside from our mind - while music cognition is 
something internal - because the mind is supposedly located inside our head.  
While musical analysis, for example, studies the objective properties of music, the modular 
account of music cognition reflects the opposite view, considering the subjective individual 
properties (mental states, brain states, or modules), admitting a strong separation between musical 
subjects and musical objects. But being committed to these radical divisions would leave the 
Cartesian presuppositions unaltered. David Huron’s methodology exemplifies this separation very 
well. On the one side we would have a deep analysis of the statistical properties of music, while on 
the other side there would be brain states, only causally related to music through qualia. In light of 
these considerations, therefore, we could make an approximate distinction between two different 
ways to investigate music and musicality referring to: (i) an objectivist and (ii) a subjectivist 
perspective.  
Both these approaches take for granted the relation between music and the perceiver/executer 
focusing alternatively on the subjective and the objective8 side, considered as two different aspects 
of musicality. But in the concrete musical activity the subject and the object are two inseparable 
features of any musical experience (Cook, 1990). The above mentioned approaches are two 
different sides of the same coin, and represent what Husserl (1901; 1907; 1936) called objectivism: 
the scientific and naturalistic claim that reality is objective, and that sense data correspond with it, 
excluding from the research the first-person viewpoint. Noticing that the natural attitude is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 With regard to this point, we could also use the classical phenomenological distinction between noetic and noematic. 
Using Husserl’s terminology, noematic refers to that which is experienced (it’s that through which the object is grasped) 
while noetic is ‘the concretely complete intentive mental process approached in such a way that its noetic components 
are clearly emphasised’ (Moran, 2000, p. 156). In an intentional relationship between a subject and an object, the noetic 
is real and fundamental (as acts of consciousness), while the noematic is dependent and unreal because that which is 
perceived is constituted, thus far as it is perceived, by the subject’s intentional acts. 
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attitude that obscures itself and remains unknown to itself, Husserl invites us to take off our usual 
blinker to look from a new perspective at the complexity of the world and its various 
representations going ‘back to the things themselves’ (Husserl, 1901, p. 7; 1912-1929 [first book]). 
 To show the ambivalence of the objective and the subjective side in the realm of musical 
experience we might consider the article by Fred Lerdahl (2009) Genesis and architecture of the 
GTTM project, written on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of a 
Generative Theory of Tonal Music (Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983) which retrospectively shows the 
birth of one of the most discussed and influential theories in music psychology (Menin, 2009, p. 15). 
The author, finding in the Chomskian linguistic theory the crucial influence for structuring the lines 
of research developed by him and Jackendoff, specifies the reasons of their interest: 
 
 
Our interest was not in a literal transfer of linguistic to musical concepts, as Leonard 
Bernstein (1976) attempted. Rather, it was Chomsky’s way of framing issues that 
attracted us: the supposition of specialized mental capacities, the belief that they could 
be studied rigorously by investigating the structure of their outputs, the distinction 
between an idealized capacity and its external and often accidental manifestations, the 
idea of a limited set of principles or rules that could generate a potentially infinite set of 
outputs, and the possibility that some of these principles might be unvarying beneath a 
capacity’s many different cultural manifestations (Lerdahl, 2009, p. 187).    
 
 
In other words, the two scholars were enamoured by the possibility to use a subjective 
methodology in the study of music. However, after a short section about Heinrich Schenker’s 
attempt to define a fundamental structure (Ursatz) at the basis of the tonal music’s complexity, they 
criticized9 such a setting of the problem, orienting their research to an apparently opposite side, 
though conceived in line with the assumptions and interests of the Chomskian approach:  
 
 
Rather than begin with a putative ideal structure and generate musical surfaces, we 
would begin with musical surfaces and generate their structural descriptions [...]. Three 
methodological perspectives borrowed from generative linguistics helped launch the 
enterprise. First, we would assume as given the musical surface - essentially quantized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ‘For a number of reasons we soon gave up this Chomskian-Schenkerian approach. First, we could not justify the 
Ursatz. Although this a priori construct was understandably central to Schenker, a thinker steeped in 19th-century 
German philosophical idealism, its status made little sense to a modern, scientifically inclined American. Nor could 
schema theory in cognitive psychology (Neisser, 1967) defend this construct, for the Ursatz is too remote from a 
musical surface to be picked up and organized by a listener who is not already predisposed to find it. Second, the Ursatz 
is inapplicable to music of other times and cultures. We sought a theoretical framework that could accommodate diverse 
musical idioms. Third, the non-rhythmic character of the Ursatz presented a formal and musical problem. How was 
rhythm to be introduced into the derivation, and why should it have inferior status? Fourth, even supposing that the 
Ursatz or some comparable structure could be justified as a foundation, there would be very many possible ways of 
generating a given musical surface. What would determine an acceptable derivation? How could derivations be 
constrained? Fifth, it was not interesting to begin our work by considering abstract background musical structures and 
presumed transformations; the exercise felt too abstract. Sixth and most importantly, what of psychological interest 
would there be even if we managed to build a system that generated this or that piece from an Ursatz-like foundation?  
What mattered to us was not the output per se but the structure attributed to the output. It was not clear how generating 
a piece could reveal much about mental structures and their principles of organization’ (Lerdahl, 2009, p. 188). 
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pitches and rhythms with dynamic and timbral attributes - without worrying about the 
complex perceptual mechanisms that construct the surface from the audio signal. 
Second, our quest for cognitive principles would proceed from our own musical 
intuitions. Only later would we seek experimental corroboration. Third, we would build 
a final-state rather than processing theory, on the view that it was advantageous to 
specify the mental structures in question before trying to articulate how they operated in 
real time (Lerdahl, 2009, pp. 188-189). 
 
 
Although this approach has been developed from the original theoretical paradigm it presents a 
radical form of objectivism, showing the common presupposition of both methodologies, namely 
that it’s productive and useful to investigate distinctly objective and subjective aspects of musical 
phenomena, implicitly assuming that the specific features of music are substantially avulsed from 
the concrete practices through which it constitutes itself. But, as Evan Thompson states, ‘to reduce 
conscious experience to external structure and function would be to make consciousness disappear 
[…]; to reduce external structure and function to internal consciousness would be to make external 
things disappear’ (Thompson, 2007, p. 225).  
Given those remarks we might consider an alternative approach for studying this still mysterious 
musical object: an enactive way, which considers the perceived and the perceiver as two inseparable 
aspects of musical experience for ‘in this transaction between the subject of sensation and the 
sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the other suffers the action, or that one confers 
significance on the other. Apart from the probing of my eye or my hand, and before my body 
synchronises with it, the sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945 [1962], p. 
214). It is no coincidence that I continuously refer to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Edmund Husserl 
in this paragraph. Enactivism shares indeed many aspects of its characterisation with the 
philosophical movement called phenomenology. Pure phenomenological research seeks essentially 
(i) to describe rather than explain and (ii) to start from a perspective free from hypotheses or 
preconceptions (Husserl, 1901). In particular, as the next chapter will show, the enactive notion of 
sense-making can be derived from the phenomenological notion of intentionality.  
A genuine investigation of music, therefore, cannot use a merely analytical approach that does 
not take into consideration the subject, nor a cognitivistic perspective, which tries to explain our 
musical behaviour in light of aprioristically defined mental processes. As emerged, after all, these 
standpoints share the same assumption that music and mind are two distinct categories and 
therefore require two different methodologies to be investigated. In contrast to this view, enactivism 
is focused on the codetemination between embodied agents and their environment, ruling out any 
possible distinction between mind and matter, brain and mind, brain and body, internal and external, 
subjective and objective.  
Before embarking on the exploration of such an approach, let’s conclude with a brief summary 
of the main differences between enactivism and cognitivism. Daniel Dennett’s critical review (1993) 
of Varela and colleagues’ seminal work of enactivism - The Embodied Mind (1991) - provides a 
clear and brief summary of the main assumptions at the basis of the enactive approach. As he points 
out, the fundamental differences are encapsulated in answers to three questions (Dennett 1993, p. 
121): 
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• Question 1: What is cognition? 
 
Cognitivist Answer: Information processing as symbolic computation - rule-based manipulation of 
symbols. 
Enactivist Answer: Enaction. A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world. 
 
• Question 2: How does it work? 
 
Cognitivist Answer: Through any device that can support and manipulate discrete functional 
elements - the symbols. The system interacts only with the form of the symbols (their physical 
attributes), not their meaning. 
 
Enactivist Answer: Through a network consisting of multiple levels of interconnected, sensorimotor 
subnetworks. 
 
• Question 3: How do I know when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? 
 
Cognitivist Answer: When the symbols appropriately represent some aspect of the real world, and 
the information processing leads to a successful solution to the problem given to the system. 
 
Enactivist Answer: When it becomes part of an ongoing existing world (as the young of every 
species do) or shapes a new one (as happens in evolutionary history). 
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Chapter 3 
The mark of embodiment10 
 
 
Nothing determines me from outside, not because nothing acts upon me, but, on the 
contrary, because I am from the start outside myself and open to the world  
 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
 
To say that I have entered into the world, “come to the world”, or that there is a world 
or that I have a body is one and the same thing 
 
- Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 
 
 
3.1 - From dualism to Neurophenomenology  
 
 
In the previous two chapters I have argued that traditional cognitive science and most of  modern 
music psychology are still under the influence of Descartes’ philosophy. As emerged, this 
commitment gave rise to problematic models of music cognition, given the intrinsic dichotomies 
that characterise any form of dualism. In particular, the separation between musical objects 
(considered as external streams of information) and musical subjects (conceived as disembodied 
minds), reflects the aprioristic assumptions that (i) music is something already defined and fully 
constituted in the external world and that (ii) music is a cognitive representation, underlined by 
specialized mental or brain states. In both cases, what underlies each corresponding research 
methodology is the reification of the musical object, always considered as something fully given - in 
the external world or inside the head. For this reason, I have also argued that no definition of music 
is necessary (or sufficient) for a genuine investigation of related issues. Starting an investigation on 
music cognition with an already given definition of music would only vitiate any possible 
methodological paradigm. As I have tried to show, many scholars in music psychology are taking 
for granted assumptions about the nature of music and the nature of cognition that are (i) not 
corroborated by concrete musical practices and (ii) not sufficiently defended from a theoretical and 
empirical standpoint. Is there any alternative?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This chapter contains material previously published as Schiavio, A. (2012). Constituting the musical object. A 
neurophenomenological perspective on musical research. In Teorema, 31(3), pp. 63-80, and as Matyja, J., & Schiavio, 
A. (2013).  Enactive music cognition. Background and research themes. In Constructivist Foundations, 8(3), pp. 351-
357. Moreover, it contains material from the following articles in preparation: Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in 
preparation). An enactive perspective on infants’ musicality, and Schiavio, A., Menin, D., & Matyja, J. (in preparation). 
Music in the flesh. Sense-making and embodied simulation in musical understanding. 	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The enactive approach, along with its intrinsic phenomenological and embodied roots, seems to 
be a perspective able to treat music as an object in constitution - an object that is never externally 
given or fully immanent to one’s mind - and to provide a biologically plausible interpretation of 
music cognition. The point here is that subjects and objects of musical experience are two 
inseparable categories that actively and mutually participate in the process of perception and sense-
making. In order to justify this position, this chapter will focus on the roots of the enactive 
approach, integrating theoretical and empirical arguments, thus drawing from the working 
hypothesis of what Francisco Varela called neurophenomenology11. According to Thompson 
(2007), neurophenomenological research aims to integrate (i) the phenomenological analysis of 
consciousness, (ii) the dynamic system theory and (iii) the empirical investigation of biological 
systems. Accordingly, my plan for this chapter is therefore the following: I will 
 
 
(i) Introduce the crucial notion of musical intentionality, emerging from a purely 
phenomenological analysis  
(ii) Show how the dynamic system theory is used in embodied cognitive science 
(iii) Analyse the empirical discovery of the human mirror mechanism as well as its 
implications and interpretations 
(iv) Redefine musical intentionality on the basis of (ii) and (iii) 
 
 
The notion of musical intentionality, or musical sense-making, represents an important step 
forward for musical research as it defines musical subjects and musical objects in a completely 
different way from the traditional cognitive science of music. In this entire chapter I will maintain a 
working methodology that always looks at approaches, models and concepts with an enactive eye. 
Rather than just presenting a given standpoint I will try to propose a dialogue between these 
approaches and the enactive perspective. 
 
 
3.2 - Intentionality and Musical Intentionality  
 
 
The doctrine of intentionality provided by Brentano (1874) reintroduced in modern philosophy 
the discussion on the Latin term intentio used among the scholastic thinkers (see Chisholm 1967) to 
indicate what is before the mind in thought. This term ‘literally means a tension or stretching (from 
the verb intendere, to stretch)’ (Crane, 2001, p. 9) and actually derives from the Aristotelian word 
noema (Knudsen, 1982). Brentano’s main goal, in using this terminology, was to make a clear 
distinction between physical and psychical phenomena, arguing that intentionality is the main 
characteristic of all acts of consciousness:   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This research methodology holds that ‘phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their counter 
parts in cognitive science relate to each other through reciprocal constraints. The key point here is that by emphasizing a 
co-determination of both accounts one can explore the bridges, challenges, insights and contradictions between them. 
This means that both domains of phenomena have equal status in demanding a full attention and respect for their 
specificity’ (Varela 1996, p. 343).	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Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages 
called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object 
(which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all 
do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something 
is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This 
intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical 
phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena 
by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within 
themselves (Brentano 1874, [1995], pp. 88-89). 
 
 
However, many scholars considered Brentano’s thesis about the object-directedness of all the 
acts of consciousness as too strong (McIntyre & Woodroof Smith, 1989). Considering 
consciousness as intentional insofar as it refers to, or is directed at, an object, Husserl (1912-1929 
[first book]; 1931) argued that consciousness may have intentional and non-intentional phases, and 
intentionality is what gives to it its objective meaning. Indeed, for example, ‘moods such as 
depression or euphoria are not always “of” or “about” something. Moreover, as Husserl notes, 
sensations such as pain or dizziness are not obviously representational or “directed towards” some 
object’ (McIntyre & Woodroof Smith, 1989, p. 149). But what happens when thinking about non-
existent objects (i.e. Pegasus)? In this case there is no actual object, but only the act of thought with 
a particular intentional content - a particular meaning (Crane, 2006).  
Thus, what distinguishes intentional from non-intentional experiences is the former's having 
intentional content. Husserl, whose work can be seen as the first proper phenomenological 
investigation of intentionality (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) holds that the intentional directedness 
does not consist in the relation to special (mental) objects towards which one is directed, but rather 
is conceived as the possession by mental acts of a noematic structure.  
 
 
The intentional openness of consciousness is an integral part of its being, not something 
that has to be added from without. Thus, intentionality does not presuppose the 
existence of two different entities - consciousness and the object. All that is needed for 
intentionality to occur is the existence of an experience with an appropriate internal 
structure of object-directedness (Zahavi, 2003, p. 21).  
 
 
There is intentionality only when there is a duality between the noetic and the noematic side as 
‘intentionality is the name for a certain “achievement” or “accomplishment”: that of the 
consciousness of identity from within the “Heraclitean flux” of flowing subjective life. Any object 
is a “pole of identity” within such a flux’ (Smith, 2003, p. 68). Another problem regards the 
ontological status of the intentional objects of the experience. According to Husserl (1907; 1912-
1929 [first book]; see also Ghigi, 2007) objects in perception are always transcendent because they 
are experienced as perspectivally given (what is given to consciousness is not the whole object but 
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only a particular aspect). Only my consciousness can make sense of that particular transcendental 
object, and experience it as a unity:	  
 
 
Reflective experience teaches us that there is no progressively perceived thing, nor any 
element perceived as a determination within it, that does not appear, during perception, 
in multiplicities of different appearances, even though it is given and grasped as 
continuously one and the same thing. But in normal ongoing perception, only this unity, 
only the thing itself stands in the comprehending gaze while functioning processes of 
lived experience remain extra-thematic, ungrasped and latent. Perception is not a simple 
empty “having” of perceived thing, but rather a flowing lived experience of subjective 
appearances synthetically uniting themselves in a consciousness of the self-same entity 
existing in this way or that (Husserl, 1925-1962 [1977], quoted in Smith, 2003, p. 67). 
 
 
As a subject I cannot experience the world. Rather, what I can experience is the intentional 
meaning of the world, while the world itself is the object intended, which is transcendental by 
definition. Husserl argued that to discover the intimate essence of an object without taking it for 
granted, as we commonly do in our everyday life, the unique useful approach consists in avoiding 
the natural attitude of the naïve observer with the suspension of belief in the existence or non-
existence of phenomena. Husserl (1912-1929) uses the term epoché (a word derived from the 
sceptics’ tradition, which means cessation) to describe this process of suspension of judgements  
(Moran, 2000, p. 148).  
Suspending the empirical subjectivity, our consciousness (now considered as pure Ego) can 
define the pure essence of a psychological phenomenon. The pure Ego, finally free from the natural 
attitude has the Cartesian cogito as its principle and this “I think” can direct its acts (cogitationes) 
immanently - when the objects are within the Ego - or transcendently - in the realms outside my 
Ego. In the natural attitude, as a naïve observer, when I look at an external object like a tree, I 
consider it as a transcendent object of the world (I cannot see, for example, its hidden side), but 
under the bracketing of existence all the beliefs about its actual existence are excluded. The 
intentional object can be in fact considered as a determinable x in a noematic sense (Husserl 1912-
1929 [first book]), for the noema is what relates my thought to the intended object.  
 
 
The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to nature, is nothing less than this 
perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the 
perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. 
But the sense - the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its 
essence - cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties 
(Husserl, 1912-1929 [first book], quoted in Moran, 2000, p. 157). 
 
 
Listening or recalling in memory the incipit of Mozart’s Symphony 40 represent two different 
modalities of experiencing that particular melody: but there is something that makes those pieces of 
music the same piece for me, even if under different conditions. What makes this possible is the 
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noema. There is a series of sounds with silences (intentional object); there is my listening to this set 
of sounds and silences (intentional experienced): The effective content of the experienced (sounds 
and silences per se) cannot be sufficient to revealing its intentional content, namely its meaning 
from my own perspective. Indeed, I have to give sense to this object if I want this melody to 
constitute that particular melody, the one I hear in this way. To have sense or to have something in 
mind is the main feature of every consciousness, which is never a general experience but an 
experience with a sense, a noetic experience (Husserl, 1912-1929 [first book]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let’s think for example about Pablo Casals who, at 93, told an interviewer that he played one of 
the Bach’s 48 preludes and fugues every morning, having done so also for the previous 85 years. 
Asked if he had not grown tired of them after all this time, he said that actually he found fresh 
beauties in them each time he played one, for every performance was like an act of discovery 
(Sacks, 2007). Using a phenomenological terminology we could say that his directedness towards 
the musical object continuously constitutes it through every intentional act. The transcendental 
nature of the object each time reveals a different intentional content, for ‘the objects of which we 
are “conscious”, are not simply in consciousness as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it 
and snatched at in it; […] they are first constituted as being, what they are for us, and as what they 
count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention’ (Husserl, 1901; quoted in Zahavi, 2003, p. 
27). As Thompson puts it 
 
 
When we ask the constitutional question of how objects are disclosed to us, then any 
object, including any scientific object, must be regarded in its correlation to the mental 
activity that intends it. This transcendental orientation in no way denies the existence of 
a real physical world, but rather rejects an objectivist conception of our relation to it. 
The world is never given to us as a brute fact detachable from our conceptual 
framework. Rather, it shows up in all the describable ways it does thanks to the 
structure of our subjectivity and our intentional activities (Thompson, 2007, 82). 
 
 
This is the reason why Pelinski (2005) states that intentionality ‘is fundamental for a musical 
aesthetics conceived from a phenomenological perspective: a piece of music doesn’t concretize its 
potentialities as a meaningful musical event if it doesn’t become the object of an intentional 
perception’. So, given these considerations we could propose a first characterisation of musical 
intentionality by saying that musical intentionality comprehends all those intentional acts of my 
Fig. 4  
Incipit from Mozart’s Symphony 40 
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consciousness directed towards a musical object, which receives its configuration through its 
intentional constitution. In other words, through an intentional relation, a subject’s musical 
cognition constitutes the musical object being intentionally directed towards it. The most important 
feature of musical intentionality, therefore, is the ability of consciousness to give sense to the 
musical object, through its intentional, object-directed acts. But what does it mean, “to give sense”? 
And, above all, is this ability limited to our high level cognition? In his masterpiece Phenomenology 
of perception (1945) Merleau-Ponty argues that the real nature of perception is not consciousness, 
but the body, intended not as the simple object existing into the physical world, rather considered a 
lived and living body. The Husserlian Cogito, the principle of pure Ego, becomes now “I can” 
instead of “I think”.  
 
 
Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning, which is not the 
work of a universal-constituting consciousness, a meaning which clings to certain 
contents. My body is the meaningful core which behaves like a general function, and 
which, nevertheless, exists and is susceptible to disease (ibid., [1962], p. 46).  
 
 
Every consciousness is no more consciousness of something; rather it is perception of something, 
a perception that is strictly linked to our body, assumed as a permanent condition of experience in 
its constant openness to the world. We are not transcendental subjects in the world. We are present 
in a world that immediately makes sense. Being in the world is already being open to meaning-
ascription, as to perceive is to give sense (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). The world in which we are 
situated discloses itself without forcing any explicit thought about it. We are entwined with the 
world, which simultaneously is entwined with us. As emerges, the distinction between inner and 
outer seems to be unnecessary to understand the modalities in which an agent is situated in the 
world. The analysis of the body of a subject, being the category that allows our being-in-the-world, 
is therefore essential for understanding the relationship between mind and world, mind and body, 
and my mind and the minds of the others.  
 
  
In saying that the mind is intentional, phenomenologists imply that the mind is 
relational. “Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger) and the “lived body-environment” 
(Merleau-Ponty) are different ways of articulating this kind of relation. The spatial 
containment language of internal/external or inside/outside (which frames the 
internalist/externalist debate) is inappropriate and misleading for understanding the 
peculiar sort of relationality belonging to intentionality, the lived body, or being-in-the- 
world. As Heidegger says, a living being is “in” its world in a completely different 
sense from that of water being in a glass (Thompson & Stapleton 2009, p. 27). 
 
 
Narrowing the research field to music cognition, we might assume that the genuine collaboration 
between phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience can develop our current knowledge of music 
and musicality considering that ‘as an intentional object of perceptual experience, music doesn’t 
symbolize; it doesn’t reflect reality: it is reality’ (Pelinski, 2005). In light of these considerations we 
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could propose a new formulation for musical intentionality by focusing on the co-determination 
between the two poles of identity (musical subjects and musical objects): musical intentionality is 
constituted by the dynamic interplay between embodied agents and their (musical) environment. In 
fact, 
 
 
In perception we do not think the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, we 
are given over to the object and we merge into this body which is better informed than 
we are about the world.  (Merleau-Ponty, 1945 [1962], p. 238) 
 
 
As Carman points out, ‘Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account 
of bodily intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of mind. Embodiment 
thus has a philosophical significance for Merleau-Ponty that it could not have for Husserl’ (Carman, 
1999, p. 206). The next section, therefore, will focus on this perspective, clarifying the meaning of 
terms such as “embodied agents” and “embodiment”, as well as analysing the centrality of the 
bodily power of action for sense-making by means of employment of the dynamic system theory.  
 
 
3.3 - Embodied and Situated approaches 
 
 
The word ‘embodiment’ defines the body of a living system as a constitutive category of its 
perceiving, knowing and doing (Gallagher, 2005). In other words, cognition (including off-line 
cognition) depends on processes that are intrinsically connected to the organism’s body, thus being 
widely distributed beyond the boundaries of the brain (Hutchins, 2010). This is the central idea of 
the so-called embodied approach (Shapiro, 2010; Gallagher, 2011), a theoretical paradigm that is 
usually seen as having roots in the phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945) 
and in the ecological psychology of affordances provided by James Gibson (1979). Consequently, 
“embodied cognition” refers to many different ideas concerning - among the others - the role of 
bodily actions for sensorimotor representations (Goldman, 2012), and for intersubjectivity (Gallese 
2010), how bodily schemas account for mental skills (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), the offloading of 
computational processing into a wider bodily structure outside of the skull (Wheeler, 2010; Clark, 
2008), and the role of situated sensorimotor coupling with the environment in order to bring forth a 
living system’s domain (Varela et al., 1991).  
As reported by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008), the focus on the agent’s body reflects a 
position free not only from the Cartesian dualism, but also from any form of materialistic 
reductionism. In fact, the embodied perspective does not simply put the mind into the body - 
implicitly maintaining a distinction between mind and body as two different categories. Rather, this 
approach aims to rethink the ordinary notions of body and mind. Corporeality, as Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) points out, is a notion that goes beyond the mere distinction between physiology and 
psychology. My body does not divide my subjectivity from the world. Rather, it is a transparent 
tool that allows me to be (and to act) in a world that discloses itself through it, through my 
perceptive, bodily-based, experiential properties. As Romdenh-Romluc puts it:  
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Although I can perceive my body in the same way that I perceive other things - I can 
see it, touch it, taste it, etc. and, in these cases, it is the object at which some state 
of awareness is directed - there is another form of bodily awareness. It is what can be 
called an “adverbial” form of awareness. Rather than being aware of my body, I am 
simply aware in my body (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011, p. 105). 
 
 
In the context of cognitive science, the embodied approach is part of what Andy Clark (1997) 
labelled as embodied-embedded perspectives (see also Wheeler, 2005), which heavily contributed to 
the fall of the cognitivistic orthodoxy in the 1990s. The focus on the agent’s embodiment, however, 
cannot be conceived as a solipsistic condition for cognition: a subject is always a subject in the 
world. In fact ‘cognition is a situated activity which spans a systemic totality consisting of an 
agent’s brain, body, and world’ (Froese 2009, p. 17). Gibson’s ecological approach to perception is 
usually seen as one of the most important contributions with regard to the situatedness of agents in 
the world. As Chemero (2009) suggests, Gibson’s standpoint has three major tenets, where (iii) 
follows from (i) and (ii) 
 
 
(i) Perception is direct (no mental representations) 
(ii) Perception is primarily for the guidance of actions (it is not for neutral information 
gathering) 
(iii) Perception is of affordances - that are directly perceivable, environmental opportunities 
for behaviour 
 
 
In Chapter 4 I will discuss the problem of affordances with regards to musical experience, 
analysing the notion of musical affordances and proposing an alternative characterisation for them, 
different from the ones provided by music psychologists. For now, instead, we should focus on how 
Gibson’s approach has been influential for the embodied-embedded theories of cognition. When 
discussing enactivism, for example, its influence is clear: the brains of living creatures do not 
represent objects of the world as proponents of classic cognitivism typically assume. Rather, each 
ecologically-situated creature enacts, brings forth or co-constitutes a world through evolutionarily-
selected sensorimotor and goal-directed patterns of meaningful actions.  
The enactive approach not only holds that bodily activity is crucial for cognition but also aims to 
provide a biological account for autonomous agency (Weber & Varela, 2002). The complementary 
focus on two types of subjectivity (biological and phenomenological, as emerged in the discussion 
on qualia) is what allows the enactive paradigm to be distinguished from other competing 
approaches in phenomenology, cognitive science or philosophy of mind (see Thompson, 2007). The 
rejection of representationalism, the overcoming of the distinction between inner and outer, and the 
radical codetermination between living systems and the world are all central commitments for the 
enactive research and are indeed deeply influenced by Gibsonian psychology.  
However, although the notion of affordance itself is radically linked to the agent’s sensorimotor 
patterns, it might eventually ‘lead to a research strategy in which one attempts to build an ecological 
theory of perception entirely from the side of the environment. Such a research strategy ignores not 
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only the structural unity of the animal but also the codetermination of animal and environment’ 
(Varela et al., 1991, pp. 204-205). As Susan Hurley puts it: 
 
 
Perhaps the received tradition has focussed too much on the internal aspects of 
perception and ignored the external aspects. But we can correct this bias and take on 
board the role of movement in making information available, without going to the 
opposite extreme of denying that the brain processes information at all [...]. The right 
response to Gibson is ecumenical: both movement through real environments by whole 
organisms and brain activity play essential roles in extracting information from the 
environment and enabling a creature to have a perceptual perspective (Hurley, 2001, p. 
20). 
 
 
In fact, ‘organism and environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the 
fundamental circularity that is life itself’ (Varela et al., 1991, pp. 171-172). This interplay between 
living systems and world is the central pillar of the enactive perspective and thus can be seen as an 
original contribution in the broader domain of the embodied-embedded approaches. 
 
 
The overall concern of the enactive approach to perception is not to determine how 
some perceiver-independent world is to be recovered; it is, rather, to determine the 
common principles or lawful linkages between sensory and motor systems that explain 
how action can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent world. Consequently, 
cognition is no longer seen as problem solving on the basis of representations; instead, 
cognition in its most encompassing sense consists in the enactment or bringing forth of 
a world by a viable history of structural coupling (Varela et al., 1991, p. 205). 
 
 
Embodied cognition is necessarily situated, and describing the interplay between cognition, body 
and environment should require ‘an explanatory tool that can span the agent-environment border’ 
(Chemero, 2009, p. 25). Many proponents of embodied cognition, therefore, consider cognitive 
systems in terms of dynamical systems where ‘a dynamical system is a set of quantitative variables 
changing continually, concurrently, and interdependently over time in accordance with dynamical 
laws that can, in principle, be described by some set of equations’ (ibid.) Following Chemero (ibid.) 
we can say that the interaction with the environment can be best described by dynamical systems as 
they have parameters on ‘each side of the skin’ (p. 26). For example, we can use the equations used 
by Beer (1995a) to describe how embodied agents and environment are coupled: 
 
 
XA = A(XA; S(XE)) 
 
XE = E(XE; M(XA)) 
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A and E are continuous-time dynamical systems, modelling the organism and its 
environment, respectively, and S(XE) and M(XA) are coupling functions from 
environmental variables to organismic parameters and from organismic parameters to 
environmental parameters, respectively. It is only for convenience (and from habit) that 
we think of the organism and environment as separate; in fact, they are best thought of 
as forming just one nondecomposable system, U. Rather than describing the way 
external (and internal) factors cause changes in the organism’s behaviour, such a model 
would explain the way U, the system as a whole, unfolds over time (Chemero, 2009, p. 
26). 
 
 
This is a classic description of how body and environment interact in terms of dynamical 
systems, as many proponents of embodied cognition assume. This point is to some extents in 
common among enactivism and traditional embodied approaches. There are, however, two main 
differences between these approaches: (i) Enaction holds a stronger antirepresentationalist position 
from traditional embodied cognition and (ii) Enaction allows mental processes to be distributed 
beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, while traditional embodied paradigms (too) often focus 
only on the bodily power of action, thus considering the environment only causally. The next 
paragraphs will discuss these two points in more detail.  
 
 
3.4 - A radical interpretation of embodiment 
 
 
As previously discussed, enactivism borrows ideas from different approaches, nevertheless 
providing a unique interpretation to cognition in terms of embodied action, sense-making, and the 
ability to enact a world. Enactivism can be seen as a radicalization of traditional embodied 
approaches as (i) it provides a stronger rejection of mental representations and (ii) goes beyond the 
idea of solely inner processing to account for cognition. If it is true that many embodied theories are 
also situated, it is also true that a too strong accent on the bodily basis of cognition might obscure 
the dynamic co-determination processes between animal and environment, providing a fully 
internalist model.  
In regards to (i), probably the most famous example is provided by what Andy Clark (1997) 
defines as action-oriented representations (AOR). These kinds of representations are unlike the 
propositional representations12 advocated by proponents of Computationalism; rather, as Wheeler 
(2005; 2008) puts it, AOR are (i) action-specific - they represent the world in terms of action-
possibilities, (ii) egocentric - the co-ordinated system represented is always in first-person, and (iii) 
context-dependent - they define the contexts of activity on the basis of particular operating 
principles (see Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 52). In other words, AOR can be described as inner states 
that at the same time inform the subject of the world in which she is embedded and prescribe 
possible modalities of actively interacting with it. Clark concludes: ‘it may […] be wise to consider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  ‘Minds are […] processors of information. Cognitive devices [used for] receiving, storing, retrieving, modifying and 
transmitting information’ (Branquinho 2001, pp. xii-xiii). In order to facilitate these processes the mind uses mental 
representations. ‘Mental representations might be thought of as images, schemas, symbols, models, icons, sentences and 
so on’ (ibid. p. xiv).	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the intelligent system as a spatio-temporally extended process not limited by the tenuous envelope 
of skin and skull […]. Cognitive science […] can no longer afford the individualistic, isolationist 
biases that characterised its early decades’ (Clark, 1997, p. 221). If Clark is right in emphasising the 
active situatedness of agents in the world, his proposal is still committed to the idea of inner 
processing via representations and computational processes (see also Clark, 2009). The enactive 
perspective, in contrast, provides a radical rejection of mental representations - whether they are 
action-oriented representations or traditional, propositional, content-bearing, representations. As Di 
Paolo and colleagues put it:   
 
 
Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they 
then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems are simply not in 
the business of accessing their world in order to build accurate pictures of it. They 
participate in the generation of meaning through their bodies and action often engaging 
in transformational and not merely informational interactions; they enact a world. 
Enactivism thus differs from other nonrepresentational views such as Gibsonian 
ecological psychology on this point […] For the enactivist, sense is not an invariant 
present in the environment that must be retrieved by direct (or indirect) means. 
Invariants are instead the outcome of the dialogue between the active principle of 
organisms in action and the dynamics of the environment (Di Paolo et al., 2010, p. 39). 
 
 
What does it mean that cognition is embodied action? And how is this bodily activity 
characterised? According to Thompson and Varela (2001) there are three dimensions of 
embodiment - bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling and intersubjective interaction.  
 
1) The first dimension of embodiment refers to bodily self-regulation, usually defined by the 
term “autopoiesis”, that is the idea at the basis of the so-called life-mind continuity thesis (i.e. 
Thompson, 2007; Godfrey-Smith, 1996). This thesis holds that a living system ‘is a process with 
the particular property of engendering itself indefinitely’ (Stewart, 2010, p. 2). Autopoiesis, implies 
autonomy: living systems are not simply coupled with other creatures, they are not passively 
responding to an external stimulus, they rather enact a world, self-regulating the processes required 
to co-constitute the environment (Di Paolo, 2005). According to Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, in fact 
‘basic autonomy is the capacity of a system to manage the flow of matter and energy through it so 
that it can, at the same time, regulate, modify, and control: (i) internal self-constructive processes 
and (ii) processes of exchange with the environment’ (Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno, 2004, p. 240 
[quoted in Thompson & Stapleton, 2009]). A creature’s sense-making, therefore, has its roots in 
these circulatory capacities to maintain itself under precarious conditions (Varela, 1979; Thompson, 
2007) thereby generating its autonomous identity.  
A classic example of an autopoietic system is the prokaryotic cell. As Varela argues (1987), the 
processes of self regulation, in this case, aims to maintain the cellular organization as a unity by 
keeping its thermodynamic imbalance with the environment. Organisms, even bacterial cells, are 
maintained within a material border (membrane, skin and so forth), and the exterior - what lies 
beyond these boundaries - does not provide any input to the autopoietic system (see Weber, 2001). 
In fact, any autopoietic organism self-produces all that is needed for its maintenance. The functional 
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relationship with the environment, however, is not broken off. The exchange of energetic processes 
with the environment can be realized by the living cellular system, for example, through the 
regulation of the permeability of the membrane. Di Paolo (2005) defines this relation with the 
environment as “interactional asymmetry”. As Varela puts it, the self-regulating processes to keep 
the agent’s conservation as auto-sufficient establish the dialectic between agent and environment:   
 
 
Whence the intriguing paradoxicality proper to an autonomous identity: the living 
system must distinguish itself from its environment, while at the same time maintaining 
its coupling; this linkage cannot be detached since it is against this very environment 
from which the organism arises, comes forth (Varela, 1991, p. 85). 
 
 
The external world, hence, is constituted by means of the degree of complexity of the agent, that 
is, its inner and biological structure. Also the nervous system, for example is a closed system. As 
Weber notices, ‘it brings forth only its own inner states, which can be stimulated by the 
environment but may be not influenced causally in an ambiguous way. The nervous system does 
not receive information. It rather creates a world by defining which configurations of the milieu are 
stimuli’ (Weber, 2001, p. 15). An Autopoietic system, therefore, gives rise to “intentionality” 
(Varela, 1992) or, as Evan Thompson puts it, ‘living is a process of sense-making, of bringing forth 
significance and value’ (Thompson 2007, 158).  In the case of the living cell, for example, the 
meanings enacted are, basically, “nutrition” and “maintaining my own integrity”. Simply put, life 
means to make sense. An agent’s self-constitution always is the constitution of a world of meanings.  
 
 
Autonomy is the property of a system that self-produces and strives to maintain its 
identity as the system that it is. The nature of this identity is conceived of as a dynamic 
network of precarious processes where each process is enabled by other processes in the 
network and also contributes to enable other processes in the network […]. The 
enactivist calls this identity autonomous because the system is constrained but not fully 
determined by external factors; instead it follows its own intrinsic norms. Linked to this 
idea is the notion of sense-making, which refers to a system’s ability to regulate its 
states or interactions with the world adaptively (Di Paolo, 2005). This is inextricably 
linked to autonomy insofar as the regulation happens with respect to the implications 
for the continuation of the system’s autonomous identity. For enactivism a system is 
cognitive when it acts in terms of value or concern with regards to its own existence 
(Kyselo & Di Paolo, 2013, pp. 7-8). 
 
 
A detailed analysis of this dimension of embodiment, with regard to musical experience, will be 
provided in Chapter 5, when considering the spontaneous and self-oganized exploratory musical 
behaviours of infants. As we will see, these kind of motor activities are supposed to be at the basis 
of human musicality.   
 
2) The second dimension of embodiment is sensorimotor coupling. Susan Hurley (1998) 
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referred to the standard view of cognition as a “sandwich”, where the meat (cognition) is segregated 
between two slices of bread (perception and action). Enactivists, on the contrary, assume that 
perception and action are radically entwined. Autonomous agency requires that a living system  
generates by itself its own actions into the environment, therefore self-determining its normative 
domain. If an embodied agent uses sensations to guide actions in order to maintain autopoiesis, then 
this means that cognition and life are the same category. This is precisely the life-mind continuity 
thesis just sketched above. Cognition is life and life is embodied action. Actions, in fact, are not 
isolated events but rather they are present in the world, modifying it by bringing forth the living 
system’s affective, relational, meaningful domains. By modifying the world (or the relation with the 
world) through embodied actions, an agent also modifies the subsequent sensory return. This 
pragmatic form of knowledge depends on the vocabulary of possible actions that the creature can 
perform in the world. This point is decisive for the discussion of Mirror Neurons in the following 
paragraphs and will result as essential for the thesis that I defend in this work.  
The centrality of action for sense-making is exemplified by the well known notion of 
sensorimotor contingencies provided by O’Regan and Noë (2001a). In their words sensorimotor 
contingencies are ‘the structure of the rules governing the sensory changes produced by various 
motor actions’ (O’Regan & Noë, 2001a, p. 941). Embodied action, therefore, can be seen as a 
mutual interplay between the environment and an agent, where the latter acquires the concepts that 
lead to the mastery of a particular (i.e. musical) perceptual experience, through its engagement with 
the world, developing a corresponding sensorimotor knowledge (Noë, 2004). This is a pragmatic, 
practical, form of knowledge - that is, what Ryle (1949) named know how knowledge, in contrast 
with a know that knowledge (see also Stanley & Williamson, 2001).  
It is possible, however, to distinguish between a strong and a weak interpretation of this 
sensorimotor claim (Shapiro, 2011; Kyselo & Di Paolo, 2013): on the one hand, the exercise of 
sensorimotor knowledge requires an actual movement in order to reveal sensorimotor contingencies 
(strong interpretation). On the other hand there is a weak interpretation of embodiment, according 
to which ‘the exercise of sensorimotor knowledge consists only in the potential to perform those 
actions that define a class of sensorimotor contingencies’ (Shapiro, 2011, p. 168).  
In the context of music cognition, Bennett Hogg (2011), who is also a practicing improviser and 
composer, defines music as intertextual because sounds do not carry meanings in and of 
themselves, but rather are the sites of: ‘complex and mediated sets of relationships between physical 
sounds, perceptual systems, personal associations, culturally significant gestures, bodily and 
emotional responses, observed actions and reactions, and culturally learned expectations.’ (Hogg 
2011, p. 89). Hogg claims that from this perspective, it would be easy to see that if being conscious 
of music is something we do rather than something that is happening to us, it takes place within 
both the cultural and the physiological constraints of our bodies: music consciousness is an 
embodied and encultured activity. The same applies to musical improvisation. According to Hogg, 
it needs to be defined in terms of the play across our memory, embodiment and situated 
consciousness, and includes multisensory experiences and actions that lead to our perceptions of 
sounds.  
Hogg’s claim resembles the position of Vijay Iyer (2004), an established jazz pianist, who 
maintains that music perception (and music cognition itself) is actively constructed by the listener, 
rather than passively transferred from performer to listener within the given culture and context. 
Interestingly,  this claim parallels von Glasersfeld’s (1988) principles, according to which 
knowledge is actively built up by the cognizing subject instead of being passively received by 
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senses or means of communication. In his papers, Iyer argues that discernment of pulse and meter 
from a piece of music depends on a person’s culturally contingent listening strategies. Iyer thus 
argues that certain varieties of microrhythmic variation (within the rhythmic expressions of our 
embodied involvement with music) are shown to display and carry encoded sonic traces of the 
culturally situated music-making bodies (Iyer, 2004). Sensorimotor coupling therefore, is the 
radical integration of sensorial and motor aspects for cognition. What makes this possible, is the 
body:            
    
The body enables the realization of a flexible being in the world. In this, enactivism is 
very close to pragmatic notions of action. This implies that a body that does not engage 
with the world, whether by moving itself, or interacting with objects, would in time 
very likely cease to be the means by which we are in the world as skillful agents. It is 
very likely the case in general that in order to maintain bodily capacities they need to be 
regularly put to practice. The enactive body is therefore a body-in-action. The enactivist 
does not limit the role played by the body in sustaining specific cognitive skills to only 
a historical role (Kyselo & Di Paolo, 2013, p. 11).  
 
 
The realm of music, as well, is a context where meanings are not already present in their 
structural or formal properties. Rather they are enacted by each musical subject, through different 
performances, different ways of listening and different interpretations. A musical subject is not a 
passive listener, as we saw. She participates in every musical experience actively, as suggested by 
the following empirical findings. The activation during listening tasks of neural circuits involved in 
motor activity and the planning of motor sequences (Carroll-Phelan & Hampson, 1996) not only 
allows ‘hypothesis about the induction of a sense of beat or pulse in the listener’ (Iyer 2002, p. 392) 
but also reflects the ecological dynamics of music perception, which is never a solipsistic or 
isolated event. Rather it is an event immersed in wordly conditions, where the ability to act is 
radically intermixed with sense-making. Listening to music, as will be shown in detail later, is an 
active, skilful, sensorimotor, exercise (Krueger, 2009). 
 
3) The third type of embodiment (intersubjective interaction) is best understood by focusing 
on classical theories in social cognition. Traditional views in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy 
of mind address the ability to understand others by means of the employment of a “folk” 
psychology by the observer. The latter eventually ‘reads the minds’ of others ascribing to them 
beliefs, intentions and other mental states (Davies, 1994). This claim represents the central pillar of 
the so-called Theory-Theory (TT) and of the Rationality-Teleological Theory (RTT). 
 According to TT, people understand others’ behaviour by developing a particular, common-
sense, theory of mind consisting ‘of a set of causal/explanatory laws that relate external stimuli to 
certain inner states (e.g. perceptions), certain inner states (e.g. desires and beliefs) to other inner 
states (e.g. decisions), and certain inner states (e.g. decisions) to behaviour’ (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998, p. 496) (see also Stich & Nichols, 1992). The intentional stance (RTT) proposed by Dennett 
(1987) assumes that what underlies mentalizing is a set of rational principles that the mind-reader 
uses to determine which mental state would be adopted by the others, seen as rational agents.  
These positions stand in contrast with the so-called Simulation Theory (ST), which, in its most 
popular and basic version, holds that in order to make sense of the behaviours and beliefs of other 
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individuals, an agent ascribes to others mental states by simulating them internally in his/her 
cognitive system (Gordon, 1986; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002; Gallese & Goldman, 1998).  
Another kind of simulation-like approach is the so-called Embodied Simulation Theory (ES). 
The theory holds that the basic skills of social cognition (understanding others’ sensations and 
emotions) don’t require any kind of folk psychology (Gallese, 2001; 2005). This position has been 
interpreted as a low-level form of mental simulation (Goldman, 2006), based on the unmediated - 
thus below the threshold of consciousness - processes underlying mirror-neuron activity (Gallese & 
Lakoff, 2005 p. 5, see also: Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). This is in contrast to a high-
level activity, associated with the attribution of complex mental states (e.g. propositional attitudes), 
accessible to consciousness (Goldman, 2006, p. 147). The enactive approach, however, rejects all 
these interpretations. Rather it tries to explain intersubjectivity in terms of interaction theory 
(Gallagher, 2012) or participatory sense-making (De Jaegher, 2006). The main point here is that 
enactivism aims to provide a biologically plausible investigation of intersubjectivity not in terms of 
inner mechanisms (building a theory or simulating) but, rather, considering the active processes of 
mutual interaction among different agents. 
 
These three dimensions of embodiment, as clearly emerges, are all radically intermixed, 
rejecting not only any form of representationalism, but also every form of inner processing - 
intended as sufficient for cognition. A standard argument for proponents of the internalist 
perspective, in fact, posits that the brain is the cause of conscious experience, intentionality, or, in 
one word, mind. As Noë (2009) observes, in contrast, we have no empirical evidence that our 
experience depends on what happens inside our head. We live in (or as) a body and these two 
categories (brain and body) are always in a deep, indissoluble, relation. However, this relation by 
itself is not sufficient to provide a biologically plausible notion of cognition. Cognition is always 
both embodied and situated and it follows that inner processes are only part of the story. As Di 
Paolo argues,     
 
 
Cognition is sense-making in interaction: the regulation of coupling with respect to 
norms established by the self-constituted identity that gives rise to such regulation in 
order to conserve itself. This identity may be that of the living organism, but also other 
identities based on other forms of organizationally closed networks of processes, such 
as sociolinguistic selves, organized bundles of habits, etc. Some of these identities are 
already constituted by processes that extend beyond the skull. But in any case, cognition 
is always a process that occurs in a relational domain. Unlike many other processes (e.g. 
getting wet in the rain) its cognitive character is given normatively and asymmetrically 
by the self-constituted identity that seeks to preserve its mode of life in such 
engagements. As relational in this strict sense, cognition has no location. It simply 
makes no sense to point to chunks of matter and space and speak of containment within 
a cognitive system. Inspect a baby all you want and you’ll never find out whether she’s 
a twin (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 19). 
 
 
An argument usually employed in modern neuroscience, to defend the opposite thesis (that is, 
inner processes are sufficient to generate conscious experience) is based on oneiric experience: 
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dreams, as it is argued, are the paradigmatic example of how the brain is able to create (i.e. 
represent) a world. In normal everyday life, brains use mental representations to make us 
understand and interact with the environment but during sleep them generate dreams. In both cases 
it is a disembodied activity. I have already discussed the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to claim 
that a brain cannot generate any kind of meaningful experience by itself. Dreaming, in contrast, can 
be seen as an example of how an agent, without any actual dynamic interplay with its own body and 
with the world, could actually have an experience that solely depends on what is going on inside her 
head. However, a deeper analysis of these issues (Noë, 2009; Rockwell, 2005) shows that the 
experience of dreaming cannot be similar to the experience that we have when we are awake. In 
dreaming, perception is not as stable as it is in reality. If you are reading a newspaper in a dream 
and - still while dreaming - you look somewhere else before looking again at the words, the text 
changes. As Noë (2009) observes, this happens because in my normal everyday activity I do not 
have to exercise any complex skill to make sense of a detail. Details, the words of the article I am 
reading, are simply there. The objects of the world are not, in reality, a construct of our creative 
imagination, as happens during dreams. When I am awake I do not need any effort to stabilize the 
details. Then, why in dreams do the details show up in a different way? Probably, as Noë concludes, 
it is because when we dream we are detached from the world in which we are usually embedded. 
The nature of the dream-like experience is therefore vitiated precisely by the fact that the world is 
absent. And with no world, there is no relevant experiential content.  
We do not have any sound argumentation to maintain that only the brain is what allows 
conscious experience. All this argument can show, perhaps, is that during sleep a subclass of 
experience is generated by what happens inside us. Once again the Cartesian view that imprisons 
cognition inside the skin, or the skull, lacks of any valid candidate to corroborate its working 
hypothesis. The brain, only the brain by itself, cannot be sufficient to generate a conscious 
experience. Of course, there are different variables in this equation. For example, as in traditional 
embodiment, brain processes are seen as off-loaded into the body, thus beyond the boundaries of 
the skull. However, this move is not sufficient by itself in order to provide a more realistic picture 
of cognition. In both cases the bonds between agents and environment are well defined and 
maintained, thus reflecting the separation between inner and outer that enaction explicitly refuses. 
This division, when not explicitly overcome, is risky. Assuming that cognition is an inner property 
of the animal, can indeed lead to positions advocating an identity between brain and mind. As 
Rockwell (2005) points out, this idea was so common in William James’ times that many scientists 
believed that ‘thought was phosphorus’, given the large amount of this element in the brain. In 
contrast, considering mind and consciousness as functional, rather than purely biological categories, 
allows a different interpretation. Cognition is part of a system, and not an inner property of a living 
creature. The next section, thus, will focus on this interpretation of embodiment through inner 
processing, introducing and exploring the conceptual geography that relates to Mirror and 
Canonical Neurons. 
 
 
3.5 - The Human Mirror Mechanism 
 
 
The discovery of canonical neurons, which fire when someone observes, without performing any 
movement, objects whose size and shape is congruent with the type of hand shape coded by the 
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neuron (Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008), and mirror neurons, which become 
active both when performing a motor action and when observing or hearing a similar action made 
by another individual (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Sakata et al., 1995; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti 
et al., 1996; Kohler et al., 2002) has represented a turning point in cognitive neuroscience and 
beyond. Thanks to this discovery, many ideas at the basis of the classic cognitivist position have 
been subjected to a gradual renewal on the basis of empirical evidence and not only through 
theoretical arguments.  
During the 1980s, in Italy, the team of neuroscientists led by Giacomo Rizzolatti was studying a 
particular area of the macaque monkey’s brain, the so-called Area F5. This area, as Iacoboni (2009) 
explains, is located in the ventral premotor cortex, and deals with planning, selecting and executing 
actions (ib, p. 9). In particular, the neurons of F5 code particular motor actions, such as grasping, 
tearing or bringing objects-food-to the mouth. The aim of Parma lab’s investigation was basically to 
understand the neurophysiological mechanism at the basis of the hand’s motor behaviour of the 
monkey. A better understanding of these mechanisms, in fact, would have been beneficial in order 
to improve rehabilitation paradigms for humans who, after a brain damage, lost some degree of 
control of their hand.  
More generally, however, their investigation also aimed to overcome the traditional view of the 
pre-motor cortex’ Brodmann’s area 6. Traditionally, this area was conceived as anatomically 
uniform with the precise role of planning and executing actions (Rizzolatti & Gentilucci, 1988). 
However, ‘as opposed to this traditional picture they had found by way of research on macaque 
monkeys that there were very interesting differences in anatomy, connectivity as well as functional 
properties between the medial areas now labelled F2 & F3 and the areas F4 and F5 in the lateral 
part of premotor cortex’ (Brincker, 2010, p. 19).  
 
 
Through laborious experimentation, the Rizzolatti team had acquired an impressive 
understanding of the actions of these motor cells during various “grasping” exercises 
with the monkeys. (They are called motor cells because they are the first in the 
sequence that controls the muscles that move the body.) Then one day, about twenty 
years ago, the neurophysiologist Vittorio Gallese was moving around the lab during a 
lull in the day's experiment. A monkey was sitting quietly in the chair, waiting for her 
next assignment. Suddenly, just as Vittorio reached for something-he does not 
remember what-he heard a burst of activity from the computer that was connected to the 
electrodes that had been surgically implanted in the monkey's brain. To the 
inexperienced ear, this activity would have sounded like static; to the ear of an expert 
neuroscientist, it signalled a discharge from the pertinent cell in area F5. Vittorio 
immediately thought the reaction was strange. The monkey was just sitting quietly, not 
intending to grasp anything, yet this neuron affiliated with the grasping action had fired 
nevertheless. Or so goes one story about the first recorded observation of a mirror 
neuron. Another involves one of Vittorio's colleagues, Leo Fogassi, who picked up a 
peanut and triggered an excited response in F5. Yet another credits Vittorio Gallese and 
some ice cream. There are others, all plausible, none confirmed. (Iacoboni, 2009, pp. 
10-11). 
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More or less, this was how mirror neurons were discovered in the monkey. These neurons, in 
fact, fired not only when the monkey was moving its hand but also when the animal was simply 
watching another agent performing a task that employed the same action. In addition to these 
mirror neurons, another set of neurons was dubbed canonical neurons, as they discharge when the 
monkey only observes an object without performing any movement, as well as when it grasps that 
object. The selectivity of these neurons, appreciable through the congruence between the codified 
motor features and objects’ visual properties, argues for their pivotal role in the process of 
transforming the visual information of objects into the appropriate motor acts (Jeannerod et al., 
1995).  
Brain imaging techniques have revealed that a similar neural activity is present also in humans. 
Fadiga and colleagues (1995) used TMS to show that motor evoked potential of the human motor 
cortex were increased during simple observation tasks, reflecting the muscle activity relevant for 
the actual performance of the observed motor behaviour. These findings, therefore, suggest that in 
humans there is a mechanism that is homologous to the one previously found in monkeys. In 
particular, the areas associated with mirroring processes are the inferior frontal gyrus, the lower part 
of the precentral gyrus and the temporal, occipital and parietal visual areas (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). A monkey or a human, therefore, while observing some other individual doing a grasping 
action, basically recruits the same motor plans in its brain that would be necessary to perform the 
same action themselves (mirror neurons). Similarly, the same neural activation occurs whenever a 
monkey or a human simply observe an object (canonical neurons).  
The only difference between humans and monkeys, with regards to mirror-like activities, is that 
in humans there is also activation when observing a meaningless movement - like pantomime, 
waving the hands, raising the arm and so forth (Gallese et al., 1996; Umiltà et al., 2001). This can 
be explained by considering the fact that mirror neurons do not fire when observing a motor 
behaviour that is not part of the motor vocabulary of the observer. Monkeys, in fact do not 
pantomime (Iacoboni, 2009). The idea of a motor vocabulary is therefore fundamental, as it 
represents one of the key concepts related to mirror neurons activation. In Rizzolatti and Luppino’s 
words: 
 
 
This motor vocabulary is constituted of “words”, each of which is represented by a 
population of F5 neurons. Some words code the general goal of an action (e.g. grasping, 
holding). Others code how, within a general goal, a specific action must be executed. 
These words select specific “motor prototypes” such as, for example, the configuration 
of fingers necessary for the precision grip. Finally, other words specify the temporal 
aspects of the action to be executed (e.g. opening of the hand). Thus, each action is 
represented by specific populations of neurons at different degrees of abstraction 
(Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001, p. 891). 
 
 
An elegant fMRI experiment carried out by Buccino and coworkers (2004) can provide further 
clarification with regards to this point. In their experimental setup, the team of researchers asked a 
number of participants to watch a silent video, where a man, a monkey and a dog were performing 
(i) ingestive and (ii) communicative actions. In the first condition, the action was biting food and all 
three animals were doing the same. In the second condition, however, the motor behaviours 
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associated with communication are very different from one species to another. Therefore, the 
actions employed for the stimuli were motor behaviours relevant to each species such as talking 
(humans), lip smacking (monkeys) and barking (dogs). The results of the experiment showed that 
for condition (i), there was a clear overlapping of the brain areas that became active during the 
observation of the videos. Indeed ‘watching the three videos produced the activation of two sites (a 
rostral and a caudal) in the inferior parietal lobule as well as the posterior part of the inferior frontal 
gyrus and the adjacent precentral gyrus’ (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008, p. 132). On the other hand, 
the results of the second condition were significantly different. The mirror-like activation, in fact, 
was much weaker when the participants were observing acts like lips smacking and disappeared 
when watching the dog barking.  
The mirror mechanism, it can thus be argued, facilitates the understanding of a goal-directed 
action that is present in the motor repertoire of the subject without involving sophisticated mental 
representations, providing the subject with a particular, intrinsically motor, modality to make sense 
of the witnessed action.  
This idea is best understood thinking that the way in which a subject understands the meaning of 
barking is different from the way in which she understands, say, grasping a mug. This “primarily 
motor” modality to understand actions and intentions reflects quite clearly the phenomenological 
importance of the body for sense-making. As Merleau-Ponty’s analysis pointed out in the previous 
section, agents are immersed in the dynamics of action, and the bodily openness to the world is 
what allows us to ascribe meaning, to understand the others’ behaviours, emotions and intentions. 
Another property of mirror neurons is their sensitivity for action goal-directedness. Many neurons 
with mirror-properties are elicited not by the precise movement performed by another individual 
but, rather, by the goal of the given action. What matters for these premotor neurons, therefore, is 
not the mere kinetic property of the motor acts, such as contractions of single groups of muscles 
(see Rizzolatti et al., 1988). ‘Virtually all mirror neurons display this behaviour: they respond only 
if the action is directed at an object. They therefore respond to the action of grasping and not simply 
the hand movements involved in grasping’ (Keysers, 2007, p. 3).  
Mirror neurons are in fact insensitive to different kinematic strategies and to the different agents 
involved in the execution of the action. These neurons code the goal of the action and not the 
movements necessary to perform it. As long as the goal of a given action is different, these neurons 
are selective enough to distinguish between different kinematic schemas (see Fogassi et al., 2005). 
In the brain, therefore perception and action are not separated entities, somehow encapsulated in 
autonomous, independent, aprioristically defined, brain modules. The relationship between 
perception and action can be intended more as perception-for-action. As Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 
put it 
 
 
The same rigid boundary between perceptual, cognitive and motor processes ends up 
being largely artificial: not only perception is immersed in the dynamics of the action, 
being more articulate and complex than previously thought, but the brain that acts is 
primarily a brain that understands. This is [...] a pragmatic, pre-conceptual and pre-
linguistic, understanding, and yet no less important, since it rests on many of our much-
celebrated cognitive abilities. (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008, p.3). 
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Mirror neurons, as previously said, are different from canonical neurons: the latter, in fact, 
discharge simply at the sight of a given object, being influenced by the size and shape of it. Mirror 
neurons firing, on the contrary, relies on the observation of goal-directed actions involving a body 
part (hand or mouth)-object interaction and it is uninfluenced by the spatial location of the 
witnessed motor behaviour (ibid.). The distance of the given object from the subjective space, on 
the contrary, modulates canonical neurons. The following two quotes encapsulate the standard 
interpretation of how the mirror mechanism is usually intended and summarize the discussion so 
far: 
 
 
The Mirror Mechanism, given the present state of knowledge, maps the sensory 
representation of the action, emotion or sensation of another onto the perceiver’s own 
motor, viscero-motor or somatosensory representation of that action, emotion or 
sensation. This mapping enables one to perceive the action, emotion or sensation of 
another as if she were performing that action or experiencing that emotion or sensation 
herself (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011, p. 512).  
 
 
In virtue of the translation of others’ bodily movements into something that the observer 
is able to grasp as being part of a given motor act accomplished with a given motor 
intention, the observer is immediately tuned in with the witnessed motor behaviour of 
others. This enables the observer to understand others’ motor goals and motor intentions 
in terms of her/his own motor goals and motor intentions (Gallese et al., 2011, p. 370). 
 
 
Also emotions, in fact are part of the story. They are strictly connected to the motor behaviour 
and action understanding mechanisms. The sensorimotor patterns that underlie our engagement with 
the world are not executed in a mechanical way, but incorporate some kind of emotional colouring 
(Sinigaglia & Sparaci, 2010), provoking a response of fear, disgust, interest, and so on, thus 
representing an essential feature for consciousness and intersubjectivity. In light of these 
considerations, it comes as no surprise that this discovery has been incredibly relevant for further 
investigations in cognitive neuroscience, and open to discussion in other fields, such as psychology 
and philosophy.  
For decades one of the most common assumptions in neurological studies was to describe the 
motor areas of the cerebral cortex in terms of a tool evolutionarily designed for merely executive 
processes. Thus, movements and actions were considered ascribable to the classic scheme: 
perception à cognition à movement (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008). This simple picture is 
coherent with the idea that sensations, perceptions and actions, being distinct and hierarchically 
organized psychological functions, should be located in different cortical areas, where the stream of 
information would proceed from a brain that knows to a brain that does (Boria, 2009, p. 32). 
According to Gallese, indeed, if we follow the traditional cognitivistic model for the analysis of 
perception and action we would find that: 
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sensations would prevail in the primary sensory areas, and perception would be the 
product of primarily temporal-parietal, associative areas, while movements would be 
controlled by motor and premotor areas located in the posterior portion of the frontal 
lobe, also known as agranular frontal cortex. The analysis of the external world would 
be configured as a unidirectional stream of information which proceeds from the 
(associative and sensory) posterior cortical areas to the frontal motor areas where they 
would integrate with the prefrontal cortex’ elaboration product, location of the 
decisional processes and, more generally, of the more sophisticated aspects of our 
intelligence. Experimental data acquired during the last twenty years, however, show us 
a completely different scenario. The motor cortex of the frontal lobe […] is constituted 
by a mosaic of distinct anatomo-functional areas, which relate to each other forming 
distinct cortico-cortical circuits […]. Each of those parieto-premotor circuits integrates 
motor and sensorial information related to a particular body area ensuring its control 
within the distinct systems of spatial and reference coordinates (Gallese, 2010, my 
translation).    
 
 
The previous quote also explains why the Parma team was so interested in the re-definition of 
the anatomical description of the premotor cortex. Their data suggest in fact that the agranular 
frontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex, however interconnected, present a strong anatomical 
and functional distinction, creating parallel circuits that integrate sensorimotor information with 
regards to a specific effector. The same holds true for the prefrontal and the cingulate cortices, 
which are concerned with planning the appropriate way to act (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2008). 
Brincker is quite clear on this point: 
 
 
This project of reinterpreting the organization of the cortical motor system might seem 
to be simply an issue of anatomical labelling, but it represents a significant split with the 
overall model of the mind as an input-cognition-output system […]. Importantly they 
started to conceptualize the functional divisions of premotor areas not only according to 
effectors, i.e. around different body parts of an internally represented homunculus, like 
Penfield and colleagues thought, but rather as depending on more abstract 
categorizations of various kinds of actions and goals. Further, based on the systematic 
differences in sensorimotor connectivity within the large heterogeneous frontal motor 
area, they argued that it was functionally much less uniform than formerly thought and 
that many areas showed a level of cognitive complexity well beyond the kinetic 
movement commands, which traditionally had been seen as the only legitimate 
functional role of motor areas (Brincker, 2010, p. 19). 
 
 
But a new model of the motor system implies not only a radical separation from the classic 
cognitivistic position but also a redefinition of many assumptions at the basis of physiology and 
neuroscience: indeed, as reported by Boria (2009) the evidence that sensory and motor information 
are ascribable to a common format codified by specific parieto-frontal circuits (Gregoriou et al., 
2006) suggests that, beyond the organization of our motor behaviours (Rizzolatti et al. 1997) some 
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other processes commonly considered high-level like space perception (Sakata et al. 1997, Colby 
1998), action understanding (Gallese et al., 2002; Rizzolatti & Matelli, 2003), and others’ motor 
intentions predictions (Fogassi et al., 2005; Fogassi & Luppino, 2005) may have their neural 
substrate in the motor system (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008).  
A well-known study by Kohler and colleagues (2002), moreover, showed that a subclass of F5 
mirror neurons fire not only when observing or performing a given action, but also when hearing 
the related sound of the action itself. These neurons become active not only when a monkey 
witnesses the observer carrying out a sound producing motor behaviour, but also when the monkey 
only hears the sound without seeing the action13. A goal-directed action, therefore, can be 
understood independently from the format of the sensory information. The motor acts employed in 
the experimental paradigm were breaking a peanut and ripping apart a sheet of paper, acts that are 
relevant for the monkey, being present in their motor knowledge.  
The conclusion therefore is that when the monkey was only hearing the sound of a given action, 
it automatically activated in its brain the motor plan necessary to perform the very same action. 
Since mirror neurons encode the witnessed or heard action along with its goal, irrespective of the 
agent who performs the action, it has been assumed they play a crucial role for action understanding 
through a mechanism of embodied simulation (e.g. Gallese, 2005). Namely, an agent can 
automatically re-enact, with her own cognitive system, the witnessed or heard action by recruiting 
the same neural population, “as if” (Damasio, 2003) she was performing the action herself.  
 
 
[W]hen we observe goal-related behaviours [...] specific sectors of our pre-motor cortex 
become active. These cortical sectors are those same sectors that are active when we 
actually perform the same actions. In other words, when we observe actions performed 
by other individuals our motor system “resonates” along with that of the observed agent 
(Gallese, 2001, p. 38).  
 
 
This “resonance” would give rise to an inner representation of the witnessed or heard action 
(Gallese et al., 1996). However, as Gallese (2009) points out, the term representation is employed 
in a very different sense from the standard cognitivistic tradition. Its content, rather than being 
solipsistically generated by symbol manipulations, stems from the relationship that our ‘situated and 
interacting brain-body instantiates with the world’ (ibid., p. 524). This move allows Gallese, as well 
as other proponents of this view, to reject most of the criticism that the standard theory of embodied 
simulation and action understanding has been facing so far (i.e. Jacob, 2008). As Dan Hutto puts it, 
many “sceptics” assume in their arguments that   
 
 
action understanding necessarily involves making mentalistic attributions of contentful 
attitudes of some kind - i.e. beliefs, desires or their analogues. It is then argued that 
mirror neuron activity does not - by itself - suffice for any kind of action understanding 
because such activity lacks some or other aspect that is required for attributing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ‘As a control, the monkeys were also tested for white noise and other sounds unrelated to the actions. The control 
sounds were used to rule out the possibility that mirror neuron responses to action sounds were simply due to the 
arousing, nonspecific effect of any sound’ (Iacoboni 2009, p. 35). 
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contentful mental states. Thus it is concluded that mirror neuron activity - in lacking the 
relevant features - necessarily falls short of what is required for action understanding 
proper (Hutto, 2012, p. 4). 
 
 
However, this criticism is valid only if one accepts that explicit mindreading (like TT, RTT or 
ST) is the only possibility to achieve intentional understanding (Gallese et al., 2009, p. 109). Mirror 
neuron theorists, on the contrary, assume that the kind of understanding embodied by mirroring 
activity is pre-reflexive and therefore not attributable to deliberate mentalizing. But how exactly 
could this mechanism instantiate a representation of goal directed actions into one’s motor 
repertoire? Is this mechanism sufficient for understanding the meaning of the actions? And is it 
really a form of simulation? Before answering these crucial questions, however, it is important to 
notice that this theoretical framework has been extensively applied to the realm of music (see 
D’Ausilio, 2009, for a review).  
The next sections, therefore, will offer a brief overview of the most relevant studies of this issue, 
showing that the notion of simulation, when applied in musical contexts, presents some difficulties 
in fully explaining the mutuality of musical sense-making. Another aim of the following paragraph 
is also to provide an analysis of the closest position in musical research to Gallese’s ES, namely, the 
SAME model proposed by Katie Overy and Istvan Molnar-Szacaks (2006; 2009). This latter model, 
as I see it, is a promising starting point to develop a research paradigm that takes seriously the 
notions of embodiment and mirror neurons, combining theoretical and empirical evidence.    
  
 
3.6 - Mirrors in music 
 
 
Many studies in the last few years have focused on the neural aspects of the sensory-motor 
integration embodied by the mirror mechanism, stressing in particular the cross-modal plasticity of 
the motor cortex through the development of musical expertise: among others, Bangert and 
colleagues (2006) showed with fMRI an activation of the left premotor regions during passive 
listening tasks for musicians, compared to non-musicians, implicitly suggesting that a musical 
vocabulary of acts could develop through musical training, underlying our musical understanding 
(for a TMS study see D’Ausilio et al., 2006).  
Lahav and collaborators (2007) explored the brain areas recruited when musically naïve subjects 
listened to sounds associated with sequences of actions they learned during a prerecording training 
period, finding that ‘music one knows how to play (even if only recently learned) may be strongly 
associated with the corresponding elements of the individual’s motor repertoire and might activate 
an audio-motor network in the human brain’ (ibid., p. 309). Haslinger and colleagues (2005), 
moreover, found that the simple observation of meaningful musical acts elicits a stronger activation 
for musicians in the fronto-parietal-temporal network when compared to non-musicians, reflecting 
‘the operation of a mirror-matching system’ (ibid., p. 289). A stronger activity for the musicians’ 
primary motor cortex has also been reported during a passive music listening task in a study by 
Haueisen and Knosche (2001), suggesting how the auditory-motor mapping implemented by the 
mirror-like activities requires an appropriate repertoire of acts to be successfully fulfilled.  
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From this empirical evidence it thus might be inferred that the development of the ability to play 
an instrument would build up in the performer’s motor system a vocabulary of (musical-directed) 
motor acts that can be recruited to simulate the actions, emotions and the intentions evoked by a 
musical piece played by another individual, thus allowing the agent to ascribe a motor-based 
intentional meaning to the musical object. This is however, a matter of degree of understanding. 
Some layers of the sense’s stratifications of an auditory feedback, in fact, can obviously be grasped 
also by individuals who (i) don’t have any musical training or (ii) don’t have that particular chain of 
acts in their motor repertoire (i.e. although being musicians, they don’t know how to play that 
particular piece, musical instrument or phrase). Indeed, the mechanism of Embodied Simulation 
(ES), as described above shapes the degree of the agent’s pragmatic knowledge of the piece, but it 
does not play an extensive explanatory role in the way a listener meaningfully interacts with all the 
features of a given musical event. Music theory, for example provides a listener with a particular 
knowledge to ascribe meaning to a musical object, yet (i) it is not the only tool that allows sense-
making and, above all (ii) it is not the primal. As we previously stated, ES refers to a basic and 
minimal form of (action) understanding, which regulates the pre-conceptual responses to the 
musical stimulus according to the listener’s motor expertise, providing her with a different, 
intrinsically motor, modality to relate to the musical object.  
However, in most literature on music cognition, this standpoint remains not sufficiently 
addressed, leading in turn to problems in drawing a coherent phenomenological description of such 
processes. The following two examples provide a more detailed idea of how simulation and 
embodiment are applied in musical contexts and how it can play a key role for musical 
understanding. On the other hand, they present some intrinsic problems when compared to the 
version of ES before mentioned, which can be seen as more parsimonious in spirit. 
 
1) Tom Cochrane (2010) provided what he dubbed the simulation theory of musical 
expressivity, in which ‘music is seen as hijacking the simulation mechanism of the brain’ (ibid., p. 
20). Drawing on the work of Damasio (2003), Cochrane suggested that musical empathy is 
grounded in the recognition of others’ emotions by perceiving their expressive behaviour. In 
particular, Cochrane’s argument is based on three main steps. At the beginning of the causal 
process, he suggests the (i) triggering of a brain’s emotion detecting simulation mechanisms, which 
- and here is the important point for our discussion - is done either by belief or imagination of the 
agency generating the sound. Next, (ii) the intermodal connection between sound and bodily 
movements is utilized, leading to (iii) the mirroring of these movements from a first person 
perspective, which elicits a simulation of emotions in the listener. Cochrane’s contribution is 
certainly fascinating, having the advantage to unify the listener’s sense-making abilities, where 
memory, imagination and other cognitive functions can be integrated in a motor-grounded 
framework. However, a few aspects of his model might require a different interpretation: firstly, it 
relies on an autonomous domain to simulate emotions, which according to ES is not necessary, and 
prone to circularity in the context of embodied approaches to sense-making where imagination is 
conceived as an instantiation of ES among others (Gallese, 2011). Furthermore, the entire process 
of musical simulation is described by Cochrane more as a matter of mental states rather than as a 
motor-grounded phenomenon, as he posits that, since a musical stimulus was “deliberately 
constructed by a human being”, we proceed to ‘interpret that work as the product of certain mental 
states, and derive the nature of those mental states from the characteristics of the work’ (Cochrane, 
2010, p. 19). 
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2) Secondly, Rolf Inge Godøy (2003) proposed that sound-producing actions (hitting, stroking 
or blowing, etc.) largely influence the formation of our images of musical sounds. Godøy posits that 
we mentally imitate sound-producing actions when we listen attentively to music, or that we may 
‘imagine actively tracing or drawing the contours of the music as it unfolds’ (ibid.). Following the 
trends in cross-modal research (Calvert et al., 1998), he hypothesizes that the motor-mimetic 
element translates ‘musical sound to visual images by a simulation of sound producing actions [...] 
forming motor programs that re-code and help store musical sounds in our minds’ (Godøy, 2003, p. 
318). We can understand Godøy's framework as an attempt to integrate ES theory into music 
studies. However, his proposal seems unfit to radicalize the claims of ES in the context of 
musicality: the action-perception cycle, as portrayed by him, is meant as a ‘feedback loop of an 
incessant process of top-down hypothesis-generation followed by bottom-up driven comparison 
with what we assumed in our hypothesis, successively adjusting and refining our top-down 
generated hypothesis by each period of the perception-action cycle’ (Godøy, 2009, p.212). His 
account, coherent with the so-called control theory, contrasts with two of the most peculiar features 
of ES, namely the intra-personal character of the resemblance primarily involved in the simulation 
process (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011, p. 513), and the absence of propositional aspects from the core 
mechanism of action understanding (ibid.). Despite embodied and simulationist approaches being 
still relatively new to the field of music research, during the last decade they have both become 
increasingly influential (see Leman, 2007). The speed of this diffusion may account for some 
peculiarities that seem to distinguish most of theoretically elaborated ES theories of musical 
understanding from the general field of embodied and enactive paradigms. While embodiment and, 
more specifically, embodied simulation, still represent a controversial topic in philosophy of mind 
(Clark, 1997), cognitive neuroscience (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011), as well as other domains, we 
find just a weak echo of this discussion in music-related studies. As a consequence, the diluted 
versions of ES as it appears in current debates are, de facto, unsuitable for providing the much-
needed reconceptualization of musical understanding. Such an achievement would require at least a 
closer attention towards some basic theoretical issues implicit in the adoption of an ES theory, even 
before considering the problems in applying this framework to musical understanding. In particular, 
the positions we briefly analysed seem to reject the basic statements of ES. That is: 
 
 
• ES does not involve any kind of mental states/cognitive involvement.  
• The acts mirrored in ES are goal-directed acts within the motor repertoire of  the perceiving 
subject.  
• The resemblance on which ES relies should be characterised as intra-personal, as the 
perceiving subject doesn't have direct access to the other's mental states or acts   
 
 
As briefly illustrated, the two contributions presented instead of moving from these preliminary 
points, seem to take for granted options and interpretations that not only should be discussed, but 
are often in contrast with classic ES theories, introducing additional structures and processes that 
are not required by the standard version. As I see it, in fact, when ES is coherently implemented in a 
musical context, it might present a more parsimonious model than other simulation-like theories for 
defining the complex mutuality between an agent and the auditory feedback. However, as will 
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emerge in the next chapter, it carries some problematic asumptions. Moreover it might fail to 
provide a model for music cognition that extends beyond the boundaries of skull and skin.        
Anyway, a better understanding of the principles of ES - and of the mirror neurons in general - is 
shown by the seminal publications of Katie Overy and Istvan Molnar-Szacaks (2006; 2009). The 
two scholars were the first to apply systematically this new neuro-cognitive paradigm to music 
research, developing the SAME (Shared Affective Motion Experience) model, suggesting that 
‘musical sound is perceived not only in terms of the auditory signal, but also in terms of the 
intentional, hierarchically organized sequences of expressive motor acts behind the signal’ (Overy 
& Molnar-Szakacs, 2009, p. 492). From this perspective, the listener (according to his or her motor 
expertise) is able to extract different levels of motor information: 
 
 
• The intention level, which defines the long-term goal of a given action.   
• The goal level, which describes the basic goals that lead to the achievement of long-term 
intentions.  
• The kinematic level, which deals with the space movements of the body. 
• The muscle level, which comprehends the pattern of muscular activity required for the 
actual execution. 
  
 
This means that the degree of comprehension of a musical object is shaped by the degree of 
practical musical expertise of the listener, before and below any kind of cognitive, or high level, 
subordination. As Mark Reybrouck, states, in fact, ‘sounds [...] are the outcomes of human actions. 
Even if they are not self-produced, they can induce a kind of (ideo)motor resonance that prompts 
the listener to experience the sounds as if they have been involved in their production.’ (Reybrouck, 
2005a, p. 3). A naïve musical subject will be able to extract information only with regards to goals 
and intentions, without being able to gain an insight into the detailed motor behaviour that allow a 
particular performance, as she does not have it in her motor repertoire. On the other hand, an expert 
musician, when listening to a piece that she has been rehearsing for a long time, is able to constitute 
the musical object in much more detailed terms, as she integrates her practical motor knowledge to 
understand (pre-reflectively) the goals and the intentions of the heard action. The authors put it as 
follows: 
 
 
For example, at one extreme, a professional musician listening to music which they 
know how to perform (e.g., a saxophonist listening to a saxophone piece they know 
well) is able to access precise information at all levels of the hierarchy, from imagined 
emotional intentions to specific finger movements and embouchure. At the other 
extreme, a musical novice listening to unfamilar music from an unknown sound source 
(e.g., someone who has no knowledge of the existence of saxophones) is not able to 
access precise information at any level, but may feel the beat, sub-vocalise, and 
interpret emotional intention accordingly (e.g., fast, loud, and high in pitch might be 
considered emotionally charged). Thus, the resonance or simulation mechanism 
implemented by the human MNS [Mirror Neurons System] matching perceived and 
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executed actions allows a listener to reconstruct various elements of a piece of music in 
their own mind (bringing together auditory, motion, and emotion information), and the 
richness of that reconstruction depends on the individual’s musical experience (Overy & 
Molnar Szacaks, 2009, p. 493). 
 
 
The authors use the word “mind” in a different (internalistic) sense from what I intended it 
during this work. Fair enough. What matters here is that this model matches quite strongly with 
Gallese’s ES theory and it allows the proponents to explain the nature of musical understanding 
from an embodied standpoint. We will consider in the next chapters in which terms the enactive 
perspective can enrich this model but, for now, we can notice that the SAME model represents a 
huge step forward for the redefinition of music cognition.  
According to this model, the goal directedness of the musical acts mirrored by the MNS are 
necessary for the constitution of a basic musical meaning and essential for the study of the 
(inter)active engagement that links musical agents (listener or performer) and musical objects (an 
auditory feedback experienced as musical). This relation, that I previously named musical 
intentionality, in its motor-based characterization, implies that:  
 
 
• Music is something intentionally constituted by the way an agent intends it, 
through her dynamic interplay with the musical environment14  
 
• Music is something that we do: we engage in music by moving, dancing, 
playing, composing, and listening. Listening is also, in fact, a skilful bodily 
activity (see Noë, 2004).  
 
 
As previously shown, the shared intimacy between action and perception lies in the assumption that 
perceptual experience consists in the implicit knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies and 
results embodied by the recruitment of the same neural population that a subject - according to her 
motor expertise - employs when performing as well as listening to the related sound(s) of the same 
(chain of) goal-directed action(s) (Kohler et al., 2002). This idea has also implications for to the 
nature of musical ontogeny, the development of musical expertise, the perception-action 
coordination in collective music making and the emotional response to music - given that the 
auditory mirror-like properties seem to be valid for a wide range of functions which can elicit very 
different behaviours (D’Ausilio, 2007). These points will be examined in greater detail in Chapters 
5 and 6. For now, instead, we can conclude this chapter stating that from a neurophenomenological 
standpoint it is our ability to be directed towards the musical object and to constitute it that makes 
the experience of music possible, and not viceversa. However this seems to be a too radical 
conclusion. The next chapter will therefore explore another possible solution, still employing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This point will be further clarified and implemented in the following chapter. As emerged, according to classical 
mirror neurons theories, it seems that this interplay is defined in terms of simulation. Rather I will argue for a different 
interpretation. 
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crucial evidence carried by the discovery of mirror mechanism, yet not committed to a too 
internalistic perspective, and not to be identified with a simulation mechanism for sense-making. 
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Chapter 4 
Music beyond mirroring15 
 
 
An individual perceptual system no more implicitly represents laws determining, or 
principles governing, transformations of states than the solar system implicitly 
represents Kepler’s or Newton’s laws. In both cases, the laws are real. In neither case 
are they represented by elements of the subject matter governed by the laws  
 
- Tyler Burge, The origins of objectivity 
 
 
The causal relations between nervous systems and environments are intricate and 
continuous. There is nothing specially oomphy about causal relations inside the skin, or 
inside the head, nothing specially capable of pushing or shoving. So there is nothing 
causally mysterious or inhospitable to materialism or naturalism or realism about 
relational states of persons. And there is no magical causal boundary around persons. 
Viewed subpersonally, they are in principle transparent to causality  
 
- Susan Hurley, Consciousness in Action 
 
 
4.1 - A wolf in sheep’s clothing 
 
 
In the last chapter I explored the conceptual geography at the basis of embodiment and mirror 
neurons, introducing and developing the notion of musical intentionality as well as highlighting a 
few studies laying at the intersection of the (mirror-implemented) embodiment thesis and musical 
experience.  
In this chapter, I will continue the discussion of the relevant literature on embodied music 
cognition through a critical analysis of the book Embodied Music Cognition and the Mediation 
Technology written by Marc Leman (2007). A second - and more important - aim of this section, 
however, will be drawing a comparison between classical embodied approaches to music 
experience and the radical interpretation of embodiment posited by enaction. I will, therefore, take 
the ecological notions of affordances and musical affordances as a starting point for this second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This chapter contains material previously published as Menin, D., & Schiavio, A. (2012). Rethinking musical 
affordance. In AVANT. The journal of the philosophical-interdisciplinary vanguard, 3(2), pp. 202-215, and as Matyja, 
J., & Schiavio, A. (2013).  Enactive music cognition. Background and research themes. In Constructivist Foundations, 
8(3), pp. 351-357. Schiavio, A., & Menin, D. (2013). Embodied music cognition and the mediation technology. A 
critical review. In Psychology of Music, 41(6), pp.  804-814. Moreover, it contains material from the following article in 
preparation: Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in preparation). An enactive perspective on infants’ musicality. 
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part, pushing the non-representationalist perspective on musical experience further, as well as 
analysing some problems that may arise by employing the concept of (embodied) simulation. 
Finally I will show how alternative views on mirror neurons can implement and perhaps overcome 
the simulationist claims - with regard to intersubjectivity, shared musical experience and music 
perception. This move will allow me to radicalize the embodied perspective on music cognition, 
defining the main themes of the enactive approach to human musicality through a confrontation 
with (i) embodied and (ii) externalist views on sense-making and musical experience.  
Generally, this chapter will present a full rejection of the concept of mental representations and a 
serious consideration of the active forms of dynamic interplay between living systems and 
environment through music-directed sensorimotor patterns. A full rejection of mental 
representation is in fact a necessity, if we are to develop an approach that takes the notions of 
embodiment and situatedness seriously. As we will see, however, many embodied claims with 
regards to musical experience not only dangerously flirt with fully blown representative objects, but 
also define as ‘embodied’ something that is - on the contrary - completely disembodied, eventually 
marrying happily the dualistic tradition as well as cognitivist models to study the musical mind.  
To understand the roots of the classical perspective on music cognition - where the musical 
stimulus is conceived in terms of an abstract and unidirectional stream of information encoded and 
processed by the brain - we can go back as far as the seminal work by Hermann von Helmholtz 
(1863). He provided one of the first accounts aimed at investigating music perception in terms of 
mere physiological processing. His work gave a neurophysiological explanation of some of the key 
aspects of Western musicality, such as perception of consonance, dissonance, harmony and tonality, 
as well as providing ‘the physiological grounding for gestalt psychology in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and for the cognitive sciences approach for the second half of the twentieth 
century’ (Leman, 2007, p. 29).  
In a well-known paper, Marc Leman and Albrecht Schneider (1997) described the origins of 
cognitive and systematic musicology (see also Parncutt 2007), analysing the revival of gestalt and 
cognitive perspectives. Considering the cognitive perspective, they referred to the study by Allen 
Newell (1982) as representative of the symbol system approach, where ‘propositional 
representations of music were believed to be a proper starting point for the study of musical 
cognition’ (Leman & Schneider, 1997, pp. 18-19). The rise of cognitivist musicology was also 
characterised by a strong link with the research in linguistics by Noam Chomsky (1965) and the 
computational approach in the field of artificial intelligence (Laske, 1977). For instance, Leman and 
Schneider examined musical semiotics - the study of the musical signs and their meaning (see 
Monelle 1992) - from a purely linguistic point of view (Ruwet, 1975) as well as from Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s theory of signs. These approaches, in league with the classic modular account of 
the mind previously discussed could be summarized in the massive trend in current music 
psychology that ultimately aims to draw an accurate map of specialized brain areas involved in 
music processing in order to provide a universal description of musical abilities. The following 
quote clarifies once again the idea behind this area of research: 
 
 
As with language, specific areas of the brain seem to be devoted to the processing of 
music information. If we could grasp universal principles of musical intelligence, we 
would get an idea of how our music understanding gets refined and adapted to a 
particular musical style as a result of a developmental process triggered by stimuli of 
	   72	  
that musical culture (Purwins et al., 2008, p. 152). 
 
 
In other words, the localisation of musical brain modules (which would represent “universal 
principles of musical intelligence”) might lead to a satisfactory explanatory model of musical 
understanding despite developmental and cultural differences.  
The representationalist account is in fact still widespread, even if sometimes it manifests itself in 
disguise. In a more recent work, for instance, Charles Nussbaum (2007) claimed to have developed 
an embodied approach to musical meaning. This approach assumes that a listener would develop a 
mental map of the bodily actions elicited by the music. The role of the body is therefore merely 
passive because, for Nussbaum, what allows the understanding of music is the listener’s ability to 
infer non-musical contents and build a representation of them in her/his brain.  
Music learning, too, is understood as ‘a process by which mental representations (genuine 
musical conceptions) are developed and gradually altered, differentiated, extended, and refined’ 
(Gruhn, 2006, p. 17). This shows that the cognitivist paradigm is still used as an important tool for 
musical understanding and education, despite the rise of the promising antirepresentationalist 
frameworks in cognitive science that I have previously described. According to Wayne Bowman, 
moreover, another (yet strictly related) problem is that 
 
 
[w]e find ourselves advocating music study for reasons that fit with prevailing 
ideological assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the aims of schooling, but 
on which we are ill-equipped to deliver, and that neglect what may be most distinctive 
about music: its roots in experience and agency, the bodily and the social. Our most 
revered justifications of music education are built upon deeply flawed notions about 
mind, cognition, and intelligence (Bowman 2004, p. 33). 
 
 
However, something has recently changed. During the past few decades, in fact, when trying to 
explain how we understand, or make sense of the musical material, scholars in musical research 
have tried to give an increased importance to the role of the body for musical experience. Probably 
the most famous and quoted work within this context is Embodied music cognition and mediation 
technology, written by Marc Leman (2007). The aim of his book is to clarify the sense-giving 
process at the basis of musical comprehension, focusing on the cognitive relationship - in the 
broadest sense - that ties musical subjects and objects. His approach assumes that the (musical) 
mind results from an embodied interaction with music: 
 
 
The human body can be seen as a biologically designed mediator that transfers physical 
energy up to a level of action-oriented meanings, to a mental level in which 
experiences, values, and intentions form the basic components of music signification. 
The reverse process is also possible: that the human body transfers an idea, or mental 
representation, into a material or energetic form (Leman, 2007, p. xiii).  
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This promising and fascinating perspective has been developed according to the previous 
literature in different disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, musicology and cognitive 
science. In the next few paragraphs I will discuss the particular way Leman tackles the problem of 
musical understanding, as well as its internal and external coherence. Specifically, I will explore 
some implications and sub-problems that arise from the adoption of an embodied approach to the 
study of musical experience, focusing on the following four points 
 
 
•  Overcoming of the subjective-objective dualism 
•  The simulation issue: what kind of processes could enable musical understanding? 
•  Musical intentionality: how can we define a conceptual topography of musical contexts?  
•  Mediation in musical practice and experience: the role of musical instruments and of the 
body 
 
 
4.2 - Mind the gap! 
 
 
From the outset of the book, Leman identifies one of the crucial problems of music research as 
explaining how to fill the gap between music seen as encoded physical energy (the way modern 
digital media considers music) and music as a matter of beliefs, intentions, interpretations, 
evaluations and significations (the human way of dealing with music) (2007, p. xiii). In his words, 
the book is based on a hypothesis about musical communication, which is supposed to be rooted in 
a particular relationship between musical experience (mind) and sound energy (matter). Despite 
some noble intentions, the way Leman tackles this issue are not beyond question. By postulating an 
open dichotomy between mind and matter, the author clearly misinterprets the embodied stance, 
which on the contrary assumes that the mind is already a category that cannot be divided from the 
body of an agent. Mysteriously, the author further assures us that ‘[n]euroscience has provided 
compelling arguments that the Cartesian division between mind and matter can no longer be 
maintained and that a disembodied mind as such does not exist’ (ibid., p. 13).  
We can notice a strong contradiction between this point and the problem the book wants to 
solve. Indeed, how is the body supposed to bridge the gap between mind and matter if they cannot 
be considered anymore two different categories? In assuming this ontological separation, the author 
actually follows Descartes’ stance, as previously discussed in Chapter 1. Among the main 
theoretical models proposed to overcome the difficulties raised by the Cartesian dichotomy (how 
are mental events and physical events linked? How can an immaterial mind interact with a material 
body?), the classic cognitive perspective, as we saw, has emerged as one of the most discussed and 
controversial approaches during the past century. It has been developed, however, leaving the 
dualistic presuppositions unaltered, as in the bottom up/top down model for information processing 
(see Dennett, 1994). Leman’s account for ‘an action-oriented approach, based on the notion of 
corporeality’ (2007, p. 26) is, in fact, supposed to overcome the problem of dualism, but its aim to 
provide an ‘epistemological foundation for bridging the gap between musical mind and matter’ 
(2007, p. 26) falls inevitably short due to the intrinsic contradiction in its assumptions.  
This dualistic theoretical background, moreover, will affect most of the topics discussed in the 
book. After discussing the problems of a subjectivist approach (ibid., pp. 12-13), we are told: ‘[a] 
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way to proceed is based on the idea that action may play a key role in mediation processes between 
the mental and the physical world’ (ibid., p. 14). In order to focus on action, Leman advocates an 
intermediate level between subjective and objective methodologies. As Keller and Janata pointed 
out in their book review, Leman’s analyses focus on the levels of descriptions used in musical 
research: 
 
 
[p]revious approaches to understanding music (e.g., traditional musicology) have 
fixated upon these two levels of description without giving adequate treatment to the 
‘rules’ that govern the mapping between objective representations and subjective 
interpretations. Such rules are needed to achieve his scientific goal of developing a 
complete theory of music, as well as his practical goal of developing a successful 
mediation technology. The key to Leman’s solution is the proposal that an 
understanding of musical intentions requires third-person and first-person descriptions 
to be linked via second-person descriptions, which are corporeal in nature. At this 
intermediate level, expressive bodily gestures from an individual’s repertoire of actions 
are used to describe moving sonic forms in a manner that the individual can interpret 
based on his or her personal experience of interacting with others in the world (Keller & 
Janata, 2009, pp. 289-290). 
 
 
Leman’s approach aims to replace an objectivistic third-person description and a standpoint 
linked to subjective intentions’ interpretations (first-person description) with a second-person 
description based on the notion of corporeal intentionality. The next section will discuss this crucial 
notion after highlighting Leman’s understanding of (embodied) simulation and its role for musical 
understanding. 
 
 
4.3 - Simulating and understanding - part I 
 
 
In Leman’s work the concept of embodiment has a pivotal role in the meaning-giving processes 
that tie musical subjects and objects. This notion, however, is strictly connected with a disembodied 
simulationist claim that has very little to do with a truly embodied kind of sense-making. The 
author, in fact, basically states that music understanding consists in a mental simulation of acts 
appropriate to make sense of a given musical surface. As briefly outlined in the last chapter, 
simulation is a very extensive issue. Therefore, in order to gain an insight into this claim we would 
need to explore the conceptual topography of Leman’s approach starting from its basic formulation. 
The first question to be answered is about the characterisation of the subject of musical experience, 
and the identification of other agents that she perceives and understands via simulation. 
 
 
The above findings agree with the notion of self as a mental model having access to a 
proprioceptive and kinesthetic representation of one’s own body in combination with a 
representation of intended relationships with the other (Gallagher, 2000; Metzinger, 
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2003). Both aspects of the self, its inward and outward directedness, can be considered 
aspects of the action-oriented ontology. In the present context, the other is of course the 
music. The above findings are consistent with the idea that empathy involves regulatory 
mechanisms by which the subject keeps track of the self in relation to music (Leman, 
2007, p. 126). 
 
 
According to Leman’s account, therefore, the subject of musical experience should be identified 
with a mental model, whereas “the other”, the agent, whose behaviour is understood in intentional 
terms, should be the musical stimulus itself. Of course Leman does not mean musical surface as 
some sort of subject to whom we can ascribe beliefs, values and meanings. His claim should be 
rather understood in these terms: what matters for musical understanding to take place is the 
subject’s intentionality; the attribution of intentionality, moreover, relies on some kind of mirroring, 
that is, ‘on the basis of a simulation of the perceived action in the subject’s own action’ (Leman, 
2007, p. 92). Here we have to notice the radical incompatibility of such a position with the ES 
theory, according to which motor understanding takes place without and before any kind of 
inferential mediation.  
Another crucial issue in defining a simulationist approach concerns the way we mean simulation 
itself. I have previously identified ST (in contrast to TT and RTT, but also to ES) as a claim that 
holds the following perspective: an agent can understand the behaviour, the intentions, the emotions 
and the actions of another individual by simulating them internally, within her cognitive system. As 
Rockwell (2008) pointed out, however, a naïve approach to this topic is no longer sustainable, in 
light of the long-term controversy between Theory Theory and Simulation Theory. According to 
Gordon (1986) and Rockwell (2008), there are two main ways simulation has been intended in 
literature: 
 
 
• As a kind of pictorial representation. In these terms “simulating” is equated to “creating an 
image in the mind”. 
 
• As a form of pre-tense or hypothetical “acting out”. According to this view, any aspect of 
our mental life can be turned into a simulation by taking it off-line. 
 
 
Both these approaches have been widely questioned regarding their theoretical presuppositions 
and empirical evidences, yet, what it seems problematic is the demand to embrace both of them at 
the same time. According to the first view, indeed, there is no need to postulate any kind of 
conceptual understanding preceding simulation, whereas the second view is known to collapse into 
a hybrid TT/ST theory. The fact that Leman does not address explicitly the issue of this distinction 
raises several coherence problems for his account, questioning whether he always means 
“simulation” in the same terms or not. The following excerpt (in which Leman quotes his colleague 
Godøy) highlights a view of “simulation” as pictorial representation, where the subjects would 
create an image in the mind from which to extract information for action planning. 
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When a trajectory in the inner space is simulated - for example, a walk from the front 
door of the university building to my office - I can associate this motor image with a 
trajectory in the outer space. I can explore the visual-audio-tactile features of the objects 
I encounter along my imaginary walk. In that sense, the sensorimotor couplings allow 
the transition from imagined movement to predicted sensory qualities. If the moving 
sonic forms can engage humans in body movements, then it is straightforward to 
assume that this movement will engender sensory qualities which can be attributed to 
music as well. If corporeal imitation of movement in sound is possible, then the 
association with sensory qualities is straightforward (Godøy, 2003, [quoted in Leman, 
2007, p. 88]). 
 
 
A second quotation, however, will show a different - and, de facto incompatible - way he means 
“simulation”, here understood in terms of imitation. 
 
 
Mimesis theory assumes a transitivity relationship: (1) music imitates something, (2) the 
subject imitates the music, and hence (3) the subject imitates that same something [...]. 
A related version of this transitivity relationship is based on the notion of 
expressiveness: (1) music expresses something, (2) the subject captures that expression, 
and (3) the subject captures the source of that expression (Leman, 2007, p. 128). 
 
 
This view, exemplified in several excerpts, outlines a circular scenario in which simulation (or 
mimesis) cannot account by itself for an understanding of actions, concepts or musical objects, 
requiring therefore, as the ST/TT dispute showed, a conceptual knowledge prior to simulation itself, 
as we can argue from this well-known argument of Dennett: 
 
 
If I make believe I am a suspension bridge and wonder what I will do when the wind 
blows, what “comes to me” in my make-believe state depends on how sophisticated my 
knowledge is of the physics and engineering of suspension bridges. Why should my 
making believe I have your beliefs be any different? In both cases, knowledge of the 
imitated object is needed to drive the make-believe “simulation”, and knowledge must 
be organized into something rather like a theory (Dennett, 1987, pp. 100-101). 
 
 
Furthermore, it seems that the emphasis on attribution of intentionality reflects a position similar to 
Dennett’s, where understanding is a matter of concepts, not percepts. As Leman puts it, in fact: 
 
 
This attribution of intentionality can also be extended to material things that move, such 
as cars. In traffic, another car is not just a moving object. It is an object with particular 
intentions, which I can understand by using the experience of my being a driver. 
Responsible drivers aim at understanding the intended movements of other cars, and on 
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that basis predict their future behaviour. It is likely that for a dog, a car is just another 
moving object. It is not an intentional object because the dog is not involved with 
driving a car. The moving car is not something that the dog can relate to its own actions. 
Hence, it may not have an understanding of it in terms of a mental simulation. Like cars, 
music can be understood as an intentional object (Leman, 2007, p. 78). 
 
 
This view seems to compromise Leman’s understanding of the mirror neurons issue. The author, in 
fact, assumes that intentionality can be mentally attributed to agents, or even to material things that 
move, via simulation. This view, however, highlights not only remarkable internal incoherencies, 
but also points to a substantially disembodied approach, in which the subject mentally attributes 
intentional states to musical surfaces. On the contrary, as Sinigaglia (2008a) noticed, mirror-like 
activities might suggest that the basic aspects of intentional understanding can only be fully 
appreciated through a motor approach to intentionality, without any form of mentalizing. It is 
probably to this kind of intentionality that Leman is referring when he uses the expression 
“corporeal intentionality” (2007, p. 84). It might be assumed that the author’s mistaken 
interpretation of embodiment could be forgiven in light of a coherent intentional theory that would 
explain the primarily motor-based relation that ties musical objects and subjects. But, again, the 
author inexplicably refers to another kind of intentional understanding, a ‘cerebral intentionality, 
which - in music - explores the speculative pursuit of potential interpretations. The essence of 
cerebral intentionality is interpreting the source of intentions attributed to music. The essence of 
corporeal intentionality is the articulation of moving sonic forms’ (ibid., p. 84 - emphasis added). 
This quote clearly shows that Leman attributes the understanding of the intentions to purely high-
level cognitive abilities, rather than to a truly embodied kind of sense-making.  
Despite its revolutionary ambitions, Leman’s view of simulation shows a clear lack of theoretical 
grounding, nevertheless portraying the intrinsic problems that stem from the employment of terms 
such as “simulation” and “understanding”. After a closing remark on Leman’s work in regards with 
the notion of mediation, I will explore from a different perspective the concept of embodied 
simulation, highlighting different interpretations of this framework, heading towards a more 
enactive perspective. But let’s first conclude our discussion on Leman (ibid.).   
 
 
4.4 - Mediation, Body, Instruments 
 
 
According to Keller and Janata (2009), mediation refers to the mappings between the intentions 
and desires on the part of active musical participants and the technology that renders the music. 
This first meaning, related to the dualistic presuppositions previously examined, is not, however, 
the only one adopted by Leman: he also refers to mediation with respect to the role of technology 
itself as mediating between the performer and actual sonic outcomes. I have already discussed the 
first kind of mediation, concerning the link between the allegedly separate domains of mind and 
matter. Now it is the turn of the second one, wondering what kind of mediation Leman poses 
between a musician and the music he plays. Simply put, we could also look at the problem from this 
side: what is the role of musical instruments, whether they are classical acoustic ones or electronic 
devices, in musical practice and experience? We have at first to notice that Leman is facing two 
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different issues: 
 
 
• How mediation technology actually works in musical practice. 
 
• How mediation technology should evolve (with particular regard to electronic devices for 
music making) and how reproducing activities should work, in order to be fully transparent, 
giving the illusion of non-mediation. 
 
 
Though Leman seems not to distinguish between these two sub-problems, he made clear his 
persuasion that an understanding of the more theoretical one would be useful in order to implement 
more effective music technologies (2007, p. 2). In order to delineate Leman’s approach to this 
crucial issue, we should look back to his position about the body-mind problem. Once recognized 
the dualistic bias, which informs his whole theoretical paradigm, we can fully understand the 
operating concept of “mediation” adopted, though not explicitly discussed. As emerges, his view 
about musical technologies should be understood as based upon the previously examined dualistic 
account: musical instruments work as mediation technologies in a similar way to how the body 
functions ‘as a biologically designed mediator that transfers physical energy up to a level of action-
oriented meanings, to a mental level in which experiences, values, and intentions form the basic 
components of music signification’ (Leman, 2007, p. xiii).  
This is, apparently, a classical embodied claim: instruments, as tools, can be seen as extensions 
of the human body or, more precisely, of the peripersonal space defined by the subject’s action 
possibilities (see Costantini et al., 2011). Nevertheless, a closer analysis will show that Leman 
reduces embodied cognition to a kind of mediation compatible with classical, disembodied, 
paradigms about tool use, once more misunderstanding the deeper meaning of embodiment. The 
reason for this misunderstanding is to be found precisely in the dualistic presuppositions previously 
examined: if mind and body are conceived as distinct substances the main theoretical problem 
becomes to justify the mediation between these separate dimensions (see also Maravita & Iriki, 
2004).  
This brief analysis aimed to show that Leman’s attempt to develop a new approach defining 
musical experience is not sufficient in providing a coherent theoretical paradigm, for most of his 
intentions fall short according to the implicit contradictory background underlining his arguments. 
The explicit use of an ontological distinction between mind and matter is indeed incompatible not 
only with an embodied approach to musical understanding, but also with a plausible notion of 
musical intentionality based on subject’s motor repertoire. At the basis of Leman’s perspective 
there is, as previously emerged, a misunderstanding of the role of the sensorimotor integration 
provided by the mirror neuron system: while the mirror mechanism ‘maps the sensory 
representation of the action, emotion or sensation of another onto the perceiver’s own motor, 
viscero-motor or somatosensory representation of that action, emotion or sensation’ (Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2011) without any cognitive subordination, the author, conceiving the subject as a 
disembodied mind, prefers to investigate other (high-level) forms of sense-giving abilities, shaped 
upon a rough notion of simulation.  
On the contrary, in order to provide a persuasive theory of musical understanding based on 
embodied cognition, the author should have considered the goal- directedness of the motor acts 
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grasped and mirrored by the subjects (for example by studying their involuntary resonance during 
passive listening tasks, or measuring their pre-attentive neural response) focusing on the basic level 
of the intentional relationship that links the subject and the object in any musical experience.  
 
 
4.5 - Simulating and understanding - part II 
 
 
It might be assumed that embracing the form of embodied and internalistic processing with 
bodily formatted (i.e. sensorimotor) representations posited by ES for explaining the way humans 
understand actions, emotions and intentions of others, is a price well worthy paying in order to 
overcome the traditional high-level forms of intentional understanding (as portrayed by TT, RTT or 
ST). However, it still remains unclear how the mechanism instantiating such an immediate and 
automatic comprehension (ES), would work in detail. Furthermore, there are several questions 
concerning the passage from the actual empirical findings of Mirror Neurons to the development of 
the theoretical framework based on ES (Gallagher, 2012; Hutto, 2013) that need to be answered. 
The traditional notion of Embodied Simulation, as described several times by Gallese, Goldman, 
Sinigaglia and other spokesmen of the Mirroring stance, does not require any sophisticated form of 
explicit mentalizing, providing a parsimonious and incorporated model for understanding the 
others’ actions, emotions and intentions.  
As noticed by Gallagher (2012), Gallese uses the following quote from Lipps to clarify the 
equivalence between perceiving and understanding: ‘when I am watching an acrobat walking on a 
suspended wire, Lipps (1903) notes, I feel myself inside of him’ (Gallese, 2001, p. 43).  As Goldman 
(2006) recognizes, this low-level, enacted form of simulation stands in contrast with the high-level, 
pretense, simulation theory (Gordon, 1986; Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002). The relevance of this 
paradigm for the enactive approach should rely on its automaticity, which avoids the recruitment of 
fully blown mental representations. However, this automaticity - as embodied by simulation-like 
processes - has been recently questioned. As Shaun Gallagher puts it, in fact: 
 
 
if simulation were as automatic as mirror neurons firing, then it would seem that we 
would not be able to attribute a state different from our own to someone else. But we 
often do this in cases where we see someone acting in a way that actually motivates the 
opposite reaction in us, for example, if I see someone enjoying acting in a way that for 
me is disgusting (Gallagher, 2012, p. 168). 
 
 
Let’s have a closer look into the main nuances of this implicit form of simulation by firstly 
focusing once more on the explicit Simulation Theory, in order to define some shared assumptions 
that might fail to develop a coherent explanatory paradigm. ES, in fact, is a form of simulation. 
Standard simulation theory (ST) implies (i) pretence and (ii) some kind of instrumental 
characterisation (Gallagher, 2012). Indeed, following the analysis provided by Gallagher (ib), we 
notice that Goldman asserts that ST employs ‘pretend states […] deliberately adopted for the sake 
of attribution’s task […]. In simulating practical reasoning, the attributor feeds pretend desires and 
beliefs into her own practical reasoning system’ (Goldman, 2002, p. 7). Moreover, classical ST 
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accounts are ‘characterised in terms of a mechanism or model that we manipulate or control in 
order to understand something to which we do not have direct access’ (Gallagher, 2012, p. 177). 
But, as Gallagher concludes, these two conditions are not met by Mirror Neurons, raising several 
problems in attributing a simulationist account for their activation. Also in the embodied model of 
simulation, it seems that pretence should play an important role, considering that ‘I put myself  “as 
if” in other person’s shoes’ (ibid., p. 178). My brain does not have any instrumental control on 
mirror neurons’ activation - it cannot decide to make them fire. Rather, being an automatic process, 
they are elicited by the other person’s actions. ‘It is not us (or our brain) initiating simulation; it is 
the other who does this to us. This is a case of perceptual elicitation rather than executive control’ 
(ibid.).  
It seems therefore that using the term “simulation” for these kinds of sub-personal processes 
might create enormous theoretical difficulties in the analysis of first- or third-person’s specification, 
as mirror neurons are neutral with respect to the subject. ‘In that case, it is not possible for them to 
register my intentions as pretending to be your intentions; there is no “as if” of the sort required by 
ST because there is no “I” or “you” represented’ (ibid., p. 179). Gallagher and Hutto summarize this 
interpretation as follows: 
 
 
Nothing (or no one) is using a model […] and neuronal processes cannot pretend. As 
vehicles neurons cannot pretend - they either fire or they don’t. More importantly, in 
terms of relevant content, if they are neutral with respect to first- and third-person, 
pretence in just these terms (I pretend to be you) is not possible. In effect, simulation, as 
defined by ST, is a personal-level concept that cannot be legitimately applied to sub-
personal processes (Gallagher & Hutto, 2008, pp. 18-19).  
 
 
There are also other problems. What happens when, for example, I am witnessing at the same 
time different actions? Let’s imagine the following scenario. Since I am a guitarist, it seems that 
while listening to a piece for guitar orchestra, I should somehow automatically simulate all the 
meaningful acts that would constitute the musical stimulus that I am listening to. But how could I 
possibly do that? The intentions, emotions, actions of the guitarists involved can be extremely 
different, though directed towards the same musical goal - the execution of a chord, a motif, a 
passage or - in general - of the piece. Of course one could posit (as I have argued myself when 
discussing music and modularism) that since a musical piece is defined not by the different parts, 
but rather by their unity, I would experience the totality of the different emotions, intentions and 
acts, therefore simulating the sum of them. Moreover it is also true that the mirror mechanism codes 
the goal of a given action rather the actual movement. But, again, how could I put myself in the 
other person’s shoes “as if” I am performing the piece by myself, in this paradigmatic case? There 
is no “other person” here, but a totality of different goal-directed motor behaviours that are 
performed by different actors. A possibility is that what I am actually doing in this context is 
resonating with my brain-body system in a way that does not involve any kind of direct matching 
between the witnessed and neurally represented given action.  
Rather, instead of simulating, the brain processes embodied by mirror-like activities could be 
seen as underlying a form of intersubjective enactive perception (Gallagher, 2012, p. 181). This 
move allows getting rid of the notion of neural representation and of neural simulation, without 
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nevertheless denying that neural processes play a decisive role in musical sense-making. To the 
enactive eye, in fact, the problem is the supposed sufficiency of such sub-personal processes16. But 
how would it be possible to characterise mirror neurons’ activation in non-simulationist terms? As 
Gallagher puts it: 
 
 
The articulated neuronal processes that include activations of mirror neurons or shared 
representations may underpin a non-articulated immediate perception of the other 
person’s intentional actions, rather than a distinct process of simulating their intentions. 
On this view, perception is a temporally dynamic and enactive process (Gallagher, 
2012, p. 181). 
 
 
This model, in other words, maintains that perceiving the actions of another individual is already 
to understand their affective, sensorimotor (i.e. intentional) meaning. Moreover, it implies that this 
is not a process encapsulated in the brain. In fact:  
 
 
[t]he explanatory unit of social interaction is not the brain, or even two (or more) 
brains, but a dynamic relation between organisms, which include brains, but also their 
own structural features that enable specific perception-action loops involving social 
and physical environments, which in turn effect statistical regularities that shape the 
structure of the nervous system (Gallagher, 2005). The question is, what do brains do in 
the complex and dynamic mix of interactions that involve full-out moving bodies, with 
eyes and faces and hands and voices; bodies that are gendered and raced, and dressed to 
attract, or to work or play; bodies that incorporate artefacts, tools and technologies, that 
are situated in various physical environments, and defined by diverse social roles and 
institutional practices? The answer is that brains are part of a system, along with eyes 
and face and hands and voice, and so on, that enactively anticipates and responds to its 
environment. How an agent responds will depend to some degree on the overall 
dynamical state of the brain and the various, specific and relevant neuronal processes 
that have been attuned by evolutionary pressures, but also by personal experiences (the 
historicity […]) of the agent […]. How an agent responds depends on the worldly and 
intentional circumstances of the agent, the bodily skills and habits she has formed, her 
physical condition, a variety of so-called extraneous factors […], with whom she is 
interacting, and what the other person may expect in terms of normative standards 
stemming from communal and institutional practices (Gallagher et al., 2013, p. 422). 
 
 
This idea is also valid for musical experience. The enactive approach to musical experience sees 
music cognition as a process that involves a living system considered as a whole, in its sensorimotor 
coupling with the environment. It is thus not reducible to structures inside the head. Given these 
considerations, it seems that the mirror neuron activation might not be sufficient per se but rather, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I am grateful to Ezequiel di Paolo, who shared with me his thoughts about this point through personal correspondence.    
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acts as an enabling prerequisite for sense-making. The enactive story is in fact compatible with 
inner processing as long as it is characterised not in the usual representational terms. What 
enactivism denies, instead, is the idea of explaining thinking by assuming that the brain is “playing 
around” with terms like “belief” or “pretend” (De Jaegher, 2010).  
A more concrete example about the enactive approach to musicality can be discussed with 
regards to the ability of the musical agent to incorporate tools in order to make music. Music 
making, indeed, often employs musical instruments extending de facto the body through a new 
organ - a musical instrument could be seen an actual extension of the body - for coupling with the 
musical environment in a meaningful way. I will return to this example in the last section of this 
chapter.  
What we can say here is that also the way I perceive music is already sense-making, it is already 
a process that is direct, interactive and not solely caused by (or determined in) the brain. As 
O’Regan and Noë put it, ‘the knowledge of the ways movements affect sensory stimulation is 
necessary for experience’ (O’Regan and Noë, 2001a p. 1055). The experience of the world, 
therefore, can be such and such mainly on the basis of the creature’s sensorimotor abilities, without 
any sort of (explicit or neural) simulation.  
The way we engage with the world is never a matter of (explicit or neural) representations and 
inferential mediations but it is rather radically entwined with the ability to actively and 
meaningfully interact with the environment. In other terms, with regards to a musical context, the 
motor expertise of an agent (her vocabulary of musical-directed actions) is constituent and 
indispensable for musical sense-making as it allows the possibility to interact meaningfully with the 
musical environment. But what does this mean? How could one interact with the musical 
environment, and, furthermore, what is a musical environment? I do not intend to imply that the 
musical environment is a sort of sonic world where pre-given entities (musical sounds) meet the 
listeners’ ears, but rather, I consider it as an in-constitution category, to be intended in terms of the 
modalities in which an agent intentionally interacts with and constitutes the musical world, 
ascribing meanings and values. As Johnson puts it:  
 
 
Meaning includes patterns of embodied experience and pre-conceptual structures of our 
sensibility (i.e., our mode of perception, or orienting ourselves and of interacting with 
other objects events, or persons). These embodied patterns do not remain private or 
peculiar to the person who experiences them. Our community helps us interpret and 
codify many of our felt patterns. They become shared cultural modes of experience and 
help to determine the nature of our meaningful, coherent understanding of our “world”. 
(Johnson, 1987, p. 14) 
 
 
This is exemplified by collective musical contexts, from rituals to orchestral rehearsals, where 
the very same “world” - though enacted in different modalities - is constituted by each agent who 
participates in the event through embodied sensorimotor patterns. The directedness towards musical 
objects constitutes them continuously through every intentional act bringing forth the agents’ own 
domain of meanings.  
This intentional directedness, therefore, needs to be radically intermixed with the object itself, in 
order to ascribe its configuration, resulting in a co-determined process. To interact meaningfully 
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with music means to enact a domain of meaning, to give sense. A pianist does that in every 
performance, in every chord, in every gesture intentionally directed towards the musical execution. 
But also a listener is doing that; a listener is in fact motorically entwined with music, and the way 
her cognitive system resonates is already sense-making. Joel Krueger describes this position quite 
clearly:   
 
 
This sensorimotor knowledge consists in the practical understanding that modulations 
of bodily movement and attentional focusing affect sensory change. For instance, when 
we perceive a visual scene, movements of the head or body change the way that 
occluded objects (e.g., part of a bush obscured by a tree standing in front of it) gradually 
reveal themselves as I move closer to or around them. We possess similar knowledge of 
how bodily movements and attentional modulations shape the character and content of 
musical experience. Rudimentary sensorimotor knowledge is thus the implicit, practical 
understanding that, as an embodied agent, I possess the sensorimotor skills needed to 
secure experiential access to different features of my world by using my body in 
different ways. Being sensitive to the sensorimotor contingencies governing my relation 
to perceptual objects is what it means to be a “skilled” perceiver (Krueger, 2011, p. 12). 
 
 
I shall call the motor action constituting the sensorimotor knowledge necessary to be engaged to 
a musical feedback teleomusical acts (in Greek τέλος means more or less “goal” or “result”). These 
actions with a musical goal-directedness, therefore, not only represent the basis for the musical 
repertoire of acts that the musician develops throughout her musical life, but are also the necessary 
pre-requisite of a fully constituted musical intentionality. This last point will be clarified in the next 
chapters, in particular when focusing on exploratory behaviours and infants’ musicality. For now, 
we have to acknowledge that this characterisation of sensorimotor skills as fundamental properties 
for musical intentionality forces us to admit that musical experience consists in situated, skilful, 
coping (Noë, 2004). As Krueger notices, in fact, ‘we enact music perception via sensorimotor 
manipulation of sonic structures’ (2009, p. 104). This “manipulation” as he concludes, is to be 
understood through the notion of affordance and musical affordance. The next paragraph offers an 
analysis of this. 
 
 
4.6 - Visual-motor affordances and the power of action 
 
 
The notion of affordance has been introduced by James Gibson (1977; 1979) as the feature of an 
object or the environment that allows the observer to perform an action, a set of ‘environmental 
supports for an organism’s intentional activities’ (Reybrouck, 2005b). The aim of the Gibsonian 
perspective was to challenge the idea that perception is based on sensation (Gibson & Gibson, 
1955). His starting point was the assumption that an array of light in the environment has simply 
too much information to be fully represented in the brain as an analogous entity.  
If perception has no mediating categories such as representation, then it can be defined as direct. 
According to Rockwell (2005), Gibson’s claim that visual experience exists in the light, should be 
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understood not in terms of ecological sufficiency (light, in fact, cannot be experienced if there is no 
one to perceive it) but rather, through the interaction between organism and the environment. The 
status of affordances is indeed unclear in absence of the animal (Chemero, 2009, p. 150).  
Studied under very different perspectives, this concept has become a crucial issue not only for 
ecological psychology, but also for cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence studies, and philosophy 
of mind. This variety of approaches has widened the already ambiguous definition originally 
provided by Gibson himself, contributing to the development of different standpoints in open 
contrast with each other (see Zipoli Caiani, 2011).  
During the last two decades several researchers tried to extend the notion also to musical 
experience, with the aim to draw a coherent theory of musical affordances (Clarke, 2005; 
Reybrouck, 2005b; Nussbaum, 2007; Krueger, 2011a; 2011b). In this section I will argue for a 
particular concept of musical affordances, that is, as I see it, narrower and less ambiguous in scope 
and more closely related to its original. In the context of motor action research, there is a common 
agreement regarding a basic understanding of the notion of affordance, usually intended in terms of 
a set of possible motor actions evoked by the intrinsic properties of an object or the environment. 
According to Gibson (1979), indeed, the visual perception of an object leads to an automatic 
selection of those of its intrinsic properties that support the individual’s physical interactions with it. 
These properties, however, are not only abstract, physical or geometrical features, but ‘incarnate the 
practical opportunities that the object offers to the organism which perceives it’ (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2008, p. 34). When, for example, an object like a cup is located in the subject’s 
peripersonal space (Costantini et al., 2011), it can represent the goal of the individual’s grasping act 
and this subject/object interaction is codified through an affordance.  
A key role for this current understanding is played by the previously discussed neuroscientific 
evidence of canonical neurons, a set of neurons which discharges when an individual simply 
observes an object without performing any movement, as well as when he/she grasps that object. 
The discovery of these visuo-motor neurons shows how an object can afford, according to the 
subject’s motor expertise, a set of possible actions that can be performed thereon, relying on a sub-
cognitive form of understanding, not linked to mental representation or higher mental faculties. 
Vittorio Gallese, in describing canonical neurons, states that 
 
 
[t]he most interesting aspect [...] is the fact that in a considerable percentage of neurons, 
a congruence is observed between the response during the execution of a specific type 
of grip, and the visual response to objects that, although differing in shape, nevertheless 
all ‘afford’ the same type of grip that excites the neuron when executed [...].The 
intrinsic relational functional architecture of primates’ motor system likely scaffold the 
development of more abstract and detached forms of intentionality, as those 
characterising thought in our species (Gallese, 2009, pp. 489-490). 
 
 
The basis of the intentional relationship between an organism and the environment, therefore, 
can be reconsidered in terms of how the motor possibilities (Poincaré, 1908; 1913) of the subject’s 
body can interact with the surrounding objects, advocating for a motor approach to intentionality 
(Sinigaglia, 2008a). This form of intentionality doesn’t require any high-level, metacognitive ability 
as ‘the intentional character […] could be deeply rooted in the intrinsic relational character of body 
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action’ (Gallese, 2009, p. 489). In other terms, cognition arises from the bodily interactions with the 
environment, depending on ‘the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular 
perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that together form the matrix within 
which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects of life are meshed’ (Thelen et al., 2001, p. 
1).  
However, it seems that the current ecological account for affordances inspired by Gibson is not 
totally committed to this characterisation. Rather, it displays epistemological vagueness. One of the 
assumptions at the basis of this perspective is that every set of behaviours ascribable in terms of a 
unitary action has the right to be described as an act potentially evoked by its related affordance. In 
order to clarify this statement we can think about the possible analogy between these two different 
conditions:  
 
 
• A cup affords the act of grasping.  
• The sight of a movie-trailer affords the act of going to the cinema.  
 
 
From an ecological standpoint, these actions (grasping and going to the movies) are both 
homogeneous and describable as unitary. But the inferential feature of the second one makes it 
unsuitable: otherwise, every a-posteriori correlation between events and actions should be 
considered affordative. To get an idea of the variety of phenomena included under the concept of 
affordance we can indeed have a look at this excerpt: 
 
 
Air, the medium we live in, affords breathing. It affords walking or driving through, and 
seeing through, at least in communities that are free of smog (E. J. Gibson, 1982, p. 55). 
 
 
This example presents some incongruences with the necessary setting of a scientific research on 
the notion of affordance. Even if sometimes the air is breathable, this does not imply that breathing 
is a goal-directed act, intentionally linked with the portion of air considered as an intentional object 
(Menin, 2011, p. 12). We cannot indeed integrate every possible interaction between the two poles 
of action (subject and object) into a genuine reflection on the issue of affordances without applying 
a rough objectivation, hence depriving the notion from any phenomenological characterisation. The 
relationship between a subject and the air that the agent is breathing, simply put, cannot be 
described as constituent of any intentional relationship. It can only be described in terms of 
physical-chemical events17.  
But if some events do have affordances, we should investigate the object of these, and also the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 With regard to this point, it should be clear that, if we are to develop an experimentally expendable notion of 
“affordance”, the original Gibsonian ambiguity needs to be explicitly overcome. If it is true that one of the most 
fascinating features of affordances resides in its being direct and someway ‘automatic’, thus not requiring any cognitive 
or attentional mediation, we cannot go, on the basis of this not-needed mediation, to the extent of saying that no 
intentional sensorimotor relationship is required for an affordance to take place. The notion of ‘basic motor act’ 
introduced in the recent literature (i.e. Rizzolatti, Sinigaglia 2008) clearly highlights goal-directedness as the central 
feature of sensorimotor interactions with the environment. 	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role of the relevant subject. Gibson (1979) stated that a niche is the set of affordances for the agent 
and that different organisms with different sensorimotor skills ‘may have physical collocated but 
nonetheless non-overlapping niches. For example, a human and a bacterium may share a physical 
location […], but their niches will not overlap. […] Gibson suggests that this is the way to make 
sense of the mutuality of animals and environments. An animal’s abilities imply an ecological 
niche. Conversely, an ecological niche implies the animal’ (Chemero, 2009, p. 147).  
The abilities in play, here, are the sensorimotor skills that would allow the living creature to 
make-sense of the world through intentional goal-directed patterns of embodied action. We see 
through our eyes, which are movable, placed in a head that can turn around, linked to a body that 
can explore the environment (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). The objects of our perceptual experience 
are shaped by what we do or by what we are able to do. It must be clear, however, that although the 
discovery of canonical neurons provided the discussion of affordances with an evidence-based 
framework that focuses on embodied actions, perceptual experience is something “wider” than 
neural states. Perception, to put it shortly, is a form of action. And any form of action implies sense-
making. A given musical pattern can be experienced as far or close to me, as spatially- expressive- 
and movement-relevant. It will never be an abstract object of symbolic manipulation, in a 
disembodied mind. It might resonate in me through my cognitive system; yet it could be constituted 
only on the basis of the dynamics of interaction outside of me, as action possibilities that would 
allow me to perform the same phenomenologically relevant goal-directed actions in the world.  
In the realm of music, many authors recognized the relevance of the concept of affordance, 
which has been investigated during the last few years in order to clarify the subject/object 
relationship characterising musical experience, with a particular emphasis on the surrounding, 
sound-made environment. What does music afford? How can a subject interact with a musical 
environment? Which modalities are involved in this sense-giving process? The following paragraph 
presents some of the answers to these questions provided in the current debate, proposing incentive 
for further discussions as well. 
 
 
4.7 - What is a musical affordance?  
 
 
This section will offer a closer look at the notion of musical affordances, focusing on the works 
by Clarke (2005), Nussbaum (2007), Krueger (2011a; 2011b), and Reybrouk (2005), probably the 
most influential and well-known studies on this specific and problematic issue. 
 
1) Ways of Listening by Eric Clarke (2005) aims to face the problem of musical 
understanding through a Gibsonian interpretation in order to overcome the interrelated dichotomies 
of subjects/objects, passive/active listening and autonomy/heteronomy of musical experience. The 
author firstly suggests that musical structure is not a construction within the mind, but, rather, 
something inherent in the environment, with which our auditory system would resonate. Secondly, 
Clarke describes the dynamics of these resonances, introducing the key concept of affordance 
(ibid., p. 36). Two of the most quoted excerpts of Clarke’s book help to highlight what kind of 
phenomenic topography is included in his notion of musical affordance. 
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Music affords dancing, worship, co-ordinated working, persuasion, emotional catharsis, 
marching, foot-tapping, and a myriad other activities of a perfectly tangible kind (ibid., 
p.  38). 
 
In the specific contexts of musical hermeneutics, musical material can be conceived as 
affording certain kinds of interpretation and not others [...]. Interpretation is also action - 
the speaking, writing, gesturing and grimacing in which interpretation is manifest [...]. 
The recapitulation of the first movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony affords 
writing (or speaking) about in terms of murderous sexual rage, or the heavens on fire. 
Interpretative writing and speaking are forms of action (ibid., p. 204). 
 
 
Looking at the examples provided in the first list, allegedly belonging to the class of perfectly 
tangible acts that can be afforded by music, we can notice a partial overlap with E.J. Gibson’s 
holistic stance. However, it appears problematic to assume that music is in some way the intentional 
object of all this variety of behaviours. What kind of phenomenological characterisation can be 
ascribed to musical experience if, dancing, persuasion or speaking about music are all under the 
umbrella term of affordance? Since, in fact, there is no substantial difference between the way 
music affords foot-tapping and writing pieces of musical criticism - in Clarke’s view - the 
mutualism between agents and environment does not result grounded into the sensorimotor patterns 
that eventually underlie music and musical experience. As Clarke admits: 
 
 
A reader might object that this discussion […] is unacceptably speculative, full of  
interpretive license, and basically out of step with an ecological approach: it seems to 
depend heavily on verbal and dramatic information to interpret the perceptual 
information […] rather than relying on specification by stimulus invariants. But this 
overlooks the fact that all of the elements mentioned (the drama, the characters, the 
sounds) are part of the available information for a viewer/listener (ibid., pp. 87-88). 
 
 
But how exactly could the direct agency of the cognizer pick up from the (musical) environment 
conceptual information related to a speculative interpretation of the stimulus? Writing pieces of 
musical criticism implies, in fact, an inferential level of mediation. In this sense, the meaning of to 
afford emerging from Clarke’s contribution does not exceed the concept of to evoke, or to elicit, 
showing that musical experience is, broadly speaking, evocative. This, however, does not mean that 
Clarke is wrong. His strategy to unify percepts and concepts (Nonken, 2008), cannot be valid for a 
basic level of sense-making, but there is no doubt that high-level forms of musical engagement 
could take place in a more inferential level. For example, it seems reasonable that I can be moved 
by Purcell’s Dido and Aeneas because I have read the tragic story of the two lovers’ fate two hours 
before the concert, allowing me to make more than legitimate inferences during the actual 
performance. It is quite clear, in fact, that there might be a distinction between my experience of the 
music, and the experience of another individual who does not know anything about the story.  
    Another important aspect of Clarke’s standpoint is the idea that a living system can adapt to a 
particular sonic environment, maintaining the direct characterisation that ‘specifies properties of the 
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object itself to an organism equipped with an appropriate perceptual system’ (2005, p. 15). The 
resonance that embodies this adaptation is active, considering that ‘the ecological approach presents 
perception as a mutual relationship between organism and environment, so that every description of 
perception is therefore specific to an individual’s capacities and perspectives’ (ibid., p. 156). This 
description of circular specification, as well as the example about Dido and Aeneas previously 
provided, seems to contradict the purely ecological idea of a fully given musical environment. If 
meanings are already there, then how could mutual relationships be possible? How can different 
musical subjects develop different ways of listening? And what would happen if an individual does 
not grasp the actual meaning of a given musical structure? Mutual specification, rather, implies that 
categories like “meaning”, “environment”, or “listening” would be in-constitution - and not fully 
given in the world, or inside someone’s perceptual system. Despite acknowledging the rare 
pertinence of Clarke’s book to themes strictly related to the development of a post-Cartesian 
cognitive science of music, it seems that the broad notion of musical affordance employed, as well 
as his coherent ecological focus on properties of the musical environment, reflects a rather direct 
application of Gibson’s view - although the concept of mutual relationship used by Clarke could 
have been developed into a more enactive - and sensorimotorically grounded - perspective. 
 
2) More ambitious is the theoretical proposal of Charles Nussbaum (2007) who actually 
aims to unravel the riddle of musical experience (ibid., p. XI) in light of its representational nature. 
To understand the problem he is dealing with, we can first have a look at this citation: 
 
 
It takes only a small amount of perspicacity to realize that music is remarkable, indeed 
an astounding, phenomenon. The emergence of human musical experience from the 
audition of organized tones remains deeply puzzling, truly ‘a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma,’ a riddle, moreover, of very long standing (ibid., p. XI). 
 
 
But this statement is highly misleading, especially with regards to the set of problems involved 
in musical understanding. The apparently naïve implication that musical experience builds up from 
the auditory perception of analytically isolable basic elements is not only unwarranted, but it also 
stands in open contradiction with the most fruitful studies of action-related aspects of perception 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008, pp. 50-52). 
 
 
If we are to unravel the riddle of musical experience, we need a thread on which to tug. 
Construing music as representational, as a symbolic system that carries extra-musical 
content, I hope to persuade you, exposes such a thread (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 1). 
 
 
As this quotation clearly shows, the enigmatic position of the musical problem and the 
representative option proposed in the book are closely interrelated. This epistemological situation 
does present analogies with the post-Cartesian dilemma concerning the emergence of a thinking 
substance from an extended body: in both cases, the hypostatisation of the starting dichotomy 
necessitates an ad-hoc solution in order to mediate between the two substantialised realms. It is 
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worth noticing, with regard to this topic, that the notion of affordance is usually connected with a 
strong anti-dichotomist position, as Gibson (1976, p. 129) first pointed out. In Nussbaum’s work, 
however, an affordance is conversely meant as a mediation tool, functional to the perpetuation of a 
radically dualistic stance. Indeed, according to this scenario, musical affordances are considered to 
be conceptual bridges between a low-level dimension of musical experience, conceived in terms of 
a meaningless isomorphic transcription on a pitch-time diagram of the stimulus, and an idealised 
high-level dimension that includes every aspect of musical experience, broadly meant. Even without 
discussing the proposed theoretical framework, we can rule out Nussbaum’s contribution, as he 
considers affordances to be a cognitive form of understanding, linked to mental representation or 
higher mental faculties, thus in contrast with any position developed from an ecological standpoint. 
 
3) Another approach aimed at developing a sustainable notion of musical affordance is 
provided by the recent works of Joel W. Krueger (2011a; 2011b). The author argues that ‘an 
affordance is a relational property of the animal’s environment perceived by that animal as having a 
functional significance for that animal’ (Krueger, 2011a, p. 4). He also states that music is 
perceived from birth as an affordance-laden structure that affords a sonic world (ibid. p. 1) that 
further affords possibilities for, among other things, (i) emotional regulation and (ii) social 
coordination. From an epistemological standpoint, however, this proliferation of affordative levels 
seems - at least - suspicious, and gives rise to three questions: 
 
 
• Does music afford a sonic world in the same sense as this sonic world affords emotional 
regulation? 
 
• What would be the relevance of such a claim in the study of the intentional relationship 
between a subject and a musical object? 
 
• How should we describe the animal-environment relationship if music affords a sonic    
world that further affords acts of any type? 
 
 
In trying to answer these questions, we find out that the mediation offered by the notion of 
“sonic world”, besides being unnecessary, if coherently implemented would substantially 
compromise the direct character of the concept of affordance, explicitly acknowledged by Krueger 
(2011a, p. 7). Besides that, however, the crucial point of Krueger's argument is the characterisation 
of musical space, developed in league with the tradition of spatiality-for-action (i.e. Poincarè 1908) 
mainly discussed in the visuo-motor domain (Rizzolatti et al., 1997; Sakata et al., 1997). In his 
paper Doing things with music (2011a), Krueger faces the problem of musical space from a purely 
ecological standpoint, defining musical environments (or sonic worlds) as comfortable or stressful, 
whereas in his other work, Enacting musical content (2011b), he does contrast inner (or structural) 
and outer musical space. Outer musical space is here identified with the localisation of the 
occasional sound source, whereas inner musical space is described as ‘the piece’s inner syntactical 
structure established by the way that constituent components (e.g. tones, rhythmic progressions, 
etc.) go together, lending the musical piece its sonic coherence as a composed object’ (2011b). 
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Since outer space is meant as non-musical (related to the localisation of musical stimulus), we 
would assume that inner space and sonic world are interchangeable notions, defining from different 
standpoints the same musical space for action. But this assimilation is hardly accomplishable. The 
notion of sonic world arises indeed from a standard ecological standpoint, while the concept of 
inner space descends from an approach in which the musical surface is identified with a Cartesian 
diagram with time and pitch as axes, embracing de facto the “pharmaceutical model” (Sloboda, 
2005, p. 319) of musical understanding which Krueger explicitly refuses (Krueger, 2011a, p. 3). As 
a result of this irreducible duality of approaches, the notion of affordance connected to the concept 
of sonic world seems extremely relational, as it is associated with every kind of activity that music 
could possibly elicit, whereas the one connected to the concept of inner space is conceived from a 
completely objectivistic point of view. What both of these concepts are missing is the intentional 
character needed to make musical affordances a phenomenologically relevant notion, which 
maintain the co-determinative character between subjects and objects. 
 
4) A better awareness of the range of issues implicit in the enactive approach to human 
musicality is shown by Mark Reybrouck (2005b), who addresses in his work an embodied 
characterisation of musical experience. The author, using syncretic integration of different 
perspectives (from classic pragmatism to cognitive economy), aims to overcome the prevailing 
objectivism in the realm of musical understanding, by applying the key notion of sensorimotor 
coupling (which defines the perception-action loop) to the analysis of this topic. His strategy 
consists of defining the two domains of (i) musical experience and (ii) motor cognition, showing 
how they can be connected in such a coupling. ‘Musical experience’, he claims, ‘is not basically 
different from an auditory experience at large. It is continuous with the natural experience or 
experience proper […] with a difference in degree rather than in quality18’.  This equivalence 
between experience proper and aesthetically connoted perception justifies the application of a 
general concept as sensorimotor coupling to the peculiar realm of musical understanding, 
considering the importance of action in acoustic perception (Kohler et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
the processes of motor cognition are introduced through the discussion of the pivotal notion of 
“image schemata”, defined as ‘recurring, dynamic pattern[s] of our perceptual interactions and 
motor programs that give[s] coherence and structure to our experience’. The two classes of image 
schemata presented as the most relevant to the study of musical experience are the “container 
schema” and the “source-path-goal schema”. While the container schema is ‘a pervasive mode of 
understanding everyday experiences in terms of “in” and “out’’, the source-path-goal schema 
represents the feature of being oriented towards a goal in a continuous, temporally extended path. 
The author then illustrates the musical analogies of these image schemata, introducing the concept 
of “musical affordance”: 
 
 
There are, as yet, many possibilities that stress the ‘action aspect’ of dealing with music. 
I mention five of them: (i) the sound producing actions proper, (ii) the effects of these 
actions, (iii) the possibility of imagining the sonorous unfolding as a kind of movement 
through time, (iv) the mental simulation of this movement in terms of bodily based 
image schemata and (v) the movements which can be possibly induced by the sounds 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Being an online publication, it is impossible to specify the page of this and of the following  quotes 
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(ibid.). 
 
 
There are, however, some doubts about the robustness of the conceptual framework developed 
here. In particular, the choice of defining separately the two realms of musical experience and 
motility seems weak, considering that Reybrouck himself acknowledges non-objectivism as one out 
of the two main claims defining an embodied approach (2005a, p. 10). Moreover, the two 
definitions proposed appear to be questionable: indeed, as Clarke (2005, p. 1) pointed out, one of 
the dichotomies that a notion of musical affordance could help to overcome is that which opposes 
autonomy and hetheronomy of musical experience, but the full integration of musical experience 
into mere acoustic experience proposed by Reybrouck seems to neglect this aspect. On the other 
hand, the notion of image schema and the actual schemata proposed could not be accepted by many 
proponents of embodied cognition as these concepts seem to individuate a class of mental schemata, 
rather than a truly embodied kind of sense-making. This problem emerges clearly from the analysis 
of the notion of “goal” provided by the author: indeed, the kind of goal-directedness described by 
Reybrouck cannot be assimilated into the classic motor-grounded one (see, for instance, Murata et 
al., 1997; 2000, for a focus on acts such as prehension). However, it does present similarities with 
the teleological stance theory advocated by authors such as Csibra and Gergely (2003), where the 
understanding of the others’ intentions and goals can only be possible from an external, ascribing, 
perspective (see also Dennett, 1987). On the other hand, Reybrouck’s contribution is certainly 
fascinating, as he explicitly appeals to enactive and embodied approaches. In a more recent paper, 
for example, we are told: 
 
 
Musical sense-making, […] can be addressed in terms of interactions with the sounds, 
both at the level of perception, action and mental processing. It is a position that 
broadens the scope of music research, encompassing all kinds of music and sounds, and 
going beyond any kind of cultural and historical constraints. Music, in this broadened 
view, is to be defined as a collection of sound/time phenomena which have the potential 
of being structured, with the process of structuring being as important as the structure of 
the music. As such, it is possible to transcend a merely structural description of the 
music in favour of a process-like description of the ongoing process of maintaining 
epistemic contact with the music as a sounding environment (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 392).  
   
 
The following quote, moreover, provides a concrete example of this process of epistemic contact, 
portraying the situation of a violin player dealing with the intonation of a pitch: 
 
 
in order to produce a beautiful sound he relies on sensory-motor integration, ‘‘shaping’’ 
the sound through the perception of the sounding result which must match the 
internalized representation of this sound. Sound production, on this view, entails the 
reciprocity of ‘‘doing’’ and ‘‘undergoing’’[…]. The reciprocity of doing and 
undergoing is typical of sensory-motor integration. This is obvious in ‘‘playing’’ music, 
but it applies also to the process of ‘‘listening’’, with the listener imagining or 
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simulating mentally the manifest movements of the players […]. There is, in fact, 
empirical evidence that motor imagery and motor execution involve activities of very 
similar cerebral motor structures at all stages of motor control (Crammond, 1997). It 
allows us to stress the continuity between ‘‘sensory-motor integration’’ an ‘‘ideomotor 
simulation’’, the former dealing with movements that are actually executed in real-time, 
the latter with movements that are simulated at an ideational level of motor imagery 
(Reybrouck, 2005b, p. 231). 
 
 
However, as we can notice, the notions of mental abilities are featuring strongly, raising several 
problems when compared to a more direct form of understanding and interaction with the musical 
feedback. In the next paragraph I will provide a definition of musical affordances in light of a more 
enactive account to perception and sense-making, without any involvement of higher mental 
faculties.   
 
 
4.8 - Teleomusical acts for musical sense-making 
 
 
Another way to deal with musical affordances is to consider them as properties of the intentional 
relationship between musical subjects and objects. Indeed, the scenario described above advocates 
a new phenomenological characterisation of musical perception, where the (musical) object is 
constituted with respect to the motor repertoire of the listener - through embedded and embodied 
forms of interaction. This pivotal role of the body and its motor knowledge has been addressed in 
the phenomenological equivalence between perceiving and giving sense to the percept (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945), where 
 
 
my body is geared to the world when my perception offers me a spectacle as varied and 
as clearly articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive 
from the world the responses they anticipate. This maximum distinctness in perception 
and action defines a perceptual ground, a basis of my life, a general milieu for the 
coexistence of my body and the world (Merleau-Ponty 1945, [1962], p. 250). 
 
 
Rather than postulating high-level cognitive abilities or simulation-like mechanisms to account 
for basic forms of musical understanding, the phenomenological explanation provided requires only 
my body, conceived as ‘the meaningful core which behaves like a general function’ (ibid. p. 46) in 
its perceptual, continuous mutual and active interaction with the world. A skilled guitarist might be 
unable to say where to put her/his finger to perform a solo, but s/he can use the motor knowledge of 
the fingers to reconstruct the actual set of notes played, by just putting the hand on the strings. I 
believe that this kind of sensorimotor process not only represents the basis of musical 
understanding, but it can also shed light on the notion of musical affordance, relying on a sub-
cognitive, pre-linguistic, intrinsically motor, form of intentionality. In particular, the studies on the 
ontogenetic basis of musicality can provide further evidences of a non-cognitive characterisation of 
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the subject-object relationship of musical experience, as we will see in Chapter 5.  
This account for musical intentionality, hence, leads the discussion to the analysis of 
teleomusical acts, chains of actions with a musical goal-directedness constituting the musicians’ 
motor knowledge. Indeed, a correct characterisation of these acts cannot be limited to the executive 
side of motility, because what allows the possibility of understanding a musical object in terms of 
its actions (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009, p. 492) is the goal rather than the actual performed 
movement (Ticini et al., 2011).  
I have argued against the fitness of the presented theoretical frameworks to consistently make 
sense of the number of problems implicit in the notion of musical affordance by proposing an 
approach that radically diverges from the standard accounts, considering musical objects as entities 
constituted within the intentional motor-based relation that defines a musical context. From this 
standpoint, the notion of musical affordance, correlatively with the key concept of music-directed 
(or teleomusical) acts, becomes then crucial for understanding the ontogenetically originary 
elements of music experience, and the processes that lead to their development to a fully constituted 
musical - embodied and enactive - intentionality. In light of these considerations we could consider 
an approximate distinction between original and constituted teleomusical acts. 
 
1) Original Teleomusical Acts (OTAs) are autonomous and relevant to the foundations of 
human musicality, considering their basic kinematics and spontaneous emergence. Nevertheless 
these acts represent a shared substrate to human musical behaviours as they are executed early in 
infancy, yet clearly directed towards the constitution of a musical object. The infant brings forth her 
domain of meaning by interacting with the environment in order to constitute and manipulate 
sounds objects. In this sense, OTAs enable the intentional relationship between music and the 
perceiver, as they constitute the basic sensorimotor skills necessary to make sense of the musical 
object.   
 
2) Constituted Teleomusical Acts (CTAs) are not authentic chains of acts in the sense that 
they are built through the unification of a set of OTAs. Yet, the fluidity of the kinematics allows the 
performer to execute them as unitary goal-directed actions. Playing a chord on the piano requires 
temporal coordination, sensibility of the fingers, wrists, arms and back, expressivity and so on. 
However, a skilled pianist does not simply integrate these categories one by one. Rather, she would 
achieve the goal (playing this chord in this way) through an intentional, fluid, active, rapid 
execution.  
 
These two different, yet interrelated, levels of actions, might represent an important turning point 
for music cognition, as they can provide a biologically plausible theory of non-musicians and 
musicians’ abilities to enjoy, make sense, and perform, music. One of the obvious 
counterarguments against the centrality of action for musical sense-making is that also musical non-
experts display some kind of motor resonance or entrainment to a given musical stimulus. 
Therefore, it can be argued, the development of musical directed chains of acts does not play a 
meaningful explanatory role, since people who lack this motor expertise could be engaged in a 
musical experience as well. A first answer is that non-musicians relate to musical objects through a 
theoretical kind of intentionality, as the one that Leman named “cerebral intentionality”. This 
solution, however, seems weak and stands in open contrast with the phenomenological notion of 
motor intentionality previously defined.  
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Rather, if we are to take seriously the challenge of OTAs and CTAs, noticing that OTAs are 
ontogenetically original, it could be argued that they would represent the roots of the sensorimotor 
skills required for musical sense-making also for non-musicians. These acts are basic (simple to 
peform), plastic (they can be easily improved, and performed through different strategies and 
motivations), spontaneous (they emerge in infancy without any imposition or help from the 
caregiver), ecologically relevant (they make sense only in light of a given subject-object relation) 
and goal-directed (they are directed towards sounds’ properties and protomusical structures). I will 
get back to infants’ musicality in the next chapter and explore in greater detail the dynamics from 
which a minimal form of musical intentionality emerges in infancy. For now, however, it goes 
without saying that non-musicians possess the basic skills to perform acts of hitting, plucking or 
scratching, and it is obvious as well that they would intend these actions non-inferentially in the 
very same way that listening to someone knocking at the door provides the perceiver with a clear 
understanding of what is going on (i.e. someone is outside the door). It this can be argued that the 
way non-musicians make sense of music is an intentional relationship based on motor skills 
qualitatively different from the ones enacted by an expert performer. Both OTAs and CTAs, 
moreover, can modify the expectations of the objects’ affordances (E.J. Gibson, 1988) showing 
again the level of mutual determination of the two inseparable categories of subjects and objects. A 
guitarist listening to a piece for guitar transcribed for piano, in fact, will display a different 
intentional relationship from the kind of sense-making that would emerge when hearing the same 
piece for her own instrument (guitar). For the categorization of the motor skills employed in sense-
making would be hierarchically different. As Chemero admits, indeed, ‘over developmental time, 
an animal’s sensorimotor abilities select its niche - the animal will become selectively sensitive to 
information relevant to the things it is able to do. Also, over developmental time, the niche will 
strongly influence the development of the animal’s ability to perceive and act’ (2009, p. 151). 
Matching the study of autonomous living systems in their sensorimotor and affective coupling 
with the environment with the notion of musical affordance provided here, makes the enactive 
approach to musical experience a dynamic science of the brain-body-environment nexus. The 
challenge, in this sense, would be maintaining a sharp equilibrium between the two poles, trying not 
to collapse into an objectified view of musical phenomena on both sides of the skin taken 
autonomously, without considering their mutual interactions. Since I have already described the 
difficulties in embracing a complete internalistic perspective to music cognition, the next paragraph 
will focus on the so-called Extended Mind Hypothesis (i.e. Clark & Chalmers, 1998) exploring its 
assumptions and perspectives. In doing this, I will mainly focus on the radically enactivist critique 
offered by Hutto and Myin (2013) providing also examples in current musical literature (i.e. 
Krueger, 2014), nevertheless showing that considering the (musical) mind as merely extended could 
represent a step backwards for a truly post-cartesian cognitive science of music.  
 
 
4.9 - Transparency and sensorimotor primacy 
 
 
We could draw an approximate distinction between two trends in philosophy of mind, when it 
comes to understanding cognitive processes. On one side we have internalists, who maintain a 
position where cognition is defined in terms of the animal’s internal factors, usually relative to the 
boundaries of the skull (i.e. Adams & Aizawa, 2001). As we have seen, this idea insists on 
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considering the environment and any exogenous influence, as a mere causal contribution that may 
play a supportive role in shaping cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 136). The core body of 
standard music cognition offers the paradigmatic example of this standpoint, seeing music as an 
external stimulus that causally affects the brain of the subject. On the other hand we have 
proponents of an apparently opposite claim. Externalists, in fact, deny that cognition can be 
reducible to what happens inside the skull or the brain-body system of the living creature. Although 
the enactive approach embraces this openness of cognitive process (to be radically imbricated into 
the brain-body-environment nexus), there are some differences in the assumptions the externalists 
and enactivists appeal to, in order to defend this position.  
The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) basically maintains that ‘the local material vehicles of 
some aspects of human cognition may, at times, be spread across brain, body and world’ (Clark, 
2009, p. 966). In particular, this can occur when ‘the local operations that realize some human 
cognizings include (possibly quite complex) tangles of feedback, feedforward and feedaround loops 
that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world’ (ibid.). This claim, is 
justified on the basis of the so-called parity principle, which is usually formulated as follows 
 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to 
go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive 
process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process (Clark 
& Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). 
 
The principle, in other terms, holds that sometimes, when given conditions are met, ‘features of 
the environment can co-constitute the mind’ (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 139). Clark and Chalmers’ 
(1998) famous example to mount the defence of their claim involves two main characters, Otto and 
Inga. Otto suffers from a slightly amnestic condition, which forces him to write down on a 
notebook any relevant information that might be useful later but could easily be forgotten. When 
Otto wishes to visit the museum he needs to use his notebook in order to find the right address. On 
the contrary, Inga, uses her biological memory to find out where the museum is, thus ‘activating her 
unconscious, lingering belief concerning the museum’s location. If this suffices for regarding Inga’s 
unconscious belief to be classed as mental, then, by parity of reasoning, we have every reason to 
adopt the same stance with respect to what is written in Otto’s notebook’ (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p, 
139). In fact, 
 
[The] organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a 
coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the 
components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behaviour 
in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the external 
component the system’s behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we 
removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally 
well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head (Clark & Chalmers, 
1998, p. 7). 
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The problem with these statements, however, is the definition of “cognitive processes”: only 
after a clarification of what is intended for cognitive process we can justify the analysis of its 
location (skull-bound, bodily, extended, neuronal) (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 10). But, as Hutto and Myin 
admit, ‘the appeal to parity is utterly silent about the nature of mentality’ (2013, p. 140). Moreover, 
it seems that there are some differences between Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory. As 
pointed out by Adams and Aizawa (2001), for example, while the notebook is not simply 
automatically updated by new information, Inga’s memory is non-inferentially modified every time 
she receives new information (for example, when she learns that an earthquake changed the whole 
topography of the city where the museum is located) (Weiskopf, 2008). Of course, die-hard 
proponents of externalism claim that technology would offer some arguments that would make 
these differences disappear. For example, ‘it is easy enough to imagine an electronic notebook 
being updated through wireless connections to the brain’ (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 141). Similarly, 
in a musical context, a performer improvising on her instrument would offload her musical 
expertise into the instrument, in processes that are functionally coupled with the constituting 
musical environment. This holds true also for joint musical events: ‘the players in a jazz trio, when 
improvising, are immersed in just such a web of causal complexity. Each member’s playing is 
continually responsive to the others’ and at the same time exerts its own modulatory force’ (Clark, 
1997, p.165).  
Moreover, Joel Krueger, in a very recent paper, insists that also a musical listener would offload 
certain regulative structures into the music, reducing her cognitive burden and perceived exertion 
(Krueger, 2014). Although Krueger’s proposal is certainly fascinating and well argued, I think that 
a concrete assimilation of the enactive and affordance-based notion of musicality to a - Clark’s style 
- extended mind model, is counterproductive. A first objection is that one can accept the notion of 
“offloading processes” in these terms, only admitting that these processes do exist inside the head 
while listening to or performing music. Di Paolo explains this concern as follows:      
 
 
Just imagine how an EM [extended mind] researcher would go about determining 
whether extra-bodily process X is constitutive of a cognitive process. He is at this point 
already convinced that the skull boundary no longer makes sense for determining 
whether something is cognitive. And yet, on consulting his EM handbook he finds this 
schizophrenic piece of advice: ‘‘Even though you know that you should not rely on the 
skull boundary in order to call process X cognitive, you must still use it to check 
whether it would have made sense to those confused people who did not take EM 
seriously and consider how they would have judged process X were it to happen in the 
head’’. Isn’t this the absurd equivalent of ‘‘Even though in the past several cases of 
mental illness were erroneously diagnosed as cases of demonic possession, in modern 
days, in order to determine whether you have a case of mental illness you must always 
consult an exorcist first?” (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 11). 
 
 
What is occurring inside the head, for example in terms of neural discharges, is not a cognitive 
process. It is only part of the story. Consider the previous analysis of motor resonance. The 
mirroring processes have explanatory value only in a relational domain between the agent and the 
(social) environment, constituting the enabling condition for sense-making. But ‘to call internal 
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processes as such cognitive is to confuse levels of discourse or to make a category mistake (neurons 
do not think and feel; people and animals do)’ (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009, p. 26). Sense-making 
needs to be understood in terms of dynamic sensorimotor patterns of embodied action immersed 
into the reciprocity with the environment. In these terms cognition and musical cognition have no 
location. If we admit a notion of mind as “skilful capacity”, then there is no need to posit internal 
processes that would extend into the environment.  
The enactive mind focuses on the communal resources that expand beyond the skull, without any 
decoupled activity by means of external structures. Playing an instrument is a form of musical 
sense-making as the performer explores and actively engages with the environment by means of 
sensorimotor patterns of meaningful coupling and not because her computational or problem-
solving analysis of the musical structure and rules is facilitated by her interaction with the 
instrument. Music playing (or music listening) is not problem solving. If this statement is too 
strong, it could at least be claimed that a subjective musical experience is not always problem 
solving. This would be a too limited account for music cognition, resulting in problematic positions 
as the one formulated by Huron, where the agents’ body is essentially decoupled from the active 
dynamics of sense-making. This comparison with Huron shows in fact that functionalist and 
extended approaches share a similar assumption about the bodily involvement in sense-making.  
As reported by Thompson and Stapleton, proponents of EMH see the body as just an element ‘in 
a kind of equal-partners dance between brain, body, and world, with the nature of the mind fixed by 
the overall balance achieved’ (Clark, 2008, pp. 56-57). ‘For the enactive approach, the body 
(including the brain) leads in this dance because it is what realizes the autonomous organization 
necessary for individual agency and sense-making’ (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009, p. 28). While 
playing a musical instrument, the agent incorporates it into her cognitive dynamical system rather 
than using it instrumentally. This sense of body ownership that can be applied to the musical 
instrument is what distinguishes the enactive account to the extended one (see also De Preester & 
Tsakiris, 2009). Does Otto experience the notebook in the same way Glenn Gould experiences the 
piano?  
Let’s think about Merleau-Ponty’s famous example of the blind man that uses a cane. According 
to the French philosopher, as the cane becomes a transparent tool, incorporated into the agent’s 
body image like an ‘extension of the bodily synthesis’ (1945 [1962], p. 153) the blind man becomes 
able to see through his cane by interpreting the data of the world without any inferential mediation 
(i.e. without measuring the cane in order to understand the distance of an object or feeling the 
pressure on his hand when the stick hits an object). Similarly, musical instruments are transparent 
tools during performances.  
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the organist is, in this sense, illuminating. An organist settles in a 
new organ like he would settle in a house, without analysing the instrument in a disembodied way. 
He does not prepare a plan, or cognitive representations of the registers and the pedals (ibid.). In 
fact, during the rehearsal or during a concert, the keys, the registers and the pedals are not simply 
located in an objective space. Rather, they become a horizon of musical-directed, motor, 
possibilities, therefore intermixed with the musician’s physiology and with the (in-constitution) 
musical environment. This position could be clarified by appealing to the “transparency constraint” 
proposed by Thompson and Stapleton:  
 
For anything external to the body’s boundary to count as part of the cognitive system it 
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must function transparently in the body’s sense-making interactions with the 
environment (2009, p. 29). 
 
If this analysis turns out to be correct, the distinction described by Fishkin (2004) between full 
embodiment and distant embodiment, based on the locations of input and output, would be fully 
compromised (see Menin, 2011). According to this perspective, while violin playing can be seen as 
a case of full embodiment, given the high degree of integration between sound and action, organ 
playing would represent a situation of distant embodiment, considering the nature of the instrument 
itself (to produce sounds the wind must move within pipes after pressing a key or a pedal). But this 
is simply a reification of the relationship between musical subjects and their instruments, as 
Merleau-Ponty clearly observed. Moreover, as this entire chapter tried to suggest, a serious 
consideration of the role of the brain-body-environment systems, in defining musical contexts, 
challenges any non-intentional interpretation of human musicality, and reorientates the discussion 
of musical affordance to a motor-based level. These challenges, however, are not to be simply 
interpreted as a set of theoretical assumptions at the basis of a new model of the musical mind.  A 
post-cartesian, enactive, cognitive science of music should explicitly address themes such as 
musical development and musical learning.  
The hypothesis of teleomusical acts, as previously presented, will therefore play a key role in the 
next two chapters. Firstly I will discuss some minimal forms of musical sense-making considering 
also the sphere of affectivity. Secondly, in the final chapter, I will present two behavioural studies 
that my colleagues and I have run at the Music Mind Machine research center of the University of 
Sheffield and at the Donders Institute for Brain Cognition and Behaviour of the Radbond University 
of Nijmegen. Both these experiment will corroborate my hypothesis on the sensorimotor bases of 
music cognition. 
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Chapter 5 
Exploring Musicality19 
 
 
A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has 
incorporated it into its “world”, and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it 
is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made upon it independently of any 
representation 
 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
 
Perceiving how things are is a mode of exploring how things appear. How they appear 
is, however, an aspect of how they are. To explore appearance is thus to explore the 
environment, the world. To discover how things are, from how they appear, is to 
discover an order or pattern in their appearance. The process of perceiving, of finding 
out how things are, is a process of meeting the world; it is an activity of skillful 
exploration. 
 
-   Alva Noë, Action in Perception 
 
 
5.1 - At the basis of musical sense-making 
 
 
The previous chapter aimed to reconsider different assumptions at the basis of human musicality, 
with particular regards to the notions of embodiment and musical affordance. As it emerged, 
moreover, the centrality of action for musical sense-making cannot be coherently addressed in 
terms of simulation-like mechanisms or fully external affordative properties that would elicit a 
particular action. Rather, without any sort of reification of musical subjects and objects, the 
enactive approach to music cognition allows a more interactive stance, based on the mutual 
engagement between living system and their world. The characterisation of musical affordance 
provided - defined as a property of the intentional relationship between cognizers and musical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This chapter contains material previously published as Menin, D., & Schiavio, A. (2012). Rethinking musical 
affordance. In AVANT. The journal of the philosophical-interdisciplinary vanguard, 3(2), pp. 202-215, and as Schiavio, 
A. (2013).  Review: Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness, and 
Language. In Philosophical Psychology. Moreover, it contains material from the following articles in preparation: 
Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in preparation). An enactive perspective on infants’ musicality, and Schiavio, A. (in 
preparation). Music, Evolution, Mirror Neurons. 
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environment - aimed to emphasise the direct (and intrinsically motor) fashion of the mutuality 
between musical subjects and objects.  
An ideal area to provide a more detailed analysis of this interactive engagement is represented by 
musical learning and infants’ musical behaviours, mainly because of their minimal and basic forms 
of intentionality. In this chapter, therefore, I will discuss the notion of teleomusical acts with 
regards to the development of musical expertise from a phylogenetic and ontogenetic point of view, 
mainly focusing on infants’ affective and (inter)active, sense-making. If we reject the idea that 
human musicality is a pre-wired biological module, underlying specific (music related) mental 
states - as remarked in Chapter 2 - how could we possibly explain the emergence of human 
musicality in infancy? How can a child familiarise with rhythmic and melodic features? The 
pedagogical work provided by Delalande (2009), might reveal some fascinating features with 
regards to the birth of musicality, without positing neither an innatistic constraint nor a distinction 
between internal states and external fully defined categories.  
The French psychologist invites us to admit that the child’s ability to familiarise with the musical 
codes of her culture depends on her practical engagement with musical structures rather than mere 
exposition (or any kind of direct imposition). In order to facilitate this process, the work of the 
music teacher should be based on the relevant motivations that would allow the infant to employ 
different strategies that would direct her to achieve a musical goal. In other terms, a teacher should 
motivate the child to actively engage with musical structures through the development of OTAs. 
Bondioli (1996) defines three ways in which the instructor can do this; in particular he refers to (i) 
mirroring - where the adult reproduces the spontaneous sound-based plays of the child - (ii) 
modelling - in which the teacher helps the infant to reach a musical-directed goal - and (iii) 
scaffolding - based on the active interaction between the two in order to develop musical ideas. The 
relevance of these methodological strategies for enaction relies on their focus on the sensorimotor 
patterns of mutual engagement, abolishing the boundaries between mind and behaviour and 
between the self and the other (see Reddy, 2008).  
From birth, in fact, humans are social animals that actively engage with the (social) environment. 
In contrast to previous assumptions that infants are passive observers of the “blooming, buzzing 
confusion” (James, 1890) surrounding them, recent evidence suggests that they are actively 
involved in interactions (that are not reducible to stimulus-response behavior) within the first 
several months of life (Bloom, 2001). The classic finding by Meltzoff and Moore (1977) that 
neonates will imitate facial gestures such as mouth openings and tongue protrusions was some of 
the first evidence that infants are engaged in social interactions from birth. Although the 
interpretation of these findings is still a source of controversy (see, for example, Anisfield et al., 
2001), at the very least, they suggest that neonatal infants are interactors with other social beings 
from the onset.  
More recently, Reddy and colleagues (2013) hypothesized that 2- and 3-month-old infants are 
more actively engaged in simple coordinated activities such as being picked up than previously 
assumed. They found that, when being approached by an adult, infants “help” adults by performing 
anticipatory body adjustments prior to the lifting act. This is just one of many examples in which 
infants actively engage with others in the first year. Similar instances occur when infants engage in 
turn-taking behavior during dyadic interactions or stiffen their leg when the caregiver is dressing 
them in the morning. Rather than focusing on whether infants are able to infer the intentions and 
plans of the caregiver at this stage or simply learn patterns of activity, the enactive account would 
focus on the infants’ movements as the ‘tools of her cognition’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007 p. 
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489). In particular, this mutual interaction between infant and caregiver portrays a legitimate form 
of sense-making, through the creation and appreciation of the basic meaning attribution process (De 
Jaegher, 2009). These goal-directed actions can hardly be considered mere reflexes or unintentional 
movements; rather, they describe the cognitive interaction through a process of mutual 
coordination. The autonomous agents involved in this interactive process present a regulated 
coupling, in which they both bring forth their own domain of meaning. As interpersonal 
engagement is a fundamental property of neonates’ behaviors, it comes at no surprise that minimal 
forms of musical intentionality can be observed in young infancy, involving social and physical 
environment. Delalande (2009), hence, individuates three different musical conducts20, each of 
them associable to the phases of the game postulated by Piaget (1964): 
 
1) The explorative conduct is based on the discovery of sounds and noises, and corresponds 
with the sensorimotor game, which, according to Piaget (1964), dominates the first two years of 
life. After a few months from birth, the infant explores the auditory possibilities of the surrounding 
objects, using different sensorimotor dynamics and producing sounds that could potentially capture 
her attention (Imberty, 1983).  
 
2) The expressive conduct corresponds to Piaget’s symbolic game, characterising the years of 
primary school. Delalande assumes that in this period the child attributes to the sound some extra-
musical values such as situations, roles, expectations and so forth, somehow enriching the primary 
form of sensorimotor intentionality with a broader domain of meaning attribution. The adult 
musicians would be immersed in the same dynamics through the emphatic gestural expressions 
used to convey further expressivity in concrete musical practice (Castellano et al., 2006; Leman et 
al., 2009). 
 
3) The organizational conduct emerges when the child discovers the enjoyment of applying 
rules to her own musical games (phase of game of rules). In a musical context, this idea is best 
understood when considering joint musical practices and turn taking behaviours. These rules would 
also play a crucial role in practices such as musical analysis and composition, where the agent is 
employing a particular strategy - governed by a given rule. In this sense, even using chance as a 
compositional methodology is still a choice, a self-imposed rule21. 
 
Any pedagogical work aimed to develop musical expertise, Delalande claims, should focus on 
these three interactive and sensorimotor conducts. Moreover, as the author interestingly points out, 
all of the most important stages of Western musical history could reflect these developmental 
phases, showing their deep continuity in ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Although this last idea is 
certainly fascinating, it does not seem to be relevant for our aims or falsifiable in any sense. 
Therefore, instead of embarking on a discussion about historical genres and musical forms, it would 
be better to have a closer look at the most basic motor behaviour described, in order to gain an 
insight into the minimal kind of musical sense making. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 A conduct is defined by a set of coordinated actions, relevant for a specific goal.  
21 The reference here is for John Cage and his well-known use of I Ching for composition, during the Fifties. 
	   102	  
5.2 - Explorations and teleomusicality 
 
 
Consider the following scenario: a 10-month infant stands in front of an unknown object - say, a 
new doll. What is she going to do? Most probably, if the object would capture her attention, she will 
try to grasp it, act upon it or interact with it. In one word she will explore it. In this way, she will 
also discover some properties of the sounds provoked by her actions on the object. Having realized 
that sounds are dependent by the motor behaviours employed to produce them, the child will not 
simply use the same chain of acts every time she explores the environment. Sometimes she will 
squeeze an object; sometimes she will hit it (and so forth). Eric Clarke perfectly described these 
embodied dynamics when discussing the first encounter of a child with a xylophone: ‘the child’s 
more-or-less unregulated experiments with hands or sticks will result in all kinds of accidental 
sounds. With unsupervised investigation, the child may discover that different kind of actions […] 
give rise to differentiated results […], and even that these distinctions can themselves be used to 
achieve other goals’ (2005, p. 23). Delalande (2009) observes that when the attention of the infant is 
captured by the produced sounds, rather than by her own action, or by other (tactile, visual) 
properties of the objects, she would start playing with the sounds in a meaningful way. For example 
she can apply some basic rhythmic or even melodic variations.  
This process emerges properly between 6 and 10 months of age. Before this period, when young 
infants see events in which some objects are targeted as goals for actions, they selectively encode 
the action and ignore object appearance (Bahrick & Lickliter, 2002). But by ten months, infants can 
encode both object appearance and the actions performed thereon (Perone & Oakes, 2006). 
Between six and ten months of age, in fact, both sensitivity to object appearance in the context of 
actions increases, and the ability to integrate information about object appearance and action 
emerges. Objects are viewed as rich in information that potentially specifies what they afford for 
action (Perone et al., 2008). As already hypothesised by Ruff (1982), infants’ exploratory 
behaviours are a necessary tool to understand the actual objects’ configuration, providing the child 
with a form of comprehension that does not rely only on visual perception.  
 
 
Infants continually shape their movement spatially to the intentional urgings that 
prompt them to move. In a very real sense, they play with movement, discovering 
kinetic awarenesses and possibilities in the course of moving. Over time, they hone their 
movement to better effect - changing their orientation, for example, or the range of their 
movement. Their focus of attention is not on themselves as objects in motion, but on the 
spatiality of movement itself, what it affords and does not afford with respect to 
touching things that are near, grasping them, pulling them toward themselves, crawling 
toward those that are distant, pointing toward them, and so on. This experiential space, 
or better this tactile-kinesthetic spatiality, has nothing to do with measured or 
measurable distances but is an experiential dimension of movement itself. Space in this 
experiential sense is precisely not a container in which movement takes place but a 
dynamic tactile-kinesthetically charged created space (Sheets-Johnstone, 2010, pp. 171-
172). 
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But how exactly is this manual exploration characterised? Which strategies are employed by the 
infants to explore the environment playing with sounds? Michel Imberty’s research on children’s 
musical improvisation (1983) showed that their musical production (both freely improvised or 
based on imitation) has two permanent features, named pivot and colmatage. While “pivot” refers 
to a stable and defined musical element, “colmatage” specifies the unstable and variable nuances of 
a musical production. These two sets of musical behaviours would require a particular attention to 
the sound properties rather than to the sensorimotor behaviours employed in order to obtain the 
sound. Therefore, pivot and colmatage emerge after (or during) the six-to-ten months’ attentive 
shift. This means that this shift would allow the infant to create musical material, being 
intentionally directed towards the sounds without being focused on the actions performed. In other 
terms, it permits the constitution of a first musical context where the infant’s goal is intentionally 
musical. We could name this basic form of intentionality as teleomusicality, considering the 
fundamental role of the goals of the action for its constitution. If the sound related to the object is 
now the goal of an intentional action, then the strategies employed by the infant are always directed 
towards new and meaningful horizons of sensorimotor possibilities.  
The explorative conduct, hence, allows the infant to understand the relationship between the 
physical properties of the explored object and its practical opportunities for action (see Kemler-
Nelson, 1999). As Delalande (2009) states, in fact, a truly musical behaviour would emerge only 
when the child’s attention would shift from the sensorimotor patterns of actions to the sound itself. 
In other terms, according to Delalande, what matters for a minimal constitution of musical contexts 
is the goal (sound) rather than mere kinematics (movements). In this characterisation, the sound 
produced by these basic musical-directed actions (OTAs) would become the noematic pole of the 
intentional relationship with the musical object, constituting a basic form of musical intentionality. 
     Another cardinal idea of Delalande regards the continuous employment of the same behaviours 
for all the musical life. In this sense, the adult musicians’ improvisation practices could be seen as a 
continuation of the ontogenetic processes of exploration, where the object intentionally explored is 
the relevant musical instrument (including the voice). As previously stated, this behaviour is 
essentially based on sensorimotor patterns of goal directed actions employed to produce a (series 
of) sound(s). It is put into effect through OTAs such as plucking, or hitting, creating a shared 
horizon of motor and musical goals which fosters concrete strategies to modify OTAs in order to 
further explore the musical environment. The child, therefore, actualizes OTAs, only after the six-
to-ten months’ attentive shift, being immersed in the musical dynamics without any mediation or 
inference that would spring from her attentiveness towards the action. Rather she will learn by 
means of her own situatedness in the world. 
 
 
Development, and therefore learning, is essentially an endogenously self-generating 
process; it is therefore unnecessary - and impossible - to “instruct” it from the outside. 
This runs directly counter to the widespread notion that “learning” is a process of 
“instruction”, by which is meant a process of information transfer from teacher to pupil 
(Stewart et al., 2010, p. 9).  
 
 
Before the 6-to-10-month attentive shift, an infant has already familiarised with musical objects, 
as it emerges from the analysis of her protoconversations with the caregiver (Stern 1974; 1985). 
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However, the evidence for grades of conscious agency that depend on innate emotions of sympathy 
for other persons’ rhythmic, “musical”, patterns of intention does not prove an innate musical 
intentionality (see Trevarthen, 1999). We can only define those behaviours as musical-inherent a-
posteriori, as they lack any intentional relationship with music itself. With regards to this point, 
Imberty (1983) invites us to notice that the infants’ auditory system develops to a greater extent 
than the other perceptive mechanisms. The reason is probably that the voice of the mother should be 
recognized as soon as possible, providing the infant with the recourses necessary to further develop 
the ability to actively interact with the sounds’ environment. This affective tuning (Stern 2004) 
relies on the cognizers’ ability to meaningfully engage in mutual activities, involving parameters 
clearly employed in musical dynamics such as intensity, durations, form and so forth. Trevarthen 
(1997) states that the infant and the mother are united by a single rhythm, that is a turn-taking in a 
slow Adagio (a beat every 0.9 seconds), responding to each other in light of the prosodic characters 
of the meanings co-enacted. Dissanayake (2000) essentially confirms these ideas when suggesting 
that 
 
 
the enjoyment and capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of indispensable 
usage in the daily habits of life of countless women, specifically mothers, and their 
infants, and that it is in the evolution of affiliate interactions between mothers and 
infants [...] that we can discover the origins of the competencies and sensitivies that 
gave rise to music (ibid., p. 389). 
 
The author does not refer to actual infants’ songs but rather to the trans-modal affective 
interactions between infant and caregiver. From a phylogenetic perspective, these active emotional 
patterns would have helped the neonate to improve her sensorimotor abilities. This is very 
important considering that very often in our evolutionary history, birth was premature (Leakey, 
1994; Morgan, 1995). The acquired competencies, therefore, would develop in the next ontogenetic 
processes through the mutual interaction of the infant with the parents or with other infants 
(Dissanayake, 2000, p. 399), disclosing new horizons of sensorimotor creative and interactive 
activities. In other terms, although the mother-infant interaction described is a goal-directed and 
intersubjective motor behaviour involving many musical components, the realisation of musical 
sense-making should reflect a clearer intentional activity directed towards a musical goal. In this 
sense, OTAs developed after the 6-to-10-month attentional shift would allow the constitution of a 
new kind of intentionality (musical intentionality) that links the musical subject and the object in a 
co-constitutive relationship.  
Simply put, the foundation of a Music-directed set of acts provides a child with the possibility to 
develop this new kind of intentionality, which is no more related to a physical object only or to the 
caregiver, as in the affective tuning. Motor acts like hitting or scratching (Delalande, 2009) make 
the child able to constitute a musical context. To sum it up, we would have not only OTAs and 
CTAs, but also a motor behaviour that only a-posteriori can be seen as musical. We can define this 
early (before six months of age) behaviour as protomusical, being directed only inferentially to a 
musical goal, therefore not yet constituting an intentional kind of musical sense-making. According 
to this perspective, after the attentive shift, the development of musicality stems from the 
unification of OTAs into CTAs in a way that would allow the agent to experience these acts in a 
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non-associative way. The ability to make sense of music, from early infancy, is thus defined by the 
agent’s motor expertise rather than by the recruitment of fully blown mental representations. As 
Dreyfus puts it in fact: 
 
 
A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the 
acquired know-how is experienced as fine and finer discriminations of situations paired 
with the appropriate response to each. […] Thus, successful learning and action do not 
require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically 
interpretable brain representations either (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 367).  
 
 
My point is that the outlined scenario portrays the origin of the musical vocabulary of acts of the 
agent who, by storing sets of OTAs, allows the constitution of CTAs leading to a more meaningful 
intentionality. This means that the abundance of these kinds of actions in the agent’s own repertoire 
is the basis of the musician expertise, while OTAs that do not develop into CTAs would provide the 
agent with a superficial musicality without leading to a better constituted musical intentionality. 
The idea, however, can be elusive. So an example may help. When a child stands in front of an 
unknown object she would explore it, eventually producing sounds. However, if her attention would 
be captured by tactile or visual nuances of the object, then the exploration will be directed towards a 
different - non-musical - goal. The already acquired OTA would be still comprehendible in light of 
its basic categorization but the horizon of goals disclosed by the employment of the explorative 
behaviour would go beyond a musical context. It thus might be assumed that an original minimal 
musicality, which is actualisable in motor OTAs, would lead to a fully developed musicality, 
crystallizing into new CTAs. Musical ontogenesis, according to this perspective, is characterised by 
a progressive cross-modal association (sensorimotor but also perceptual-imaginative and visual-
acoustic), corresponding to a better clarity in intending CTAs. This model offers a 
phenomenologically relevant interpretation of the development of musical expertise, stating that the 
constitution of a first musical context is immersed in the dynamics of action. In particular, this 
process reflects the idea that what matters for musicality is the goal of the motor behaviours, rather 
than abstract movements. The development of Constituted Teleomusical Acts, moreover, depends 
on the attentive, strategic and motivational behaviours of the infant, whose relationship with the 
musical objects can be modulated by meaningful social interactions with the caregiver or with the 
music teacher. That being said, it must be clear that this speculation does not exclude other 
modalities of meaningful engagement (i.e. exposure, dance, and so forth). Rather, it promotes the 
view that the primary way to constitute a musical intentionality is based on the spontaneous 
interaction between musical subjects and objects (Bannan & Woodward, 2009; Custodero, 2009). 
Furthermore, these circular dynamics of interaction are best understood without any reference to the 
standard input-output model, being constituted by co-determinative processes. An infant constitutes 
the musical context on the basis of her motor expertise, her motivations and goals, through her 
embodied interaction with sounds, whose discovery would eventually lead to other (more fluid and 
precise) forms of musical engagement. The following representation sums up the theoretical 
framework here developed: 
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This process of constitution, however, will never solve in a fully determined musical 
intentionality for the simple reason that musical intentionality is an in-constitution category. There 
will always be for the cognizer new meaningful ways to interact with, and constitute, the musical 
object. The horizon of sensorimotor patterns of mutuality is never fully defined. Musical practice 
does not simply end with the mastery of CTAs but, rather, it keeps on developing according to the 
strategies and motivations (see Sloboda et al., 1994) that the adult musician employs to engage with 
the musical environment.  
 
 
5.3 - Interactive and affective sense-making in infancy 
 
 
The role of early social interaction in infants’ sense-making has been described by researchers 
and philosophers spanning an array of theoretical perspectives. For example, Meltzoff’s (2005) 
“like me” hypothesis focuses on the links between the infant and co-actor’s “body schema”. That is, 
he suggests that there is an inherent connection between the bodily mappings of self and 
conspecifics that infants can act on from birth. In contrast to the hypothesis that there is a direct 
Protomusicality 
(i.e. mother-infant 
interaction) 
 
Teleomusicality 
(constitution of  first 
musical contexts through 
sensorimotor patterns of 
active engagement) 
OTAs CTAs	  
Explorations  
Fig. 5 
This figure encapsulates my enactive interpretation of musical development. While affective tuning 
provides the infant with a superficial and non-directed musical expertise, explorative behaviours 
allow the constitution of teleomusical acts through the active engagement with the environment, 
modulating motivations and strategies employed by the infant to engaging in musical practices. Note 
that OTAs could develop into CTAs thanks to dynamical interactions with caregivers (or music 
teachers) or through self-organized (spontaneous) modalities of meaningful explorations.  
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mapping between self and other, Tomasello (1999) has put forth the idea that our motivation to 
engage with others and attempt to understand them plays a critical role in our understanding of 
others’ intentional states.  
This view more closely follows the cognitivist approaches, implying that infants come to 
understand others through analogy with their own internal states. Barresi and Moore (1996) 
emphasize the important role that interactions, and particularly triadic interactions (in which two 
individuals share attention on a common object), play in making sense of others’ actions. They 
propose that the physical alignment between intentional relations (e.g., the relation between an 
infant and the object of his or her gaze or the relation between a mother and the object of her gaze) 
facilitates recognition of others’ intentions. In this way, they take a step closer to enactivism by 
emphasizing the role of the interaction in the sense-making process.  
 
 
The key here is to realize that because there is an individuality that finds itself produced 
by itself it is ipso facto a locus of sensation and agency, a living impulse always already 
in relation with its world. There cannot be an individuality which is isolated and folded 
into itself. There can only be an individuality that copes, relates and couples with the 
surroundings, and inescapably provides its own world of sense (Weber & Varela, 2002, 
p. 117). 
 
 
Or, as Susan Oyama puts it, ‘biological persons are constructed, not only in the sense that they 
are actively construed by themselves and others, but also in the sense that they are, at every 
moment, products of, and participants in, ongoing developmental processes’ (2000, p. 180). Having 
established that social interactions are common, salient, and thought to be sources of cognitive and 
social development early in life, we now focus on empirical evidence of the action-perception link 
in infancy.  
Growing evidence from both correlational and intervention studies suggest strong links between 
action production and action perception in the first two years of life. Infants’ motoric capacities 
increase greatly in the first two years of life and beyond. For example, at around six months of age, 
infants become proficient at grasping objects within their reach. Near the end of the first year, they 
begin to produce object-directed points, engage in object-directed gaze, produce containment 
actions, and use tools as means to retrieve objects (see Clearfield & Thelen, 2001 for review of 
motor developments). In conjunction with these fine motor developments, infants become able to 
move themselves in self-propelled ways by crawling, cruising, and eventually walking. The natural 
progression of these skills allows researchers to assess relations between variations in these motoric 
abilities and infants’ perception of these actions when produced by others.  
Sommerville and Woodward (2005), for example, found that individual differences in ten-
month-old infants’ ability to produce a cloth-pulling action (in which they needed to pull on a cloth 
to retrieve a toy at the end of the cloth) was related to their perception of the goal of this action (the 
toy) in a habituation paradigm. Similarly, Woodward (2003) found that production of object-
directed pointing was related to infants’ perception of the relation between an agent and the object 
of his or her point. Interestingly, this relation was specific to the particular action in that pointing 
production was unrelated to perception of object-directed gaze (whereas engagement in shared 
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attention was related to gaze understanding). Similar relations between action experience and action 
perception have been found for gross motor actions on a neural level.  
For example, van Elk and colleagues (2008) measured motor activity in 14-month-old infants 
(using electroencephalography) when they viewed videos of infants crawling and walking. At this 
age, as a group, infants had more experience crawling than walking and showed greater motor 
activity when viewing crawling actions than walking actions. Further, variability in walking 
experience (as measured in months since walking onset) related to the amount of motor activity 
when infants viewed videos of walking infants. Importantly, this effect of experience remained after 
accounting for differences in age, indicating that motor experience, rather than general 
development, was underlying these changes.  
These findings are of particular interest because they suggest that motoric experience (with 
crawling), rather than visual experience (with walking), drove motor activity during the observation 
of gross motor movements. That is, infants likely had a great deal more experience observing 
walking than crawling, but motor activity changed as a function of motor, not visual, experience. 
Together, these findings support the notion that action production and perception are not separated, 
autonomous, categories as the standard cognitivist view posits. A quote by Merleau-Ponty can 
clarify this point: 
 
 
The organism cannot properly be compared to a keyboard on which the external stimuli 
would play […]. Since all the movements of the organism are always conditioned by 
external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of the 
milieu. But in the same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives 
have in turn been possible only by its preceding movements which have culminated in 
exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behaviour is 
the first cause of all stimulations. Thus the form of the excitant is created by the 
organism itself. (1945, [1962], p. 13). 
 
 
Correlational studies, however, do not allow causal claims to be tested. To determine causal 
directions, intervention studies are needed. A series of recent studies have done just this: given 
infants experience learning an action when they are at the brink of being able to perform that action 
and then tested the infants’ perception of that action when produced by others. For example, at three 
months, infants are not yet proficient at effectively reaching for and grasping objects and they do 
not yet recognize the goal-directed nature of this action when performed by others. Sommerville, 
Woodward, and Needham (2005) fitted infants of this age with Velcro mittens that allowed the 
infants to pick up and move around toys (also covered in Velcro). After gaining this object-directed 
action experience, infants’ recognition of the goal of a mittened grasping action was assessed in a 
habituation paradigm. Infants who had gained experience producing object-directed reaching 
actions using mittens, but not those who did not get this experience, then recognized the goal of this 
action when performed by an experimenter, as assessed in a habituation paradigm.  
Research by Gerson and Woodward (in press) contrasted active mittens experience with visual 
experience observing mittened actions and found that active experience was uniquely beneficial for 
perception of a grasping action at three months. Similar findings demonstrate the effect of active, 
above and beyond observational, experience in two-step means-end actions at eight and ten months 
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of age (e.g., Sommerville et al., 2008). The unique effects of active experience at the origins of 
action perception are congruent with an embodied perspective of action in infancy. The above-
reviewed findings, however, focus on motor experience gained as an individual, independent of 
social context. The enactive account, in contrast, focuses on the embedment of living bodies in the 
social world. Infants are engaged in interactions, not only with objects, but also with other people.   
Recently, Gerson and colleagues (Woodward & Gerson, in press) have put forth an account in 
which the knowledge gained through one’s own self-produced actions (as described above) can then 
be used as the base for building upon this knowledge through social interactions. Similar to the 
effect of experience in triadic interactions described by Barresi and Moore (1996) above, 
Woodward and Gerson suggest that comparisons between self and other during social interactions 
can facilitate generalization of action understanding. In one study, they examined how comparison 
facilitated understanding and imitation of a novel action in seven-month-old infants (Gerson & 
Woodward, 2012). At seven months, infants can produce grasping actions and understand and 
imitate grasping actions when they view them performed by others. In contrast, they do not yet 
produce or recognize the goal of tool-use actions, in which an individual uses a tool as a means to 
retrieve an object. In this study, infants played a simple game in which the experimenter passed the 
infant a series of toys using a tool. During this interaction, infants could compare their grasping 
action with the experimenter’s tool-use action and recognize that the two actions shared the same 
goal structure; that is, they both aimed to reach the same object. Following this interaction, infants 
recognized and imitated the toy-choice of the experimenter when she used a tool to reach one of 
two toys. Infants who received other kinds of experience with the tool and toys that did not allow 
them to compare the grasping and tool-use actions did not imitate the experimenter’s toy choice in 
the test trials.  
Thus, participation in the interaction facilitated comparison between actions and understanding 
and imitation of the novel action. Gerson (in press) suggests that comparison processes during 
social interactions can provide a rich source of information about intentional actions. Consistent 
with an enactivist perspective, sense-making takes place in the meaningful interaction due to the 
sensorimotor coupling that links embodied agents with their world. For this reason, the sphere of 
affection must be considered as a constitutive and fundamental part of (musical) sense-making and 
not treated as an autonomous category. Rather, affectivity is radically intermixed with perception 
and inter(en)action. There are two reasons for assuming this: 
 
 
First, there is a large amount of anatomical overlap between the neural systems 
mediating cognition and emotion processes, and these systems interact with each other 
in reciprocal and circular fashion, up and down the neuraxis. Second, the emergent 
global states to which these interactions give rise are “appraisal-emotion amalgams”, in 
which appraisal elements and emotion elements modify each other continuously. Such 
modification happens at each time-scale, through reciprocal interactions between local 
appraisal and emotion elements, and circular causal influences between local elements 
and their global organizational form (Thompson, 2007, p. 371). 
  
 
In the realm of infant research, many scholars in the field of attachment theory have long 
discussed the value of early, everyday interactions between infants and their caregivers. As in the 
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enactivist account, they suggest that these social interactions provide the basis of subsequent affect, 
cognition, and behaviour. The affective component of these interactions is critical to accounts of 
attachment in that the feeling of security with a caregiver when faced with fear forms the basis of 
the attachment (Bowlby 1988). According to Bretherton (1990), infants create models of their world 
that act as “affective-cognitive filters”, and are created through representations of the self, 
attachment figures, and relationships. These models then influence a child’s actions and view of self 
in future relationships and interactions with social partners. Attachment theorists label these models 
“internal working models”, and they are often thought of as representations of the world, thus 
taking on a cognitivist perspective. Others, however, have proposed that the information contained 
in these models need not be cognitive and explicit. As Suomi puts it: 
 
 
Cognitive constructions per se may not be necessary for long-term developmental or 
cross-generational continuities in attachment […]. That is, such continuities are 
essentially “programmed” to occur in the absence of major environmental disruption 
and are in fact the product of strictly biological processes that reflect the natural 
evolutionary history of advanced primate species, human and nonhuman alike (Suomi, 
2008, p. 186). 
 
 
The proposal that affective and cognitive information is integrated through these interactions and 
influences future behaviour and interactions has been studied in adults and preschoolers using a 
variety of techniques, including interviews and storytelling games. In general, expressive emotional 
communication is a theme that should be tightly intermixed not only to an embodied and enactive 
perspective on early musicality, but also to human cognition in general. However, even an author 
like Piaget “largely ignored” (Trevarthen, 2012, p. 472) this aspect, as he mainly focused on the 
sensorimotor advances that characterise infants’ development. An enactive approach, nevertheless, 
considering the whole creature in its situated and autonomous self-organization, cannot avoid a 
discussion of the basic forms of sense-making. Giovanna Colombetti, for example, considered 
bodily arousal not as a mere ‘response to the subject’s evaluation of the situation in which she is 
embedded. It is rather the whole situated organism that subsumes the subject’s capacity to make 
sense of her world’ (2010, p. 15).  
In general, the main idea is that the sphere of affectivity constantly emerges in the openness to 
the world that characterises a cognizer (Ratcliffe, 2009). The sphere of emotion cannot be simply 
bracketed out. Rather, it does act as a ‘transparent background that constrains and informs the 
features of the environment which show up for a perceiver’ (Ward & Stapleton 2012). This is true 
not only for the cognizer-as-perceiver but also for the cognizer-as-embodied agent, which 
ultimately are exchangeable notions. As Trevarthen (2012) states, in fact, ‘enactivism itself must 
allow that one must care about what one is doing, must have an emotional investment in the moving 
and its consciousness’ (p. 468). Let’s consider, for example, the semantic analysis of the terms 
“motion” and “emotion” provided by Bloem (2012). The author claims that Descartes’s philosophy 
might have influenced the processes related to the current use and comprehension of the word 
“emotion” (2012, pp. 416-417). Starting the analysis from the French verbs “e ́ mouvoir” and 
“mouvoir”, Bloem posits that while “mouvoir” has been treated as a term to indicate physical 
movement, “e ́mouvoir” has a psychological connotation, thus separating de facto the mind from 
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the body, in league with the Cartesian dualistic stance. Before that, the two terms were used almost 
equally to express either physical movement or stimulation. In the following section, hence, I will 
discuss the enactive analysis of emotions and musical emotions, in order to provide further insight 
into the categories employed for musical sense-making.    
 
 
5.4 - Enacting Emotion 
 
 
The word “emotion” originally comes from the Latin verb emovere, which literally means an 
outward movement (Thompson, 2007, p. 363). This categorization is very similar to the very first 
meaning of intentionality, which we encountered in Chapter 3. Thompson (ibid.) provides a useful 
quote from Walter Freeman, in order to clarify the relation between these two terms: 
 
 
A way of making sense of emotion is to identify it with the intention to act in the near 
future, and then to note increasing levels of complexity of contextualization. Most 
basically, emotion is outward movement. It is the ‘stretching forth’ of intentionality, 
which is seen in primitive animals preparing to attack in order to gain food, territory or 
resources to reproduce […]. The key characteristic is that action wells up from within 
the organism. It is not a reflex. It is directed toward some future state, which is being 
determined by the organism in conjunction with its perception of its evolving conditions 
and its history (Freeman, 2000 [quoted in Thompson, 2007, p. 364]). 
 
 
Similarly, a pianist’s motor behaviour is intentionally directed towards a musical goal, whose 
sense’s stratifications include affective and sensorimotor properties by its own definition. A pianist 
does not play mechanically, like a puppet; she does not spend hours and hours of practice to 
perform, simply by moving the fingers and the hands on the keyboard. Rather she constitutes the 
musical object by imposing a meaning, an intentional meaning that is emotionally driven and thus 
co-determined by the perceiver(s) in various aspects. As we previously saw, in fact, musical sense-
making is a process that allows the specification of a musical environment by enacting or bringing 
forth the participants’ meaningful perspective.  
This holds true for performers as well as for listeners. In a performance both of them co-enact a 
world (see McGee, 2005) in a completely different manner from how the cognitivistic viewpoint 
would tend to portray this process. There is no need to postulate cognitive mechanisms for coping 
with perceptual structures resulting from individuals’ activity in an objective musical environment. 
The direct, yet neurally enabled, process of sense-making reflects the assumption that music is not a 
unidirectional entity that meets a passive listener. Meaning making involves the cognizer as an 
embodied and affective system, ‘constantly coping with the demands of being-in-the-world’ 
(Geeves et al., 2009, p. 107).  
Perception and emotion therefore should be considered as dependent nuances of intentional 
motor behaviours. With regards to this point, Ellis and Newton (2012) recently claimed that an 
agent is an organism that meaningfully acts in a world with an affective-driven behaviour, mainly 
elicited by the affordances of the environment. As Trevarthen admits, indeed, ‘evidences from 
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neuroscience and neuropsychology abundantly demonstrates how skilful action, every kind of 
knowledge, and all the “mirroring” of the intentions and feelings of others, depend on core 
processes of “action imagery” and specific emotional charge’ (2012, p. 468, emphasis added). From 
this perspective, an emotion would be distributed over brain, body and environment, manifesting 
itself in the subjective evaluations of bodily sense-making.  
This account of emotions as embodied in the circular dynamics of the sensorimotor loops (see 
Colombetti, 2014) goes against two typical models of affectivity: the cognitivistic perspective (i.e. 
Solomon, 1976) and the bodily-feeling theories (i.e. Damasio, 1994). According to the classic 
intellectualistic view endorsed by proponents of cognitivism, an emotion depends on the belief 
about a certain state. In this sense, I can feel ashamed only if I would acknowledge that my 
behaviour was wrong. Realizing my mistake would therefore enable my feeling of shame. ‘If you 
don’t believe you did anything wrong, you will not feel ashamed. Shame can be caused by beliefs 
and cured by beliefs’ (Hutto 2012, p. 2). But could this model account for a complete story of 
emotional states?  
 
 
Pure cognitivist accounts of the emotions are woefully incomplete in that they overlook 
the importance of feelings. […]. For it is easy enough to imagine the relevant cognitions 
taking place in disembodied, entirely “cold”, “detached” and, wholly, “unemotional” 
ways. This observation is especially pertinent even if we consider quite ordinary cases. 
Familiarly, even when our emotions are stirred up by having certain beliefs or 
judgements, the associated feelings relating to such emotions can outlast the changes in 
those beliefs and judgements. Thus my wife’s seething anger and feelings of outrage at 
what she takes to be my transgression might not immediately subside upon discovering 
me innocent of that of which I am accused. While, as a consequence of this discovery, 
she may no longer direct anger at me (and certainly not with justification) it does not 
follow that her feelings of anger entirely dissipate, and in such circumstances, it is the 
having of such feelings that seems sufficient for her being in a continued emotional 
state of anger (ibid.) 
 
 
On the contrary, a theory of emotions as body-feelings, like the one proposed by Damasio (1994; 
2003) assumes that emotional consciousness is not a matter of beliefs but, rather, depends on 
receiving interoceptive information (a signal from the inside of the animal) aimed at maintaining 
the agent’s homeostasis (the somatic marker hypothesis). Many authors, however, reject the idea of 
an efferent signal that ‘travels towards the central nervous system from more remote areas’ (Ellis & 
Newton, 2012, p. 62). Damasio’s view ‘provides no account of how conscious information 
processing is different from a robot’s passive receiving of inputs and then transforming them into 
behavioural outputs’ (ibid.). In contrast, the focus on participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di 
Paolo, 2007) reveals a more ‘complex interplay of degrees of connectedness’ (Colombetti & 
Torrance, 2009, p. 17) that is never a matter of solipsistic inner events but, rather, it emerges in 
intersubjective practices. As Hutto puts it: 
 
 
Such theories [bodily feelings theories] are problematic in that they “have little to say 
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about the processes by which external stimuli are evaluated for ecological and social 
significance” (Hill, 2009, p. 199). Basically, in reducing emotions to bodily feelings or 
perceptual states exclusively targeting such, “somatic theories have trouble explaining 
what it is for an emotion to have an intentional object or target” (Hill, 2009, p. 200). 
They lack appropriate reach (Hutto, 2012, p. 2). 
 
 
The idea that sensorimotor patterns of motor loop between organism and environment would 
modulate the emotional meaning enacted by each organism implies that any isolationist proposal 
would face difficulties in integrating such mutual processes for understanding (musical) emotions. 
While proponents of the cognitivistic framework would in fact describe the emotional sphere as a 
top down mechanism, the enactivist will consider “top down” and “bottom up” as ‘heuristic terms 
for what in reality is a large-scale network that integrates incoming and endogenous activities on the 
basis of its internally established reference points’ (Thompson, 2007, p. 366).  
In musical contexts, the subject of emotion is probably one of the most important, having 
received much interest in behavioural, electrophysiological, and theoretical studies (i.e. Juslin & 
Sloboda, 2001). Among others, Peter Kivy (2001; 2007) argues, for example, that our emotional 
response to music depends on our ability to identify certain sounds’ qualities that would elicit a 
particular feeling. According to this traditional view, therefore, a listener would be affectively 
moved by a particular piece, thanks to the way in which music represents, or portrays, a particular 
emotion. This idea, which eventually recalls Huron’s model of expectations, heavily relies on the 
agent’s past listening experiences - since they could facilitate the tendency of the musical properties 
to evoke an emotion in the listener. It is quite clear, however, that this perspective is based on the 
input-output dichotomy, as well as on the attribution of given qualities to the musical object, thus 
objectifying the two poles of musical intentionality. The input-output commitment is a die-hard 
assumption not only in music cognition, but also in the broader field of neuroscience. As Thompson 
puts it, in fact, ‘traditional neuroscience has tried to map brain organization onto a hierarchical, 
input-output processing model in which the sensory end is taken as the starting point. Perception is 
described as proceeding through a series of feedforward or bottom up processing stages, and top-
down influences are equated with back-projections or feedback from higher or lower areas’ (2007, 
p. 366). Endorsing such a view would make us lose any chance to consider the brain as an 
autonomous system (Freeman, 1999).  
 
 
Self-determining or autonomous systems […] are defined by their organizational and 
operational closure, and thus do not have inputs and outputs in the usual sense. For 
these systems, the linear input/output distinction must be replaced by the nonlinear 
perturbation/response distinction. From an enactive perspective, brain processes are 
understood in relation to the circular causality of action-perception cycles and 
sensorimotor processes. Hence emotion is not a function in the input-output sense but 
rather a feature of the action-perception cycle - namely, the endogenous initiation and 
direction of behaviour outward into the world. Emotion is embodied in the enclosed 
dynamics of the sensorimotor loop, orchestrated endogenously by processes up and 
down the neuraxis, especially the limbic system (Thompson, 2007, p. 365).  
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A musical emotion therefore is not an autonomous category, a property of auditory feedback that 
would be actualised in the mind. Rather, it is a constitutive part of the holistic process of musical 
sense-making, being distributed over brain, body and musical environment, thus playing a 
fundamental role in the sensorimotor loop characterising musical intentionality’s mutual 
specification. Once again, the distinctions between internal and external and between subjective and 
objective must be reconsidered: 
 
 
Cognition is a form of embodied action  […] the enactive approach implies that we need 
to move beyond the head/body and subjective/objective dichotomies that characterise 
much of emotion theory. Appraisal is not a cognitive process of subjective evaluation 
“in the head” and arousal and behaviour are not objective bodily concomitants of 
emotion. Rather, bodily events are constitutive of appraisal, both structurally and 
phenomenologically (Colombetti & Thompson, 2008, pp. 56-58). 
 
 
A post-Cartesian cognitive science of music, therefore, should take into serious consideration the 
challenge posited by the primacy of corporeality in cognitive and affective economy. Empirical 
frameworks aimed to shed light on the nature of musical emotion should hence consider embodied 
agents and their environment as inseparable systems, without any reification of subjective and 
objective categories.  
If a living system is best understood ‘by identifying the significant variables that constitute its 
behaviour, both inside and outside the head’ (Rockwell, 2005, p. 197), then the study of musical 
emotion should not be limited to the understanding of the (inner or external) mechanisms that 
would provoke a feeling. Rather, the direct coupling between performers (or listeners) and their 
musical world implies a primacy of action, which is already an affectively enacted category. As 
Varela and colleagues remind us: 
 
 
[t]he enactive approach consists of two points: (1) perception consists in perceptually 
guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor 
patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. The overall concern [...] is not to 
determine how some perceiver-independent world is to be recovered; it is, rather, to 
determine the common principles or lawful linkages between sensory and motor 
systems that explain how action can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent 
world (Varela et al., 1991, p. 173). 
 
 
In this sense, the proposal to reconceptualise emotions here described is only a sketch and simply 
argues for a more phenomenologically relevant working methodology for the analysis of musical 
emotions, for example in league with dynamic systems theory’s techniques (see Garvey & Fogel, 
2008).  
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5.5 - Phylogenesis and ontogenesis 
 
 
The study of infants’ musicality and musical emotions, being directed towards the basic forms of 
mutual engagement between musical subjects and objects, implicitly asks us to investigate other 
possible antecedents of musical behaviours. A biologically plausible interpretation of human 
musical behaviours, in fact, should take into consideration also the mutual constraints between 
ontogenesis and phylogenesis, without any strong distinction between the two (Tomasello 1999). 
Cross (2003) suggested that musical behaviours in infancy could be seen as a cognitive and motor 
play leading to a decreasing of social tensions inside a group of individuals, confirming the idea of 
Robin Dunbar (1996), who claimed that a complex vocal exchange - without any clear 
communicative significance - could have been used among our ancestors as a “social lubricant”. 
Phylogenetically, it is useful to note that group activities are fundamental also for chimpanzees 
(Boesch, 2005). For example, during hunting activities, although there is no proper “role division”, 
every animal tries to maximize its chance to capture the prey and the group responds to each 
animal’s spatial position (Tomasello, 2008). According to the classic perspective, chimpanzees do 
not co-operate as humans, as they do not understand the goals of their partners (Povinelli & O’Neil, 
2000). The discovery of mirror neurons, however, contributed in changing this assumption as they 
show how monkeys intentionally respond to goal-directed motor behaviours (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2008). Moreover, chimpanzees are also aware of the others’ own perceptions, 
considering that during food competitions they take into consideration whether the rival sees the 
food or not (Hare et al., 2000), sometimes trying to get closer to hidden food (Melis et al., 2006).  
Chimpanzees, therefore, are able to understand the others in terms of their goals and perception 
(Tomasello, 2008). According to Kirschner and Tomasello (2009a; 2009b) these nuances seem to 
overlap with human musical behaviours, leading the two scholars to integrate the studies on 
primates with research on humans. For example, they demonstrated that 4-year-old humans who 
shared a musical experience with some partners, tends to behave in a more social and cooperative 
way. If the hypothesis is that some kind of protomusicality could improve social bonds inside a 
group, it remains unclear which kind of concrete musical experiences are involved. Merker (2000) 
assumes that synchronisation plays the cardinal role, given that protomusical behaviours such as 
affective tuning are usually characterised by regular beats. In 1974 Fraisse noted that the easiest 
rhythmic impulse to synchronise with seems to correspond to the spontaneous timing that is the 
subjective velocity employed when performing natural rhythmical movements - such as leg-
swinging - providing an argument in favour of Merker’s hypothesis. According to the latter, in fact, 
these kinds of basic synchronisation would have led groups of primates to perform synchronised 
vocalisations with functions related to territory’s defence and courtship (Tomasello, 2008). Most of 
the monkey’s species display a basic shared repertoire of vocalisations, suggesting an actual 
predisposition for shared vocal activities.  
On the ontogenetic side, Delalande (2009) observes that the explorative behaviour previously 
described develops from basic sounds’ discoveries to the mastery of more meaningful affective and 
sensorimotor conducts underlining musical sense-making. With regards to this point, it is important 
to note that the ontogenetic differences in the adoption of sensorimotor patterns - as in the 
elaboration of short phrases - led researchers to postulate the existence of a personal style since the 
very first months after birth (Imberty, 1983). Repetitions or variations of given OTAs or CTAs, in 
this sense, would represent a basic morphology of musical sense-making, together with the 
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development of body schema (Freschi, 2006). As observed by Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (2009), 
moreover, the capacity of musical subjects to synchronise and interact might improve their ability to 
predict events. In their words: 
 
 
At a basic level, this is evident in the simple pulse that underlies most musical 
behaviours, which is highly predictable and allows for spontaneous, enjoyable 
synchronisation (e.g., group clapping, dancing). At a higher level, it is evident in our 
strong emotional responses to, and preferences for, extremely familiar music (e.g., 
Peretz et al. 1998), a phenomenon that seems to appear in early childhood and continue 
throughout adulthood. It might appear that this proposal contradicts the classic theory of 
musical expectancy, which suggests that emotional responses occur to unexpected 
features in music (Juslin, 2001; Steinbeis et al., 2006; Meyer, 1956). Rather, we suggest 
that the capacity for music to create such a strong environment for minimized prediction 
error (and resultant affect) provides the very basis for a strong emotional response to an 
unpredicted event. While familiar, predictable music can be enjoyed to its fullest, the 
violation of expectancies can be more emotionally dramatic, as evidenced, for example, 
in the Romantic era of classical music (ibid., p. 494). 
 
 
The distinctive aspect of synchronisation seems to be its empathic nature. While a study by 
Himberg (2006) shows that human adults tend to better synchronise with a human partner rather 
than an audio beat coming from speakers, Kirschner and Tomasello (2009a) showed that young 
infants are facilitated in synchronisation tasks (like clapping the hands to a beat) in intersubjective 
events. It comes at no surprise, then, that Walter Freeman provides a definition of music as 
‘biotechnology of group formation’ (2000, p. 419). Although this definition appears too exclusive, 
it stresses the importance of intersubjective practices and their role in phylogenesis, creating and 
modelling social bonds:  
 
 
Here in its purest form [music] is a human technology for crossing the solipsistic gulf. It 
is wordless, illogical, deeply emotional, and selfless in its actualization of transient and 
than lasting harmony between individuals […] and perhaps even among higher apes 
[...]. It constructs the sense of trust and predictability in each member of the community, 
on which social interaction are based (ibid., p. 420). 
 
 
Many theories have tried to shed the light on the origins of music from a phylogenetic 
standpoint. According to Antonio Serravezza (1996) the first evolutionary theories of music have 
been provided by Herbert Spencer (1857) and Charles Darwin (1871).  For the British philosopher 
the birth of music was a necessary evolutionary adaptation aimed to trigger stronger emotions than 
language. In particular, first forms of affective human vocalisations would have induced emotions, 
being characterised by the use of cadences and vocal inflections (Serravezza, 1996, p. 232). In this 
scenario, music developed as a tool to communicate emotions, independently from, and more 
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strongly than language. Moreover, Spencer argued that musical sounds22 have a natural relationship 
with the organic conditions from which they are produced and consequently they are representative 
of a defined mood, physiologically linked to us through a sort of associative memory (ibid., pp. 
238-239). Hence, the phylogenetic value of music is highly important, as it would have facilitated 
social cohesion through its feature of being a medium of physiological moods. While the theory 
provided by Spencer is based on a physiological standpoint, the perspective adopted by Darwin is 
genuinely biological.  
Although Darwin himself considered his hypothesis on music as “exactly opposite” (Darwin, 
1871, [quoted in Serravezza, 1996, p. 239]) from Spencer’s approach, in his work Expression of the 
emotions in man and animals (1872) his analysis appears to some extents similar to the one 
provided by his intellectual rival. Darwin, considered the voice as the actual root of the developing 
process of music, because - he claimed - every musical feature is reducible to chant. In fact, 
‘primeval man, or rather some early progenitor of man, probably first used his voice in producing 
true musical cadences, that is in singing, as do some of the gibbon-apes at the present day’ (1871, p. 
133). Despite this affinity, however, the two theories effectively present some differences: while 
Spencer claims that music is an emotionally intensified way of communication, Darwin considers 
this argument as too reductive as it can be applied only to very simple contexts (e.g. a scream for 
help must be very high and intense) and it might be inappropriate considering that, often, the 
emotions provoked by music are more connected to the laws23 of sounds’ associations than to the 
features of single vocal modification (Darwin, 1872). Their disagreement, according to Kivy 
(1959), reveals their different philosophical approaches as Darwin criticizes the deductive argument 
developed by Spencer from a very general premise. In Darwin’s view, in fact: 
 
 
The impassioned orator, bard, or musician, when with his varied tones and cadences he 
excites the strongest emotions in his hearers, little suspects that he uses the same means by 
which his half-human ancestors long ago, aroused each other's ardent passions, during their 
court-ship and rivalry (Darwin, 1871, pp. 942-943).  
 
 
From his perspective, music can be considered as seductive tool for reproduction (see also Miller 
2000), indeed ‘[b]esides this natural means of selection, by which those individuals are preserved, 
which are best adapted to the place they fill in nature, there is a second agency at work in most 
bisexual24 animals tending to produce the same effect, namely the struggle of the males for the 
females. These struggles are generally decided by the law of battle; but in the case of birds, 
apparently, by the charms of their songs, by their beauty or their power of courtship’ (Darwin F., 
1909). The proof of this argument, for Darwin, lies in the economy of nature itself. If female birds 
were unable to appreciate their partners’ voices, then all the effort to produce sounds would be 
simply useless (Darwin, 1871, p. 599; see also Fisher, 1915).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 He mainly refers to chant and singing sounds.  
23 No reference to tonal harmony has been provided by Darwin. 
24 Peter Kivy (1959) writes about this term that ‘a certain ambiguity here with regard to the term bisexual. Darwin is 
clearly using the term here to refer to species in which the male element is present in one individual and the female 
element in another. However, modern scientific dictionaries give hermaphroditic as the synonym for bisexual. In this 
sense, a bisexual animal is one with both male and female sex elements. Darwin must have seen this problem for, when 
this passage appeared in print in 1858, the term bisexual was replaced by the term unisexual’.  
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The Darwinian hypothesis of music, however, should be integrated with some clarifications. 
First, it cannot pretend to be exclusive: the fact the some birds use vocal sounds for courtship does 
not necessarily imply that the complexity of the musical phenomenon has all its substrates in it. And, 
second, even if it may appear granted, we consider birdsongs as “songs” only a posteriori for they 
seem similar to what we think music is. In fact, Fitch (2006) noticed that there are at least two 
conditions that made the birdsongs relevant to an evolutionary enquiry on music: they are ‘complex 
and learned vocalisations’ (ibid., p. 182). In literature, many studies have investigated the learning 
abilities of birds (Marler, 1970b), while the study of the vocalisations’ complexity - apart from 
aesthetical purposes (Messiaen, 1944) - is considered as a very difficult argument (Weng et al., 
1999) considering the ambiguity of the used concepts. Though Scholes (1938) considers birds as 
‘the only masters in nature for men’ (ibid. p. 107), the discovery of complex vocalisations by 
marine mammals has at least put some doubts on this common conviction (Payne & McVay, 1971). 
Even if a comparative methodology has some advantages in phylogeny, by detecting common traits 
among different species and formulating inferences on our ancestors’ adaptive functions (Fitch, 
2006, p.181), in the case of music it appears insufficient for the development of a coherent 
hypothesis. Hence, the similarity between the bird syringe and the human larynx is not enough to 
draw a definitive conclusion about the birth of musicality and Darwin did already notice that the 
birds’ sound production can be considered as analogous and not homologous25 of the human songs 
assuming that our common ancestor, a reptile from the Palaeozoic era, was not able to sing. 
Furthermore, according to the definition provided by Fitch (complex and learned vocalisations) the 
only primate capable of singing should be man. In fact, despite the complex vocalisations of similar 
animals, like gibbons (Geissmann, 2000), there is no evidence about their actual learning (Janik & 
Slater, 1997).  
Enamoured by these argumentations, and trying to defend the uniqueness and the specificity of 
music as human traits, Hauser and McDermott published a famous study with the title The evolution 
of the music faculty. A comparative perspective (2003). Their argument, considered also by Fitch 
(2006, pp. 183-184), is based on three different points.  
 
1) The first assumption consists of defining the animal repertoire as very limited in 
comparison to the human musical production, because it is used only for courtship or territorial 
defence. Unfortunately, those are not the only contexts in which these behaviours emerge. Many 
birds do sing alone and not only during the reproduction season. Furthermore, following the 
example provided by Fitch (ibid.), a different role for their sound production cannot invalidate the 
analogy, otherwise we should not consider as analogous the wings that a specific species uses for 
predating from the ones of another species used for flying.  
 
2) The second argument provided by McDermott and Hauser is based on the consideration 
that human music is founded on pure delight, while animals’ proto-musicalities have 
communication as their primary function, considering the prevalence of intersubjective contexts. 
This analysis, however, turns out to be problematic as it assumes a predefined and a-problematic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In biology this distinction is aimed to separate all the common tracts of a species by virtue of a common ancestor, 
from the similar features independently developed across evolution. 
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notion of music. For example, Merriam (1964) noticed that aesthetic enjoyment is only one of the 
functions music fulfils26 (Giannattasio, 1998, p. 209).  
 
3) The last point used by Hauser and McDermott to refute the analogy between human and 
animal music assumes that in most of the animal species, the singer is mostly a male while, for 
humankind, there is no sex preference for sound’s production activities. Actually, according to 
Langmore (1998; 2000) and Riebel (2003) many female birds can sing and, from a socio-cultural 
perspective, we also notice how in some human cultures only men are allowed to sing (Titon et al., 
1984).  
 
One aspect that emerges from this discussion is that all these approaches seem to disregard the 
role of ontogeny, focusing on an exclusivistic way to investigate music. As Tomasello (2008) states, 
indeed, in phylogeny nature selects the ontogenetic paths, which lead to the mature phenotype and 
the Darwinian approach is a dynamic position where the different factors are not located in a static 
and a-temporal present. The genetic variation and the natural selection operate across time, with 
different processes in different modalities (Tomasello, 1999) and the primates’ (humans or not) 
ontogenetic ways would have not developed without external materials and information. If mankind 
has the ability to learn maths, language or music, it does not mean that this ability is pre-determined 
in our genes. As Maturana and Varela put it: 
 
 
Note well that innate behaviour and learned behaviour are, as behaviours, 
indistinguishable in their nature and in their embodiment. The distinction lies in the 
history of the structures that make them possible. Therefore, our classifying them as one 
or the other depends on whether or not we have access to the pertinent structural 
history. We cannot make that distinction by observing the operation of the nervous 
system in the present (Maturana & Varela, 1992, pp. 171-172). 
 
 
For example, in the case of music, this point emerges from the variety of the ways of constituting 
musicality across cultures; several and with various shapes, those different paths show how 
musicality is ontogenetically constituted, rather than genetically rooted. Enhancing the positive role 
of behaviour in evolution would mean amending the notion of adaptation from the feature of 
passivity often bestowed from Neo-Darwinian adaptionism (Ferretti, 2007, p. 74). In other terms 
‘every ontogeny occurs within an environment [...] it will become clear to us that the interactions 
(as long as they are recurrent) between [organism] and environment will consist of reciprocal 
perturbations. [...] The results will be a history of mutual congruent structural changes as long as the 
organism and its containing environment do not disintegrate: there will be a structural coupling’ 
(Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 75).  
Since ontogeny is defined as ‘the history of maintenance of [the system’s] identity through 
continuous autopoiesis in the physical space’ (Varela, 1979, p. 32) then it seems that the 
phylogenetic roots of musicality reflect the ontogenetic processes at the basis of infants’ sound 
discoveries, in their bringing forth a world. The musical environment in which we are embedded is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For example, we can think about social or religious ceremonies, or about music therapy (Rouget 1968). 
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at the same time an environment in constitution, never fully given, and a category co-determined by 
the mutual influences that occur phylogenetically (in terms of different musical cultures and styles 
developed through time) and ontogenetically (in terms of basic sensorimotor modalities of actively 
engaging with it). Simply put, as musical subjects, we are (in) the musical world that we enact.  
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Chapter 6 
From the cradle to the stage27 
 
 
It is precisely this emphasis on mutual specification that enables us to negotiate a 
middle path between the Scylla of cognition as the recovery of a pregiven outer world 
(realism) and the Charybdis of cognition as the projection of a pregiven inner world 
(idealism)[…]. Our intention is to bypass entirely this logical geography of inner versus 
outer by studying cognition not as projection or recovery but as embodied action 
 
- Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind 
 
 
Living systems are units of interactions; they exist in an ambience. From a purely 
biological point of view they cannot be understood independently of that part of the 
ambience with which they interact: the niche; nor can the niche be defined 
independently of the living system that specifies it 
 
-   Humberto Maturana, Biology of Cognition and Epistemology 
 
 
6.1 - Crossing the boundaries   
 
 
In this final chapter I will draw from the conclusions which emerged in the last section, trying to 
further elaborate the enactive approach to musical experience through empirical corroboration. In 
particular, I will present two experiments that my colleagues and I have recently run. In the first 
one, we focused on the sensorimotor integration underlying an infant’s engagement with a musical 
instrument, and the resulting facilitation in detecting action-effect contingency in musical events. In 
the second one, we investigated cross-modal processes of active engagement between adult subjects 
and musical objects, through relevant learning tasks involving atonal music. Taken together, these 
two empirical studies corroborate some of the main ideas developed until now in this work. In 
particular they address themes related to the development of musical expertise from early infancy, 
focusing on the sensorimotor processes underlying the engagement between musical subjects and 
objects. Musical experience, as I have argued, does not possess an objectivistic subject-object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  This chapter contains material from the following articles in preparation: Schiavio, A., & Gerson, S. (in preparation). An 
enactive perspective on infants’ musicality, and Schiavio*, A., Gerson*, S., Timmers, R., Bekkering, H., & Hunnius, S. 
(in preparation). Sensorimotor integration and action-effect contingency in infants’ engagement with a musical 
instrument. (*both first author), and Schiavio, A., & Timmers, R. (in preparation). Cross-modal facilitation in learning 
atonal melodies. 	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structure but it is rather constituted by a subject-object inter(en)action, immersed in skilful activity. 
In this sense, musical cognition is a distributed category, emerging from the circular dynamics of 
brains, bodies, and musical environment.  
However, enamoured by the methodological progress of the cognitive neuroscience of music, a 
large number of researchers prefer to focus only on the brain mechanisms involved in musical 
experience. Recent findings in these areas concern cortical and subcortical neural pathways 
underlying musical emotions (Juslin et al. 2008), brain plasticity induced by musical training 
(Schlaug et al., 1995; Bangert & Altenmüller, 2003), premotor response to musical stimuli (Brown 
& Martinez 2007), and the activation of motor areas during imaginative musical tasks (Kristeva et 
al., 2003; Lotze et al., 2003). Although most of these studies assume that musical listening, 
learning, or emotions are actual achievements of an isolated brain, some of the data reported admit 
a different interpretation, closer in scope to the enactive perspective. In particular, the study of 
developmental processes clearly highlights the importance of sensorimotor interactions and active 
explorative behaviours for cognition (Majewska & Sur, 2006). Cortical plasticity in somatosensory 
and motor systems, for example, seems to reflect the adult musician’s mastery of relevant 
sensorimotor skills, showing the interdependency of functional architectures and active musical 
behaviours (Münte et al., 2002). In the context of visual research, moreover, it is generally accepted 
that an agent’s forms of interaction with the environment crucially determine the development of 
neural circuits constituting her visual system (Held 1965).  
With regards to this point, we could linger on the work of the American neuroscientist Paul 
Bach-y-Rita. As reported by Alva Noë (2009), Bach-y-Rita’s research on neuroplasticity led to the 
empirical development of the famous concept of sensory substitution. In particular, the scientist 
developed a device that would allow blind people to “see” again. How? His view holds that the eyes 
simply are conduits that lead perceptual information to the brain (Bach-y-Rita 1967; 1972). 
Therefore, changing the pathway would not substantially change the content of the information that 
would reach the visual system. Indeed, his work was not focused on the “eyes” of an individual but, 
rather, on the possible alternative ways to convey relevant sensory information to the brain. In order 
to do this, he developed the famous sensory substitution tool named TVSS (tactile-vision 
substitution system), in which the visual input is captured by a camera and converted into a ‘tactile 
stimulation on a twenty-by-twenty matrix of vibrators that a blind person, for example, could wear 
on her abdomen’ (Myin & O’Regan, 2009, p. 193) or other parts of the body.  
According to Evan Thompson, ‘TVSS brings about quasi-visual experience of being able to 
perceive the shape and the movements of objects at a distance only if the subject is able to exercise 
active control of the camera and thereby integrate it into his or her sensorimotor repertoire’ (2007, 
p. 255). In terms of brain mechanisms, it is possible to postulate that this sort of specific cortical 
areas’ re-mapping would allow people to compensate for the lost perceptual modality. Brain 
imaging techniques show that congenital blind patients present a cross-modal activation of the 
occipital cortex during perceptual tasks concerning other senses, including sound localization and 
recognition (Renier & De Volder, 2005; Amedi et al. 2007). Over the last three decades visual-to-
auditory sensory substitution devices like vOICe (Meijer 1992), or open source software like VIBE 
(Auvray et al., 2005) aim to provide the patients with a visual experience by using sounds. In these 
cases, research on brain areas indicates not only neural activity in the lateral occipital cortex, but 
also functional improvement thanks to adequate training sessions (Proulx et al., 2008). It comes as 
no surprise, therefore, that vision is not the only domain in which sensory substitution is applicable. 
Recently, in fact, Schurmann and co-workers (2006) examined the consequences of applying the 
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same paradigm to auditory conditions, showing that tactile sense could generate activation of the 
auditory cortex. It could be argued, therefore, that for each perceptual domain there is a 
corresponding pattern of ‘sensorimotor interdependency that is constitutive of that modality’ 
(Thompson 2007, p. 257).  
 
 
Contrary to behaviourism, perceptual experience, being in part constituted by 
endogenous knowledge (skilful mastery) mediates between sensory stimulation and 
motor behaviour. Contrary to cognitivism, however, experience does not intervene in a 
linear causal fashion between sensory “input” and motor “output”. Sensory stimulation 
does not cause experience in us, which in turn cause our behaviour, because “skilful 
activity (consisting in behaviour and sensory stimulation) is the experience” (O’Regan 
& Noë, 2001b, p. 1015). In other words, as a skilful activity of the whole animal […], 
perceptual experience emerges from the continuous and reciprocal (non-linear) 
interaction of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes, and is thereby constituted by 
motor behaviour, sensory stimulation and practical knowledge (ibid., p. 256).  
 
 
Although Bach-y-Rita himself believed that his device would allow sensory substitution by 
means of the transmission of a new kind of information to the brain, which would eventually 
transform it into a representation, the surprising results obtained by his TVSS allow a different 
interpretation. In particular, as acknowledged by Noë (2009), Bach-y-Rita’s research shows that it 
is possible to constitute a relation between an individual and an object where there was no relation 
before. It suggests that what matters for our experience is not the neural activity inside the 
boundaries of the skull. Rather, it is the dynamical interaction with the objects of the environment. 
We “see” with our skin, with our ears or with our bodies because perceptual activity is an active, 
explorative activity. It is not a matter of symbolic computation.  
Again with regards to the visual domain, a classic argument in favour of the enactive approach 
comes from the studies by Held and Hein (1963). In particular, proponents of enactivism consider 
their work as a firm proof that vision would not develop normally without motor activity. As 
reported by Jesse Prinz (2006b) Held and Hein raised two kittens in total darkness, without 
allowing them to see the light. However, only for a few hours per day the animals were conducted 
into a room with adequate illumination. Inside the room, one of the kittens was allowed to move 
and explore the environment while the other one was suspended over the ground in a cage, hence 
without any possibility to actively explore the room. After this habituation phase, the two animals 
were freed and the researchers noted that while the kitten that was allowed to move had normal 
visual abilities, the other one ended up being impaired. In particular, the latter was not able to ‘use 
vision to direct its paw reaching behaviours and it was indifferent to visual cliffs. Noë [like other 
spokesmen of the enactive approach] suggests that this experiment supports the view that visual 
perception necessarily involves understanding of motor responses’ (ibid., p. 9).  
In the context of musical research, this discussion influenced Alicia Peńalba Acitores (2011), 
who indeed considers her recent work as an application of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s 
sensorimotor contingency theory, where ‘the knowledge of the ways movements affect sensory 
stimulation is necessary for experience’ (O’Regan & Noë 2001a, p. 1055). Her perspective assumes 
that bodily movements (such as the rotation of the head or movements of the whole body closer to 
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the sound source in order to increase the amplitude) and the knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies guiding them are crucial for auditory perception. As Joel Krueger puts it: 
 
 
Bodily gestures are a form of attentional focusing and the vehicle of perceptual 
construction. The animate body becomes a vehicle for voluntarily drawing out features 
of a musical piece (e.g. expressive aspects, rhythmic beats, or melodic progression) and 
foregrounding them in our attentional field. This drawing out is an enactive gesture in 
response to felt affordances within the music. The listener perceives the inner space of 
the piece as a space that can be entered into, experientially, and by doing just this 
shapes how the experiential content of the piece-as-given becomes phenomenally 
manifest. In short, “we hear what the body feels” (Philips-Silver & Trainor, 2007 p. 
544). What the body feels are sensorimotor contingencies-possibilities for interaction, 
movement, and coordination that determine the character and content of musical 
experience. Sensitive music listening is thus a kind of skilled coping with a sonic world 
(2013, p. 187). 
 
 
Mark Reybrouck (2005b) captures this idea, defining music as a “tool for adaptation to the sonic 
world” or as something that is “heard and enacted upon” rather than a merely represented category. 
The musical brain is a brain in action, inconceivable without a body and a world. It is only in this 
condition that the brain enables embodied agents to coordinate their interactions with the 
environment. The field of musical learning, for example, represents an excellent domain (Palmer & 
Meyer 2000) to shed further light on the motor basis of this interaction, in league with the idea that 
musical experience is an embodied and embedded enaction. In particular, learning tasks can be 
appropriate for investigating the strategies used by the musical subjects to actively engage with 
given musical objects.  
For example, in a study by Truitt and colleagues (1997) based on piano sight-reading, the 
researchers investigated the role of the musicians’ expertise measuring the eye-hand span (temporal 
distance between the seeing of the note on the score and the playing on the piano) and the 
perceptual span (the spatial region from which the agent would extract information, close to the 
note on the score) in expert and non-expert pianists. The results were surprisingly similar: there was 
no significant difference in the measures of expert and non-expert musicians. According to Jänke 
(2006) this can be explained by considering the sensorimotor optimization underlying the 
performance as belonging to the motor side of the process, rather than on the visual one, regardless 
of the different participants’ expertise. Musical intentionality is primarily a form of active, 
sensorimotor interaction, which constitutes the horizon of further motor possibilities aimed at 
meaningfully exploring and understanding the musical environment. In the next section I will 
provide additional empirical evidences to this point, once again focusing on the basic forms of 
musical intentionality characterising infants’ musical behaviours. 
 
 
6.2 - Sensorimotor coupling and action-effect contingency in infants’ engagement with a 
musical instrument  
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Categories like “action”, “perception”, “cognition” and “affectivity” are radically intermixed. In 
the context of musical research, recent studies show a direct correlation between motor knowledge 
and auditory experience, in particular after long-term motor training, as for adult professional 
musicians (i.e. Koeneke et al., 2004).  
Gaining adequate motor knowledge is an important prerequisite in order to develop a subject’s 
musical expertise, as the mastery of specific goal-directed actions is indeed beneficial for 
recognizing the goal of the relevant actions witnessed or heard, without any cognitive 
subordination. As von Hofsten argues, indeed, ‘by closing the perception–action loop the infant can 
begin to explore the relationship between commands and movements, between vision and 
proprioception, and discover the possibilities and constraints of their actions. It is important to note 
that the core abilities rarely appear as ready-made skills but rather as something that facilitates the 
development of skills’ (2007, p. 55). The enactive approach highlights the role of the active body as 
the essential tool for cognition. Without a situated body, in fact, there would be no cognition at all. 
As Di Paolo and colleagues put it: 
 
 
the body is the ultimate source of significance; embodiment means that mind is inherent 
in the precarious, active, normative, and worldful process of animation, that the body is 
not a puppet controlled by the brain but a whole animate system with many autonomous 
layers of self-constitution, self-coordination, and self-organization and varying degrees 
of openness to the world that create its sense-making activity (Di Paolo et al., 2010, p. 
42). 
 
 
As previously acknowledged, however, how and when the active experience of creating music 
influences perception is largely unexplored in terms of ontogeny. Very briefly, it is worth 
reminding that “actions” are different from “movements” in light of the former intentional 
character. In other words, an action is goal-directed. Recent studies suggest that infants start at 
about 18 weeks of age to perform simple goal-directed actions (Daum et al., 2008). The thesis that I 
have offered holds that musical-directed motor behaviours can emerge during the 6-to-10-month 
attentive shift characterising the manual explorative behaviours in infancy, in light of the dynamic 
engagement between embodied agents and their sonic environment. In the domain of action 
understanding, active experience is initially more beneficial than observational experience for 
learning about others’ goal-directed actions. The ability to detect the goal-structure of actions plays 
a fundamental role in learning activities of different domains, such as word learning (Baldwin & 
Moses, 2001) or the understanding of cultural instruments and artifacts (Bloom & Markson, 1998). 
In particular, as previously remarked, infants do not solely focus on the kinematics properties of the 
actions or the physical structures of the objects. Rather, their attention is captured by the outcome of 
the actions employed to achieve a particular goal (i.e. a sound). As acknowledged by Sommerville 
and co-workers, ‘for instance, after watching an actor reach for and grasp a toy, infants show a 
stronger novelty response to a change in the actor’s goal than a change in the spatial location or 
trajectory of her reach (Woodward, 1998). This basic ability to construe action with respect to 
external goals may form the cornerstone for an understanding of goals as abstract entities that guide 
human action and govern event sequences’ (Sommerville et al. 2005, p.2).  
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In the current study, Sabine Hunnius, Harold Bekkering, Renee Timmers, Sarah Gerson and I28 
have connected the work on music cognition and infants’ action understanding to assess the effects 
of active versus observational training versus no training, in a musical context. Our hypothesis was 
that active training would play a key role in improving infants’ sensitivity to action-effect 
contingencies (in terms of synchronous versus asynchronous stimuli) in a musical context. 
Moreover, the population of interest (6-month-old infants) reflects the above-mentioned ideas about 
the first constitution of musical intentionality.  
   
• Participants 
 
Sixty six-month-old healthy and typically developing infants (mean age = 6.5 months) 
participated in one of three conditions. Infants were tested only if awake and in alert state, after 
their caregiver had provided informed consent. Participants were recruited through a database 
maintained by the Baby Lab of the Donders Institute for Brain Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud 
University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. A phone call was made to the parents in the area whose 
names appeared in the database. Parents or caregivers who expressed interest in participating in the 
study were contacted to schedule an appointment. Subjects received 10 Euros or a small book for 
their participation. No information was asked about their ethnicity. 
 
• Materials 
 
We recorded and manipulated a 30 seconds video in which an experimenter plays a toy snare 
drum with two drumsticks (full-hand grip - alternate drumming). The video only displays the 
drumsticks, the toy instrument and the hands of the actor performing the music. The music played 
uses the rhythmical structure of the excerpt in fig. 6. The video was manipulated in order to create 
an asynchronous effect of 300 and 600 ms (see Lewkowicz, 1996), in which the sound was delayed 
or anticipated when compared to the original. Stimuli - two parallel videos per trial - were 
represented on a high-definition video in front of the infant, randomizing all the present material. In 
order to analyse the looking time preference of the participants, a camera recorded their behaviours 
for the entire duration of the experiment (training and videos). 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Schiavio*, A., Gerson*, S., Timmers, R., Bekkering, H., & Hunnius, S. (in preparation). Sensorimotor integration and 
action-effect contingency in infants’ engagement with a musical instrument. (*both first author). 
Fig. 6 
Rhythmical structure of the experimental stimulus 
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• Procedure 
 
The infants witnessed drumming videos in which their recognition of synchronous versus 
asynchronous drumming actions were assessed before or after the engagement with the drumming 
task. In all conditions, the infant had the chance to gain live experience with drumming (active 
training [n = 20] or observational training [n = 20]) before the videos or active experience after the 
videos (control [n = 20]). For the entire duration of the experiment, all the participants were sitting 
on their caregivers’ laps. In the active training condition, infants had the opportunity to play with a 
drum from five to ten minutes, according to their degree of awareness.  
The drumstick was placed in the infants’ hand and, if they did not act, the experimenter helped 
them by moving their hand toward the drum and demonstrating how it worked. In the observational 
condition, infants saw an experimenter produce drumming actions for a comparable amount of time. 
In the videos, infants always saw two videos presented simultaneously (see Figure 8). The 
drumming sound was synchronous with one of the two video displays and was off by 300 or 600 ms 
in the other display. The side on which the synchronous and asynchronous videos were displayed 
was counterbalanced across eight trials. In other words, we recorded a normal (synchronous) video, 
and four different versions (delayed and anticipated by 300 ms, deleyed and anticipated by 600 ms). 
The normal video was always shown in every trial, along with one of the other versions in a 
randomized order. This was repeated twice, for a total of eight trials. 
 
 
 
 
	  
Active	   Training Observational Training 
Fig. 7 
Two participants during active training and observational training 
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Fig. 8  
Synchronous vs Asynchronous video. In every trial the infant was presented with the synchronous video on one side of 
the screen along with one of the asynchronous versions on the other half of it,, for a total of eight randomized trials. 
 
 
6.3 - Results and discussion 
 
 
We examined whether infants looked longer at the synchronous versus the asynchronous videos 
across trials. Infants in the active training condition looked significantly more often at the 
synchronous trials (see Figure 9), whereas infants in the observational and control conditions 
showed no preference.   
In particular we found that, in the control group, 11 infants looked more at the asynchronous 
stimulus while 7 displayed more interest in the synchronous video. Two infants looked for the same 
amount of time at the two different conditions, so we did not use their data. Participants of the 
active training group, in contrast, showed a different trend: 14 of them looked more at the 
synchronous video while only 4 preferred the asynchronous.  
Also in this case, we decided not to use the data of two infants, as they looked for the same 
amount of time at both the videos. As for the observational group, we found that 10 participants 
looked more at the asynchronous video, while 9 infants showed more interest for the synchronous 
condition. In this group, we found that only 1 subject looked at both the videos for the same 
duration. Although we are planning to examine the potential role of individual differences during 
training (which was between 5 and 10 mins, depending on the infant’s degree of attention and 
participation), for now these findings provide new insight into the link between action experience 
and music cognition. There was a significant effect of group on the distribution of looking 
preference for the asynchronous or synchronous condition (chi-square (2) = 6.093, p < .05).  
 
 
	  
Synchronous Asynchronous 
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A more detailed data analysis is performed by dividing the experiment into two tests, where the 
first one compares control versus active condition, and the second compares observational versus 
active condition. This is also justified by the fact that one condition (observation) was added later to 
the experimental paradigm.  
 
1) Control vs Active condition 
 
In order to assess whether infants consistently looked at synchronous versus asynchronous videos 
across trials, each infant was given a binary score of 0 for each trial for which he or she looked 
longer at the asynchronous video and a score of 1 for each trial for which he or she looked longer to 
the synchronous video. The proportion of the eight trials for which each infant looked longer at 
synchronous videos was then used as a dependent variable. An independent samples t-test indicated 
that infants in the two conditions differed in the proportion of trials for which they looked longer at 
synchronous videos, t(38) = 2.27, p = .029 (cohen’s d = .72). In order to follow up on this effect of 
condition, one-sample t-tests were conducted for each condition to determine whether the preferred 
proportion of trials using synchronous videos differed from chance (50%). In the pre-training 
condition, infants looked longer at synchronous videos on approximately 60% of the trials; this 
differed significantly from chance level: t(19) = 2.73, p = .013 (cohen’s d = 1.25—bonferroni 
corrected: p < .025). In the post-training condition, infants looked toward synchronous videos on 
approximately 49% of trials and did not differ from chance, t(19) = -.29, p = .78 (cohen’s d = .13). 
Non-parametric, binomial tests confirmed these findings. More infants in the pre-training condition 
looked longer at the synchronous trials than asynchronous trials (p = .022), but the number of 
infants who looked longer at these different types of trials did not differ for infants in the post-
training condition (p = .79). We also examined infants’ differentiation between synchronous and 
asynchronous videos separately for 300ms and 600ms offsets. Independent samples t-tests indicated 
that infants in the two conditions differed in the proportion of trials for which they looked longer at 
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Fig. 9 
The results show a clear effect of active training over observational and control condition. The 
infants who experienced an active engagement with the musical toy displayed a greater sensitivity 
to the action-effect contingency of the video, preferring to look at the synchronous video, when 
compared to the subjects of the other groups. 
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synchronous videos for the 600ms offset trials, t(38) = 2.53, p = .016 (cohen’s d = .80), but not for 
the 300ms offset trials, t(38) = .99, p = .33. One sample t-tests for the 600ms offset trials confirmed 
that infants in the pre-training condition differed significantly from chance, t(19) = 3.68, p = .002 
(cohen’s d = 1.69), whereas infants in the post-training condition did not , t(19) = -.30, p = .77 
(cohen’s d = -.14). Non-parametric, binomial tests confirmed these findings. More infants in the 
pre-training condition looked longer at 600ms offset synchronous trials than asynchronous trials (p 
= .006), but the number of infants who looked longer at these different types of trials did not differ 
for infants in the post-training condition (p = 1.00). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Observational vs Active Condition 
 
As in the previous analysis, we first examined whether infants differed from chance in the number 
of trials in which they looked longer at synchronous versus asynchronous trials. Infants in 
Experiment Two looked longer at synchronous trials in approximately 51% of trials. A one-sample 
t-test confirmed that this did not differ from chance, t(19) =.11, p = .92 (cohen’s d = .05). A 
binomial test further indicated that the number of infants who looked longer to more synchronous 
than asynchronous trials did not differ (p = 1.0). An independent-samples t-test was used to directly 
compare infants in the post-training condition from Experiment One with infants in Experiment 
Two. Across all trials, infants in these two conditions did not differ in the number of trials in which 
they looked longer at synchronous or asynchronous trials, t(38) = 1.35, p = .19 (cohen’s d = .43). 
Following these analyses, we once again examined the trials with 600ms versus 300ms offsets 
Fig. 10 
T-test comparing the means of control and active condition: 
t(38) = 2.27, p = .029. 
One samples T-test comparing the mean with chance level (.5): 
Control group: t(19) = -.29, p = .78 
Active group: t(19) = 2.73, p = .013 
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separately. One-samples t-tests indicated that infants did not differentiate between synchronous and 
asynchronous trials in either 600ms offset, t(19) = -.69, p = .50 (cohen’s d = -.32) or 300ms offset 
trials, t(19) = .78, p = .45. A binomial test indicated that the number of infants who looked longer at 
more synchronous versus asynchronous trials did not differ in the 600ms offset trials (p = .79). We 
then compared infants’ attention to synchronous versus asynchronous 600ms offset trials across 
post-training infants from Experiment One and observational infants from Experiment Two. An 
independent-samples t-test indicated that infants in these two conditions differed from each other in 
the 600ms offset trials, t(38) = 2.42, p = .02 (cohen’s d = .76). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These data, therefore, confirm our hypothesis. Infants who participated in the active training 
displayed higher sensitivity to the action-effect contingency of the videos, highlighting the key role 
of motor knowledge for musical perception. In other words, the acquired teleomusical acts represent 
the necessary condition to understand the musical object in a meaningful way, given the infants’ 
ability to discern between the synchronous and the asynchronous condition. With regard to this 
point, it is worth noticing that the new motor knowledge acquired (in terms of playing with 
drumsticks on a drum) represents a good example of how CTAs could emerge from mutual 
interaction, active engagement and motivation. The experimenter helped the participant to employ 
strategies in order to meaningfully interact with the explored object. The sensorimotor integration at 
the basis of this process shows that ‘the infant’s nervous system has an endogenous, intrinsic 
dynamic, which generates transient patterns of activity’ (Chemero, 2009, p. 202). These patterns of 
motor behaviour would alter something in the environment; in this case they generate sounds. And 
these sounds ‘impact the infant’s sensorimotor coupling to the niche […], which in turn perturbs the 
Fig. 11 
T-test comparing the means of passive and active condition: 
t(38) = 1.35, p = .19 (not different) 
For 600 ms: t(38) = 2.42, p = .02 (different). 
One samples T-test comparing the mean with chance level (.5): 
Passive group: t(19) =.11, p = .92 
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endogenous dynamics of the infant’s nervous system […] and again and again through the loop’ 
(ibid.). De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) assume that sensorimotor coupling is determined by the 
self-organized structure of a living system. As they put it, in fact: 
 
 
Such a view of cognitive systems as autonomous rejects the traditional poles of seeing 
cognizers as responding to environmental stimuli on the one hand, and as satisfying 
internal demands on the other - both of which fail to give the autonomous agent its 
proper ontological status and subordinate it to a passive role of obedience. A key 
principle of the enactive approach is that the organism is a centre of activity in the 
world. The relation of emergence between novel forms of identity (e.g., integrated 
sensorimotor engagements as emerging from neural, bodily and environmental 
dynamics) is one whereby the coupling between the emergent process and its context 
leads to constraints and modulation of the operation of the underlying levels (ibid., p. 
488).  
 
 
In other terms, to explain infants’ musicality, we would need to integrate the entire system of 
inter(en)active sense-making, without only focusing on brain correlates, sonic environment, 
muscles and so on. Infants provided with adequate training display significant facilitation in 
detecting a synchronous stimulus because perception is a skilful activity involving the whole living 
creature. This perspective on learning and development might remind us of the influential work by 
Esther Thelen (i.e. 1989; 1994). Consider, for example, the following passage by Linda Smith, 
which perfectly describes Thelen’s contribution:    
 
 
According to Thelen, the processes that give rise to motor behaviour are […] the 
repository of knowledge and the driver of developmental change. As phenomenon, they 
also provide the key to the nested dynamics of human development […]. Traditionally, 
psychologists have considered action, learning, and development as distinct processes. 
Thelen argued and showed us in her work how this conceptualization is wrong (Smith, 
2006, p. 89). 
 
 
   Moreover, the fact that - already at 6 months of age - infants are able to distinguish between 
synchronous and asynchronous stimulus because of their newly acquired repertoire, reflects the 
flexibility of the model of musical ontogeny provided in Chapter 5. It would be impossible to 
determine exactly how and when patterns of sensorimotor agency would constitute a truly enactive 
kind of intentionality. My model aimed at emphasising the active role of explorative behaviours in 
light of the 6-to-10-month attentive shifts, rather than providing a definitive structure of the nature 
of musicality. My aim was to provide a biological plausible account of early musical behaviours in 
light of phenomenological and empirical results without postulating any sort of “unified timetable” 
of developmental changes. As Thelen argues 
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at developmental transitions, one or several components of the complex system may act 
as control parameters, including variables in the context or in the environment […]. 
Although all of the elements or subsystems are essential for the systems output, only 
one or a few of the subsystems will trigger transitions, which, in turn, will lead to system-
wide reorganization. This principle helps explain the heterochronic, asynchronous, and 
often nonlinear character of behavioural ontogeny. We commonly observe "pieces" of a 
functional behaviour long before the performance of the mature behaviour. These pieces 
seem to be used out of sequence, in inappropriate or different functional contexts, only 
under certain experimental conditions, or otherwise not properly "connected" with the 
other elements needed for goal-directed activity. Theories that assume that 
developmental change is driven by a unified timetable in the form of maturational 
plans, neurological reorganizations, or cognitive structures have had difficulty accounting 
for both the anticipations of function and regressions. In this systems approach, we 
strongly emphasize that contributing components may mature at different rates. The 
component processes are thus developing in parallel, but not synchronously or 
symmetrically (Thelen, 1989, p. 88).  
 
 
It is quite clear, therefore, that a new approach to music cognition should focus on the processes 
underlying musical behaviour rather than their mere outcome. Otherwise we will lose any chance to 
gain an insight into the phenomenological structures of human musicality. In particular, given that 
no ontogenetic change is pre-wired in the brain of the animal, it seems that what matters for musical 
behaviour is the intentional characterisation of the dynamic processes of sense-making, where goal 
directed patterns of action continuously implement and integrate self-organized properties of the 
system in its openness to the world. As Thelen puts it, in fact, ‘developing systems are stable and 
predictable where their adaptive demands have constrained, through phylogenetic mechanisms, their 
range of solutions […]. The physical and social context of the developing animal is more than just a 
supportive frame; it is an essential component of the assembled system. In such systems, new forms 
arise when the stability of the system is disrupted when random fluctuations are amplified by the 
scaling of a critical component’ (ibid., p. 114).  
In light of these considerations, it seems that the boundaries between brain, body and environment 
should be reconsidered, hence admitting a paradigm where the body-brain-environment nexus would 
orchestrate the inter-relational, active, and sensorimotor dynamics of human musicality. Music 
cognition, in these terms, is a distributed category that reaches out beyond the boundaries of skull and 
skin. After having established the core of my proposal with regards to infants’ musicality and the basic 
forms of musical sense-making, it would be interesting to see how this model would work in adults. The 
next section, therefore, describes another experiment with a population of adult musicians and non-
musicians, engaging in learning atonal melodies under different conditions. 
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6.4 - Cross-Modal facilitation in learning atonal melodies 
 
 
In this study, Renee Timmers and I29 investigated the role of motor learning in the memorization 
of four different musical excerpts for piano. Pianists, other musicians (non-pianists) and non-
musicians have been asked to familiarize with four different short piano melodies under different 
conditions: “playing condition” (performing the melodies on a keyboard), “silent tapping condition” 
(performing the melodies on a piano without any auditory feedback) and “seeing condition” 
(watching a video with a performer playing the melodies). Our idea was to examine the role of 
motor learning in basic musical tasks.  
The audio-motor integration underlying musical experience has increasingly received attention 
over the last few decades. As shown by Stefan and colleague (2005), the ‘mere observation of 
movements leads to the formation of a lasting specific memory trace in movement representations 
that resembled that elicited by physical training’ (ibid., p. 9344). The relationship between 
perception and action can be intended more as perception-for-action, considering, in the realm of 
music, the heard, read or played melody ‘in terms of the intentional, hierarchically organized 
sequences of expressive motor acts behind the signal’ (Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009, p. 492). 
The implications for musical learning, however, remain still not fully clear. How this paradigm can 
improve our understanding on the intentional relationship between a musical subject and a musical 
object? Is the musicians’ memory instrument-specific? And how is non-musicians’ memory 
affected by music-directed actions’ observation?  
It is already well known that auditory–motor associations acquired while learning to play a piece 
can be determinant for later auditory recognition (Brown & Palmer 2012), but most of the relevant 
literature focuses on a population of well trained musicians engaged in expertise-related tasks with 
their own instrument. In their study on musical learning, indeed, Brown and Palmer (2012) argued 
that ‘motor learning can aid performers’ auditory recognition of music beyond auditory learning 
alone, and that motor learning is influenced by individual abilities in mental imagery and by 
variation in acoustic features’ (ibid., p. 567). However, the authors considered only a population of 
expert pianists, thus referring to subjects whose musical-directed motor vocabulary is already 
partially constituted.  
The present study, therefore, aimed to investigate the constitution of a musical-motor vocabulary 
of acts, comparing in the same piano-based task pianists, musicians (non-pianists) and non-
musicians to see not only whether the motor system engagement can be similar in musicians and 
non-musicians when the task requirements are musically relevant (Zatorre et al., 2007), but also to 
understand in which terms the musicians’ intentionality can be intended as cross-modal. 
Considering that many empirical evidences (e.g. Lotze et al., 2003; Kristeva et al., 2003; Zatorre & 
Halpern, 2005) show that musical imaginary and perception are strictly linked, being underlied by 
the same phenomenological structure and neural correlates, a crucial issue concerns the topography 
of this cross-modal feature of musical intentionality. Namely, we wanted to investigate the concrete 
modalities in which musical subjects with different musical expertise engage with musical objects. 
We therefore asked the participants to familiarize with four atonal30 melodies in three different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Schiavio, A., & Timmers, R. (in preparation). Cross-modal facilitation in learning atonal melodies. 
30 We used atonal music in order to avoid any facilitation in remembering the melodic fragments with the help of the 
common tonal rules. 
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conditions with diverse degrees of motor engagement (playing, playing without any auditory 
feedback and only seeing the hand of a performer playing), testing their ability to recognize these 
melodies among different ones. We expected the subjects’ motor expertise to show its advantages 
beyond other learning modalities. In particular, we hypothesised that the strong coupling between 
auditory and motor information would allow the participants who performed the melodies on the 
piano (with both auditory and motor feedback) to remember them with more accuracy than subjects 
involved in other learning modalities. For this reason, we also expected an advantage for pianists in 
familiarizing with the stimuli.   
 
• Participants:  
 
One hundred and twenty healthy adult volunteers (mean age = 26.725) were asked to take part in 
this study. In order to recruit participants, an announcement was placed in the Music Department of 
the University of Sheffield and on the Internet. The population examined was divided into three 
groups, according to their musical expertise. Musicians who did not play the piano (A, n=40, mean 
age: 27.75), and pianists (B, n=40, mean age: 27.75) were required to have at least 5 years of 
advanced musical training. Non-musicians (C, n=40, mean age: 24.675) were required to have no 
previous experience in musical training or performance. Musicians who took part into the 
experiment had a different background, having studied classic music, rock, metal, folk, or jazz. In 
particular, besides 40 pianists (group B), the population of musicians (group A) includes 40 subjects 
who studied the following instruments: guitar (n=16), voice (n=9), violin (n=3), clarinet (n=3), 
drums (n=2), sax (n=2), trumpet (n=1), cello (n=1), oboe (n=1), accordion (n=1), French horn 
(n=1). The mean of the years of training for all the musicians was 12.83.(pianists = 16.175; other 
musicians = 9.5).  
 
• Materials 
Subjects listened to the stimuli through headphones at a comfortable volume. Participants involved 
in playing and silent tapping conditions performed on an Evolution (model MK 44-9C) keyboard 
without weighted keys. Several videos have been recorded in order to assist the participants in the 
tasks: for the silent tapping and playing conditions two videos have been recorded (1 for right-
handed participants and 1 for left-handed). The videos provided the volunteers with all the relevant 
instructions for placing their hand on the keyboard and perform the melodies following a 
representation of the keyboard with highlighted keys on the screen (see figure 12). For the seeing 
condition, volunteers have been only asked to watch a video with the performer’s hand playing the 
melodies. The videos (one for right-handed subjects and one meant for left-handed participants) 
have been recorded with a video camera placed above the piano, giving an aerial view of the 
performer’s hand (see figure 13).  
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The stimuli of the experiment include (i) 4 short atonal piano melodies and (ii) their variations - 
for a total of 16 melodies (4 correct melodies / 12 variations). The stimuli have been performed by a 
professional pianist and recorded at the Department of Music of the University of Sheffield using 
Cubase®. The 4 original piano melodies have been taken (entirely or with slight modifications) 
from C. Ives compositions for voice and piano (1922) and last less than 15 seconds each. The 
melodies are made of 5 notes, allowing the participants to use a single hand position on the 
keyboard, pressing one key with each finger. The four main stimuli are the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 
Playing and silent 
tapping condition; 
higlighted keys to 
assist the playing 
task 
Fig. 13 
Seeing condition: 
aerial view of the 
performer’s hand 
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The other stimuli are melodic or rhythmic variations of the original melodies, providing a total of 
16 stimuli (4 corrects and 12 incorrect. The next figure shows an example of how a melodic 
fragment has been varied. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Procedure: 
 
A specific learning trial was set up for all the conditions: firstly, all the participants listened once 
to all the stimuli at a confortable volume. Afterwards they went through their specific learning 
condition. According to the relevant task, each group was divided into four subgroups, each of them 
made by 10 volunteers. Subgroup 1 was involved in a playing task, subgroup 2 in a silent tapping 
condition, participants of subgroup 3 had to watch a video and subgroup 4 was the control group. 
Participants were comfortably seated in front of a keyboard, which was placed by the screen of a 
computer. For conditions 1 and 2 (playing and silent tapping) participants listened to one melody 
before performing it on the keyboard. This process is repeated two times for each melody. For 
condition 3 (seeing), subjects listened to one melody before watching the performer playing 
(without any auditory feedback) it. Again, as for the other conditions, after two repetitions of the 
same stimulus the video presents another melody to familiarize with. For the control condition (4) 
participants are only asked to listen to the original melodies and to go straight to the recognition 
phase. The melodies were always presented randomly for a total of eight trials (two for each 
melody). In other words, the experiment is divided into two main parts. In the first one subjects are 
asked to listen to the four atonal piano melodies. After listening to each melody the volunteers will 
perform a different task, according to his/her subgroup: 
 
 
• Sub-group 1 à every participant plays on the piano the melodies 
• Sub-group 2 à every participant imagines to play the melodies, through a silent tapping 
performance on a mute keyboard. 
Fig. 14 
The four stimuli used for the experiment 
Fig. 15 
first variation of Stimulus 4 
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• Sub-group 3 à every participant watches a video with a pianist’s hand playing the same 
melodies.  
• Sub-group 4 à participants are asked only to listen to the melodies. 
        
 
   After 10 minutes from the first part, participants were asked to recognize the same melodies from 
a set of different stimuli. A computer-based questionnaire was given for the volunteer to respond Y 
(yes) or N (no) after each stimulus.  
 
 
6.5 - Results and discussion 
 
 
A univariate analysis was conducted with learning condition and musical training as between-
subjects variables. The dependent variable was the mean correct response. This analysis showed a 
significant main effect of condition (F(3,108)=5.466, p=.002, r=.363). There was no significant 
effect of musicianship (F(2,108)=0.235, p=.791), nor a significant interaction between musicianship 
and condition (F(6,108)=0.091, p=.997). A pairwise posthoc test was conducted using Bonferroni 
corrections for multiple comparisons to investigate the differences between the conditions. This 
analysis showed that the mean correct scores were lower for the control condition than the playing 
(p = .05) and silent tapping (p = .002) conditions. It also revealed that the scores in the silent 
tapping condition were marginally better than in the seeing condition (p = .053). The means per 
condition are given in Figure 16.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16 
Mean of the correct results per condition.  
Note that no significance difference was recorder between groups. 
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The results show a difference between the subjects of subgroups 3 and 4 (seeing and control) and 
subgroups 1 and 2 (playing and silent tapping). It is interesting to note that the discrepancy between 
musicians and non-musicians in providing correct answers (recognizing the correct melodies and 
naming the wrong ones as incorrect) is not significant. These data suggest that playing music or 
silent tapping gives the participants a greater chance of learning the melodies, regardless of their 
musical expertise. A standard interpretation of these results would be in terms of memory’s 
facilitation elicited by multi-modal engagement with the musical stimuli. Basically, the more 
modalities you are engaged with, the better your memory will perform when trying to recognize 
musical fragments previously learned. This is certainly true. However, a more speculative 
interpretation is possible, without any contradiction with this more traditional observation. What 
changes from the classical interpretation is the nature of the modalities involved. Instead of 
perceiving, coding, storing and representing, we could think of these results in more dynamical 
terms, where what truly matters for sense-making is the active sensorimotor engagement with the 
melodic fragments proposed. Indeed, according to the intentional account of musical experience 
previous provided, these results are not surprising. In order to make sense of the melodies, and then 
to recognise them among others, a subject needs to be motorically linked to the musical stimuli. The 
newly acquired motor knowledge, gained through playing and silent tapping conditions, provides 
the participants with a stronger modality to engage with the musical environment, above conceptual 
conscious reflection.  
With this is mind, note that these data cannot fit into the traditional paradigms of musical 
cognition, where musicians, thanks to their knowledge of musical structures, will be significantly 
better than non-musicians - using strategies such as anticipation and grouping to facilitate their 
understanding of the excerpt. With regards to this point, someone would argue that musicians 
would not actually have any advantage, given the atonal nature of the stimuli. For example, it would 
be unclear how they would use the theoretical knowledge that comes from traditional Western 
music. However, the musicians’ familiarity with musical structures in general, and with learning or 
listening strategies in particular, would have certainly played a key role in the task. On the contrary, 
despite the basic nature of the stimuli, what seems to matter for musical sense-making is the motor 
intentionality at the basis of the mutual co-determination between musical subjects and objects, and 
not abstract theoretical abilities.   
At this point, however, a clarification seems necessary. Mark Rowlands (2006) assumes that the 
movement of the pianist’s fingers, while playing, is to be considered as pre-intentional, as the 
performer is not aware of the actual position of each finger on the keyboard. According to 
Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), however, although an expert pianist will not display a detailed 
awareness of everything she is doing while playing, if we would stop her in the middle of the 
performance and we would ask her whether her middle finger was playing a C-Sharp, she would 
certainly reply correctly. So, as their argument goes, the pianist’s movements are intentional acts. 
Although I do consider these movements as intentional, I disagree with both Rowlands and 
Gallagher and Zahavi’s interpretations. There is no need to postulate any kind of intermediate level 
between non-intentional and intentional acts, given that not-being-aware cannot be a coherent 
category to distinguish among them. As previously shown, in fact, the Mirror Mechanism’s 
literature clearly highlights pre-conceptual and unmediated resonances as the prerogative of motor 
intentionality. Therefore, the movements of pianist’s hand on the keyboard are intentional not 
because she is aware of each finger’s position (I highly doubt that a performer would be actually 
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aware of each finger’s position) but because her actions are goal-directed, regardless of her 
awareness.  
The goal of a musician’s set of actions is not to put each finger in the right position. Rather it is 
playing the chord, using the right dynamic, the phrasing the motif, and so forth. Otherwise, the 
segmentation of actions in mere kinematic movements would substantially compromise the fluidity 
of executions the characterise most of the musicians. To my mind, this experiment shows that 
musicians and non-musicians are engaged with the musical object without recruiting high-level, 
theoretical knowledge. Otherwise musicians (pianists and non-pianists) would have performed 
much better, when compared to non-musicians. In other words, the layers of the sense’s 
stratifications of the stimuli are best understood in motor rather than conceptual terms. Many non-
musicians, while engaging in the playing or silent tapping condition, were completely unaware of 
the position of their hand on the keyboard (because of their lack of knowledge of the keyboard 
itself, and because their attention was more focused on performing correctly non-familiar 
movements). However, since their results were not significantly different from musicians, we could 
conclude stating that their intentional relationship with the musical object displayed the same 
structure and phenomenological character of the group of pianists and other performers.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion. Towards a post-Cartesian 
cognitive science of music 
 
 
Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning, and we cannot do or say 
anything without its acquiring a name in history. 
 
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
 
The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process: how does 
it come about that this does not come into the considerations of our ordinary life? 
 
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
 
 
Traditional music cognition, in its commitment to various forms of Cartesianism, has 
presupposed and defended the integrity of boundaries that may not hold up. This work, therefore, 
aimed to reconsider dichotomies and assumptions derived from the Cartesian metaphysics, 
proposing a different interpretation of human musicality, in light of the enactive approach to 
cognition. The openness of an embodied agent towards her social environment, the active, affective 
engagement underlining mutual forms of communications are seen in my dissertation as crucial 
points for criticizing these long term dichotomies (between internal and external, input and output, 
brain and body, subjects and objects). The notion of musical intentionality here offered intended to 
overcome such a dualistic stance by emphasising the direct, motor-based, coupling that links 
musical subjects and musical objects.  
I began this dissertation in Chapter 1 highlighting the continuity between Cartesian tradition and 
disembodied cognitive science. This commitment gives rise to problematic perspectives about the 
nature of mentality and fails to integrate the role of the environment and of the body for cognition. 
Shortly, I have argued that cognitivism makes a double mistake. First, it does not provide any kind 
of accurate phenomenological explanation of musicality. Second, its presuppositions are flawed, 
being immersed in an isolationist analysis that cannot coherently reflect the active and articulated 
dynamics underlining music cognition. 
Similarly, as I have pointed out in Chapter 2, current trends in music cognition suffer from the 
same “Cartesian anxiety”, postulating dichotomies between inner and outer, input and output that 
would eventually portray music and musical experience as something substantially avulsed from the 
concrete practices in which they emerge. I gave arguments against the common perspective in 
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musical research about the modularity of the musical mind, defending the claim the music, rather 
than being biologically pre-wired in brain modules, is ontogenetically and intentionally constituted. 
The development of this alternative view, based on phenomenological and embodied traditions 
was provided in Chapter 3, where I also introduced the fundamental notion of musical intentionality 
in light of the discovery of a Mirror Mechanism. The same section also explored the conceptual 
geography of the enactive and embodied approaches to human cognition, dealing extensively with 
empirical perspectives (i.e. the application of dynamic system theory).  
In Chapter 4 I provided a detailed analysis of one of the most famous books on embodied music 
cognition, showing that some leftovers from Cartesianism are still present in the current debate on 
embodiment. In this section I have argued that only a full integration of mirroring and co-
constitutive processes could provide a biologically plausible interpretation of the basic forms of 
musical intentionality, providing a reconceptualization of musical affordances. In particular, 
considering the activation of mirror neurons as the enabling condition of enactive perception and 
sense-making allows us to avoid the problematic notion of simulation.  
Chapter 5 faced the challenge to see in detail how this paradigm would work, considering 
infants’ musical behaviours as the starting point for discussion. In this section I have emphasized 
the role of embodied and enactive dynamics at the basis of human musicality, showing that the 
active exploratory behaviours play a cardinal role in the dynamic interplay between cognizers and 
musical environment.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I presented two empirical studies, in order to corroborate the previous 
assumptions with regard to infants and adult musical learning. The enactive approach to music 
cognition I have presented, to put it shortly, holds that human musicality is the active engagement 
that links embodied agents and the world of sound. It emerges in circular, interactive, sensorimotor 
and goal-directed dynamics.  
From these chapters it emerges that musical sense-making is not a passive representation of 
elements of the musical environment. Rather, it is a process of bringing forth, or enacting, a 
subject’s own domain of meaning through sensorimotor knowledge. This view is best understood 
by considering the musical niche as a place of affordances, defined not as fully given categories, but 
as properties of the intentional relationship itself - hence avoiding any risk of objectifying the role 
of the environment. Musical affordances, being constituted by the circular interplay between 
musical subjects and musical objects, show the direct and intrinsically motor fashion of the 
mutuality of world and embodied subjectivity. Another very important issue is the analysis of the 
actual motor behaviours defining the sensorimotor patterns of interactions. From the detailed focus 
on infants’ musicality, I have thus developed the notion of teleomusical acts, musical-directed sets 
of actions at the basis of musical expertise. These acts do play a fundamental role not only in music 
performance, but also during perception. In fact, given that mirroring processes represent the 
enabling condition of sense-making, teleomusical acts would constitute the subject’s motor 
vocabulary, giving rise to the processes of mutual interplay at the basis of perceptual activity, 
intended as exploration.  
In light of these considerations, my work has implications not only for music cognition but also 
for the broader field of cognitive science. While investigating human musicality in terms of 
embodied action and mutual inter(en)action is a significant step forward from more traditional 
methodological paradigms in musical research, my proposal to integrate the enactive standpoint 
with the study of goal-directed (chains of) actions, represents a new contribution for the studies of 
mind and subjectivity in general. Although many scholars have already proposed a paradigm shift 
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in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive science, focusing on the concrete activity of the agents 
in the world, a precise characterization of the type of action relevant for sense-making has rarely 
been addressed. This approach, broadly speaking, aims to mediate between the radical view of 
embodiment posited by enaction - by questioning the plausibility of neural correlates of musical 
consciousness - and the neuroscience of Mirror Neurons. Taking into account the direct, interactive, 
reciprocity of embodied agents, this standpoint advocates a reconsideration of musical learning and 
music cognition in general.  
The positive part of the dissertation, can be summarized through the following points: 
 
 
(i) Music is an intentional object of experience 
 
 
The core of my argument is based on the phenomenological notion of “intentionality”, a term 
which refers to the property of consciousness to be always directed towards an object. Music, 
therefore, is an object of intentionality because there is always a subjectivity directed towards it. We 
can listen to music, imagining music, playing music, analysing music, and so forth, and we cannot 
have music, or a musical experience, without being in a relation with it. Considering music as an 
intentional object provides a significant step forward from traditional research, mainly because 
under this characterization, music becomes inseparable from the subjects who are experiencing 
music. In this sense, music is not an abstract, isolated, category but rather a complex phenomenon, 
which manifests itself only in its relation with human subjectivity. This relation, called “musical 
intentionality”, represents the main premise of my argument.  
 
 
(ii) The main feature of musical intentionality is, for agents, to give sense to a (musical) object. 
 
 
Musical intentionality defines the relation between music and experiencing subjects. But what is 
the nature of this relation? After analysing phenomenological, neuroscientific, and musical 
literature, my argument proposes that, as an intentional object of experience, music is an object of 
significance, value, meaning and emotion. But because we cannot consider music as an independent 
category from the subjects of experience (first premise) it seems that this imposition of meaning is 
part of the relation itself, and not a separate process. In other words, to experience something 
already means to give sense to that something. A subject is always attributing a meaning to the 
object of experience, as there is no experience without significance. Experience is sense-making. 
 
 
(iii) This sense-giving ability is based on the power of action of the body. 
 
 
Meaning attribution does not require any high-level, cognitive, subordination. As Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) famously asserted, in fact, the body is the ultimate source of significance. We can make 
sense of the world in which we are embedded and its objects thanks to our embodied ability to 
generate patterns of meaningful actions. We are always immediately open to the world without 
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postulating representative mechanisms at the basis of our meaningful engagement with it. 
Experiencing music, before and below any conceptualization, is an embodied experience, where 
bodies and modalities of action provide a horizon of possible ways of understanding and making 
sense of the intentional object, given the motor expertise of the subjects. This final point is 
corroborated by the neuroscientific evidence of a mirror mechanism for action understanding in 
humans, as it is involved in music experience (Overy & Molnar-Szacaks 2000). Although it still 
remains controversial how exactly, and to what extent, neuronal processes would participate in 
meaning attribution, it seems clear that the motor repertoire of a subject, in terms of her ability to 
play an instrument, underlies a basic imposition of meaning, prior to any cognitive or intellectual 
processing. Experiencing music, at a basic and automatic level, is a sense-giving process (second 
premise) immersed in the dynamics of action. 
 
 
(iv) A music-directed repertoire of motor acts plays the key role for musical experience. 
 
 
The enabling condition of musical sense-making is represented by the mirroring activity, 
which allows an agent to attribute a meaning to the musical object, thanks to the subject’s degree of 
motor knowledge (third premise). But if brains play only a part of musical sense-making, then it 
seems we should investigate the nature of musical experience from a perspective that takes into 
account the embodied dynamism of the experiencing subjects. The decentralization of mental 
processes I proposed leads the study of human musicality towards the active modalities of 
embodied inter(en)action with the musical environment. I thus individuated two sets of musical-
directed actions at the basis of our ability to make sense of music: original teleomusical acts (OTA) 
and constituted teleomusical acts (CTA). While OTAs can be easily witnessed in infants’ 
exploratory behaviours, CTAs reflect the mastery of the specific goal-directed chains of action 
involved in the production of musical contexts, being constituent of the development of musical 
expertise. When an infant autonomously explores the environment and her attention is captured by 
the sound properties of an object, she might employ a specific goal-directed motor behaviour to 
generate (and to modify) sounds. She can, for example, continuously hit an object in order to play 
with the sounds and even generate basic rhythmic, dynamic, or melodic variations. When this kind 
of activity exhibits clear goal-directedness (that is: the infant is employing specific actions in order 
to generate and play with sounds), then the actions used by the infant can be named original 
teleomusical acts. As the infant grows older and the ability to master these actions improves, she 
could perform more sophisticated patterns of goal-directed sensorimotor activity, perhaps 
associating different OTAs without compromising the fluidity of her movements. This is for evident 
for adult musicians, who can easily display non-associative motor behaviours while playing. When 
for example a professional guitarist explores the dynamic possibilities of the instrument to increase 
the tension of a given theme, she will not focus on the position of each finger independently. Her 
motor expertise, rather, allows her to intervene and modify the piece’s dynamics through a series of 
coordinated movements, without unnecessary high-level, intermediate, speculations. Similarly, an 
infant exploring an object, as she acquires enough motor expertise, develops greater ability to reach 
a particular musical goal without focusing on single movements. For example she could use a stick, 
or both hands, in order to create sounds experiencing grasping the tool or coordinating the hands as 
contributing components of the goal-directed musical actions and not mere kinematics per se. 
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Although at the beginning she might encounter difficulties and she might focus on single actions 
(holding the stick, individuating the surface to generate sounds, drumming) after some time she will 
be able to construe and perform basic sets of actions with greater accuracy and fluidity, 
individuating a musical goal (the goal of the set of action is “playing with sounds” rather than 
“holding the stick”). Both OTAs and CTAs, therefore, are constituent of human musicality by 
shaping the degree of meaning attribution, being part of the circular interplay between perception 
and action that is central for the enactive approach to cognition.  
 
 
(v) Music cognition is not in the head.  
 
 
Musical intentionality is dynamically modulated by the musical object (which provides the 
agent with a horizon of motor possibilities to interact with - defined as affordances) and the musical 
subject (which makes sense of the object through her sensorimotor knowledge). It follows that 
experiencing music is a process of codetermination between subjects and objects, where brains, 
bodies and environmental features dynamically interact through circular sensorimotor loops. In 
light if these considerations it seems that musical sense-making is a process that extends beyond the 
boundaries of skull and skin, being constituted by embodied and embedded forms of mutual 
determination.  
	  
Implications 
	  
• Musical education - from early infancy - should focus more on the constitution of a 
vocabulary of motor acts, by investigating motivations, participatory musical practices and 
exploratory behaviours. The development of musical expertise is an emergent phenomenon 
constituted by embedded and embodied forms of interactions between a self-organized 
living system and its (musical) environment and not a mere solipsistic event.  
 
• Further research in music cognition should assume that the very bases of human musicality 
are motor in nature and the taken-for-granted division between internal mental 
representations and pre-given external world should be therefore ruled out, as it cannot 
coherently integrate the feedback of the organism’s action to cognition. 
 
 
Ending a thesis without the classic inflammatory claim, however, might be not entirely 
satisfactory. Hence, consider the second implication from the summary of my proposal. If further 
research in music cognition will seriously consider the very bases of human musicality as motor in 
nature, then music therapy (e.g. in Parkinson’s disease) might exploit the role of the chains of 
teleomusical acts to design rehabilitation paradigms for improving patients’ motility. In this sense, 
the processes of sensorimotor integration described will improve not only our understanding of 
human musicality or musical learning, but also other aspects of human mind and subjectivity. In 
particular, it would be interesting to see (i) whether musical training can enhance the ability to 
engage in fine motor skills’ tasks and (ii) whether the training effect is, for instance, modulated by 
single or collective musical practice. The results obtained might be beneficial for implementing the 
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rehabilitative paradigms for patients with motor skills’ deficit, providing further evidences for the 
sensorimotor primacy in musical perception (or, in general, musical sense-making).   
The theory and explanatory strategies I have employed throughout this work come from different 
but partly overlapping frameworks: Enactivism, Phenomenology, Dynamic System Theory. The 
original interpretation of enactivism that I have endorsed derives not only from its application to the 
realm of musical experience, but also from the integration in the dynamics of sense-making of the 
Mirror Mechanism for action understanding, seen as its enabling condition. In this dissertation I 
have not demonstrated that the enactive approach is the only paradigm able to shed light upon the 
nature of human musicality. It is just a promising - and according to my insights, necessary - step 
forward towards a better biological and phenomenological description of musical behaviours, which 
is likely to provide greater explanatory value when compared to classical cognitivism. 
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